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Introduction
The peculiarity of the European Monetary Union is that member countries are ﬁscally independent
but they share the same currency since January 1st 1999, when they locked their national currencies
together by ﬁxing their exchange rates against each other. The monetary union implied the creation
of a unique central bank for the Euro area and the national central banks had to transfer many of
their powers to the European Central Bank (ECB henceforth) that became responsible for conducting
monetary policy.
The objective of the ECB is price stability in the Euro area. In conducting monetary policy towards
the achievement of this goal the ECB has to face several issues. The main problem is due to the fact
that the implemented policy measures might not be optimal for all countries if they are in diﬀerent
phases of the business cycle or they have diﬀerent fundamentals and economic structures. These last
aspects are related also to the issue of the monetary policy transmission mechanism: even though a
policy action is optimal for all members, its ultimate eﬀects might diﬀer across countries because of
diﬀerent propagation mechanisms. These issues have been extensively studied by both theoretical and
empirical literature.
After 2008, with the spread of the ﬁnancial and sovereign debt crisis, the short-term rate turned out
not to be anymore suﬃcient to achieve price stability and the ECB had to intervene with unconventional
measures and macro-prudential instruments in order to maintain ﬁnancial stability. The deep changes
in the economic environment brought about by the crisis did not shift away the attention from the
original issues of optimal monetary policy and its transmission mechanism. Instead, they gained new
attention as it became necessary to design new monetary policy interventions and study their eﬀects
across countries.
This thesis wants to contribute to this literature analysing the eﬀects of unconventional measures,
the conduct of monetary policy in the Euro area and the eﬀects of the crisis on the economic structures
of member countries.
The eﬀects of ECB unconventional measures on government bond yields
The ﬁrst chapter deals with the eﬀects of unconventional monetary policy measures implemented by
the European Central Bank since 2007 to cope with the ﬁnancial and sovereign debt crisis. These
measures had diﬀerent scopes but their implementation was aimed at restoring a correct monetary policy
transmission mechanism so that assessing their actual propagation mechanism is of crucial interest. In
particular, the chapter focuses on government bond yields in secondary markets, as they became the
9
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direct expression of the sovereign debt crisis in the Euro area, and it deals with two aspects of the
transmission mechanism: the ﬁrst one is the expectational channel and the second one is the eﬀect of
liquidity injections. Both analyses are based on event-study techniques.
The analysis of policy announcements shows that the expectational channel actually shaped mar-
ket movements. The announcements that produced the most relevant eﬀects were the ones about the
Covered Bond Purchase Programmes, the Securities Markets Programme, the Outright Monetary Trans-
action programme and the rumors about the lengthening in the maturity of LTROs in early December
2011.
The analysis of liquidity injections (LTROs) considers 10-year government bond yields of 10 Euro-
area countries and 6 extra Euro-area countries and it allows to evaluate if there had been positive
spillovers from the banking to sovereign debt. Results show that the unfolding of the European sovereign
debt crisis completely changed the impact of liquidity injections as they led to a rise in interest rate
spreads for highly indebted countries. This ﬁnding raises some issues about the eﬀectiveness of monetary
policy during unconventional times especially when market tensions are not due to monetary issues like
the lack of liquidity but rather they are caused by ﬁscal issues like debt sustainability. In this context
liquidity injections had the eﬀect of exacerbating rather than mitigating market tensions.
The ECB monetary policy reaction function
In order to assess the conduct of monetary policy in the Euro area since the beginning of the EMU
and also considering the crisis period, the second chapter estimates a monetary policy reaction function
for the ECB over the period 1999-2013. The reaction function features time-varying coeﬃcients and
heteroskedasticity so to allow for diﬀerent responses depending on actual economic conditions.
To better understand the behaviour of the ECB, this chapter considers several diﬀerent speciﬁcations
for the monetary policy reaction function. The baseline speciﬁcation is a Taylor rule where the monetary
authority is considered to target the current annual inﬂation rate and the output gap. Then the monetary
policy reaction function is extended by adding other variables that might have been considered by the
ECB, namely M3 growth, a commodity price index, the real exchange rate, a government bond yield
spread index, a stock market volatility index and bank loans.
The results for the two main variables, i.e. output gap and inﬂation, show that the ECB stabilized
output mainly during the peak of both the dot-com bubble in 2001 and the crisis in 2009. Instead
the coeﬃcient of inﬂation is rarely signiﬁcant and only over the period 1999-2001 and in 2007. Among
the other variables considered, only the government bond yield spread index and bank loans have been
found to be able to signiﬁcantly explain the conduct of monetary policy. Overall, in line with the related
literature, I found evidence of a shift in the conduct of monetary policy during the crisis as from 2008
on the ECB increased again its sensitivity towards output but it also started to track new variables like
sovereign bond yield spreads and bank loans.
The eﬀects of the crisis on cross-country heterogeneity in the Euro area
The last chapter studies the eﬀects of the recent economic crisis on the macroeconomic developments in
the Euro area focusing on cross-country heterogeneity. The aim is not to study the the crisis mechanism
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but rather to provide a better understanding of what happened during the crisis in light of historical
structural macroeconomic relationships.
The type of heterogeneity considered here is the asymmetry in macroeconomic fundamentals gener-
ated by the crisis shock. The focus is on Euro-area aggregates and the four biggest European economies,
namely France, Germany, Italy and Spain, as they also well represent the diﬀerent macroeconomic de-
velopments occurred during the crisis. The analysis is based on a conditional forecast exercise from mid
2007 on by which Euro-area variables are predicted conditioning on the actual path of some US variables
which are intended to capture the crisis shock. By comparing the forecast with the actual path of the
variables it is possible to evaluate whether, given the eﬀects of the crisis in US, pre-crisis structural
macroeconomic relationship are able to explain Euro-area economic developments from 2008 on. When
this is not the case, it means that either a structural break or an idiosyncratic shock occurred.
Results show that the eﬀects of the crisis have been much more heterogeneous than what implied
by structural relationships and the crisis shock. The conditional forecast of single-country variables
shows that their evolution is much more less predictable than the one of Euro-area aggregate variables
suggesting that either a structural break or a strong idiosyncratic shock aﬀected the Euro area after
2008. Finally, the sovereign debt crisis by itself seems not to be able to explain neither business-cycle
and inﬂation heterogeneity, nor the recent recession and economic slack.
11

Chapter 1
An Event-Study Analysis of ECB
Unconventional Monetary Policy
Measures
1.1 Introduction
This chapter aims to evaluate the eﬀects of the recent unconventional monetary policy measures imple-
mented by the European Central Bank on government bond yields using an event-study approach.
Unconventional measures became necessary since the main European policy rate (interest rate on
the main reﬁnancing operations) had already been lowered to almost zero and this raises a large number
of issues concerning the conduct of monetary policy. First of all, when the nominal rate is low it is
likely that the real short term rate diﬀers from the value necessary to ensure stable prices. In particular,
if inﬂation expectations are negative, the real rate will be higher than needed while when inﬂation is
expected to be high the real interest rate becomes negative. A second issue concerns the interest rate
rule that loses its eﬀectiveness when the nominal rate reaches the zero level. This in turns puts forward
the problem of how to conduct monetary policy when the main instrument of the central bank is not
anymore at its disposal.
Bernanke and Reinhart (2004) analyse three types of actions to overcome the policy problems con-
nected to the zero-lower bound. A communicative strategy should be used to inﬂuence expectations over
the future path of interest rates and inﬂation but then the central bank should also directly intervene
by expanding and changing the composition of its balance sheet to provide liquidity and to aﬀect yields.
These three actions have been actually implemented by several central banks around the world to
respond to the ﬁnancial crisis.
This work deals with the eﬀectiveness of such extraordinary measures in particular on European
government bond yields.
The reason why I focus on government bond yields is that, starting from the second half of 2009,
the ﬁnancial crisis, which as for then was mainly a liquidity crisis of the banking sector, spilled over
13
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involving the public ﬁnance of Euro-area countries. Therefore, the ECB had to face a double problem:
ensure the correct functioning of the credit market and mitigate tensions on government debt markets.
I use an event-study methodology: I focus on the days surrounding policy announcements and policy
actions because it allows me to capture the direct eﬀects on bond yields. By studying yield changes on
a day-by-day basis I can sweep aside the macroeconomic context as it is assumed to be ﬁxed in a short
period of time. Therefore signiﬁcant changes in yields around some key dates can be attributed to the
eﬀects of policy news and interventions on markets.
The literature analysing the eﬀects of ECB interventions is mainly based on the estimation of struc-
tural macroeconomic models. For example, the papers by Lenza, Pill, and Reichlin (2010), Giannone,
Lenza, Pill, and Reichlin (2011, 2012), and Giannone, Lenza, and Reichlin (2012) aim at studying
the monetary policy transmission mechanism, the money market functioning and credit ﬂows. They
study the eﬀect of unconventional monetary policy by estimating a VAR model on pre-crisis data and
assume that the macroeconomic relationships remained unchanged during the crisis to simulate how
the economy would have evolved without any policy intervention. The evaluation of the eﬀects of the
ECB measures is then possible by comparing the simulated paths of variables with actual data. Also
Peersman (2011) studies the eﬀect of non-standard policy measures in a VAR framework, where uncon-
ventional measures are identiﬁed as innovations in credit supply caused by monetary policy actions that
are orthogonal to the policy rate, ﬁnding that their macroeconomic consequences are similar to those
of a traditional interest rate innovation even though they work through diﬀerent transmission channels.
Finally, Gambacorta, Hofmann, and Peersman (2012) and Darracq Pariés and De Santis (2013) explore
the eﬀects of unconventional interventions of the ECB in a panel-VAR framework. On the other hand,
the event-study approach is used by Altavilla, Giannone, and Lenza (2014), Falagiarda and Reitz (2013)
and Szczerbowicz (2014).
The work is organized as follows. Section 1.2 summarizes the recent interventions of the European
Central Bank to curb the ﬁnancial crisis. Section 1.3 reviews the literature about the event-study
methodology. Section 1.4 analyses the eﬀects of the ECB announcements regarding its unconventional
measures on government bond yields at diﬀerent maturities of ten Euro-area countries. Section 1.5
presents a panel analysis to study the direct eﬀects of liquidity injections (represented by six LTROs
with very long maturity) on 10-year maturity government bonds of ten Euro-area countries and on six
extra-Euro countries. Section 1.6 concludes.
1.2 The History of Unconventional Monetary Policy
Since October 2008 the European Central Bank started to implement non-standard policy measures to
provide the ﬁnancial sector with extra-sources of liquidity.
In normal times, weekly main reﬁnancing operations are the ECB's main policy instrument to provide
liquidity to the banking sector because the amount allotted is not predetermined but depends on the bids
of the banks, i.e. on liquidity demand. On the other hand, longer-term reﬁnancing operations (LTROs)
are conducted through competitive tenders in which each bank demands an amount of liquidity and
oﬀers an interest rate to remunerate the central bank: the total amount of liquidity to be allotted
is predetermined and only the bids at higher interest rates are satisﬁed. In implementing the recent
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unconventional monetary policy measures the ECB completely overturned the scope of LTROs, which
have been conducted with ﬁxed rate tender and full allotment procedure and they have become the
main source of funding for banks.
The ECB interventions prevented the collapse of the ﬁnancial sector and acted along diﬀerent di-
mensions:
• maturity transformation (the maturities of repos were lengthened);
• liquidity transformation (illiquid assets were accepted as collateral);
• transaction services (the number of eligible counterparties was increased);
• adverse selection (the counterparties' credit risk was absorbed).
In the following the unconventional actions are presented in chronological order.
The intervention of the ECB with supplementary liquidity measures has started in August 2007 when
it announced a 3-month LTRO for an amount of 40 billion euros in addition to the regular monthly one,
with the aim of supporting the normalization of the functioning of the euro money market. In September
2007 a further supplementary LTRO was implemented. The renewal of both these LTROs was decided
in November of the same year. After few weeks the ECB announced that in line with its aim to keep
very short term money market interest rates close to the minimum bid rate in the Eurosystem's main
reﬁnancing operations, it would reinforce its policy of allotting more than the benchmark allotment
amount in main reﬁnancing operations for as long as needed and at least until after the end of the
year. However these measures cannot fully be considered unconventional because the terms and the
allotment procedures were standard. At the beginning of February 2008 the ECB announced a further
renewal of the previous LTROs to consolidate the normalization of the euro area money market.
The ﬁrst 6-month LTRO was introduced in March 2008. The allotment procedure was standard and
so, although the term of the operation was lengthened, this cannot be considered a fully unconventional
measure yet.
In October 2008, after the Lehman Brothers' bankruptcy, the ECB started to lower interest rates.
Concerning liquidity measures, the Governing Council decided to increase the frequency and the size
of its LTROs, and to conduct all the reﬁnancing operations through a ﬁxed rate tender procedure with
full allotment. This implied that the ECB gave the full amount of liquidity that banks requested at
a previously announced ﬁxed interest rate, subject to being able to provide suﬃcient collateral. Also
the list of eligible collaterals was expanded to include securities (other than ABS) rated BBB or higher.
In addition, the ECB started to oﬀer funding in US dollars and Swiss francs through foreign exchange
swaps. This represents the oﬃcial beginning of unconventional monetary policy measures.
In May 2009 the ECB announced the Enhanced Credit Support programme by which it introduced
three longer-term reﬁnancing operations with maturity of 12 months at a quarterly frequency with ﬁxed
rate tender procedures and full allotment. Moreover, the European Investment Bank (EIB) became
an eligible counterparty in the Eurosystem's monetary policy operations under the same conditions as
any other counterparty, therefore supporting lending in the Euro area. Finally, the Governing Council
announced the ﬁrst Covered Bonds1 Purchase Programme (CBPP1) (see Beirne, Dalitz, Ejsing, Grothe,
1Covered bonds are debt securities backed by cash ﬂows from mortgages or public sector loans. The originator (usually
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Manganelli, Monar, Sahel, Su²ec, Tapking, and Vong (2011) for full details). The programme consists
in the direct purchase, starting from July 2009, of Euro-denominated covered bonds (with a minimum
rating of AA or equivalent) issued in the Euro area for an amount of 60 billion euros, in order to
improve liquidity in private debt security markets, to ease banks funding conditions and to improve
the risk proﬁle of institutions holding covered bonds. As a matter of fact, the covered bond market is
the most important privately issued bond segment in Europe and represents one of the main sources
of banks' funding for mortgage lending. The ﬁnancial crisis led to an increase in secondary-market
spreads and then to a decrease in new issuances. This worsened the banks' liquidity condition, which
was already jeopardized by the stall in money market activity so that an intervention by the ECB was
necessary. The CBPP1 remained in place until June 2010. Figure 1.1 reports the purchases of covered
bonds.
In May 2010 the Governing Council established the Securities Markets Programme (SMP). Under
this decision the Eurosystem central banks purchased Euro-area marketable-debt instruments issued
by central governments or public entities. The aim of the program was to address the severe tensions
observed in certain market segments ensuring depth and liquidity in order to restore an appropriate
monetary policy transmission mechanism. The actual implementation of purchases started on the same
day of the announcement and ﬁgure 1.2 reports the weekly amounts of bonds purchased. This action was
designed not to aﬀect the monetary policy stance: the impact of the interventions has been sterilized
through speciﬁc operations to re-absorb the injected liquidity2. In addition, LTROs with maturity
of three and six months and ﬁxed rate tender procedure with full allotment were scheduled. Finally,
the temporary liquidity swap lines with the Federal Reserve System and US dollar liquidity-providing
operations was reactivated. These operations took the form of repurchase operations against collateral
and have been carried out as ﬁxed rate tenders with full allotment. A second round of the SMP was
implemented starting in August 2011.
In the following months the ECB repeatedly renewed its decision to conduct its main reﬁnancing
operations as a ﬁxed rate tender procedure with full allotment, and it established several LTROs of
diﬀerent maturities (up to 12 months) always with ﬁxed rate tender procedure and full allotment.
In October 2011, the ECB launched a new Covered Bond Purchase Programme (CBPP2) to be
implemented from November 2011. The programme consisted in the direct purchase in primary and
secondary markets of 40 billion euros of covered bonds with a minimum rating of BBB- or equivalent,
maximum residual maturity of 10.5 years and underlying assets that include exposure to private and/or
public entities. The CBPP2 was expected to be completed by the end of October 2012. Moreover, the
CBPP2 portfolio was available for voluntary lending through security lending facilities oﬀered by central
securities depositories.
In the same month the ECB published the schedule of the reﬁnancing operations from October
2011 to July 2012. Two LTROs were announced, one with a maturity of approximately 12 months, to
be implemented in October 2011, and the other with a maturity of approximately 13 months, to be
implemented in December 2011. Both operations would be conducted with the ﬁxed-rate full allotment
a ﬁnancial institution) remises a pool of assets to a special purpose vehicle that ask to the bank for a loan to buy the
assets. The bank obtains the necessary liquidity by issuing bonds, namely covered bonds. So the assets purchased by
the SPV are the guarantee for the repayment of the bonds.
2Sterilization can happen, for example, through the sell of highly valued assets contemporaneously to the purchase of
weaker securities (government bonds, in this case).
16
CHAPTER 1. An Event-Study Analysis of ECB Unconventional Monetary Policy Measures
procedure. Moreover the Governing Council decided to continue conducting its MROs with ﬁxed rate
tender procedures and full allotment for as long as necessary and the same procedure would be applied
to the monthly 3-month LTROs to be allotted in the ﬁrst half of 2012.
In December 2011 the ECB surprised the markets by announcing two longer-term reﬁnancing op-
erations with a maturity of 36 months and the option of early repayment after one year. Not only
the maturity of these operation is extraordinary, but also the amount of loans announced: almost 490
billion. The loans was not directly oﬀered to governments but banks could use European government
securities as collateral as well as mortgage securities and other commercial papers. Regarding this as-
pect, the ECB has extended the range of rating for asset-backed securities eligible as collateral in credit
operations and it has reduced the reserve ratio from 2% to 1%. The ﬁrst of this measures has been
implemented in December 22nd 2011, while the second one has been put in place on March 1st 2012 for
an amount of nearly 530 billion.
After the increase in the tensions on sovereign bond markets the ECB intervened announcing a
new program labelled Outright Monetary Transactions (OMT) in August 2012. This program allows
the Euro-area countries to ask for ﬁnancial assistance to the ECB which will purchase government
bonds with maturity from 1 to 3 years, provided that the country agrees to adopt speciﬁc economic
measures (the so-called conditionality principle). The aim of the program is to restore and maintain
an appropriate monetary policy transmission and the singleness of the monetary policy by lowering
bond yields and therefore decreasing borrowing costs. The details of the program were published in
September 2012. The oﬃcial announcement of the OMT was preceded by an important declaration by
the President of the ECB, at the end of July 2012, that stated that Within our mandate, the ECB is
ready to do whatever it takes to preserve the euro. And believe me, it will be enough.. An important
thing to notice here is that, for the time being, no OMT purchases were carried out yet.
In the following sections I will analyse yield movements around policy announcements and actions.
The long term yields of government bonds can be decomposed into the sum of the compounded short-
term risk-free interest rate expected over the period to maturity and the risk premium. The SMP and
the two CBPPs implemented by the ECB directly inﬂuenced the quantity of assets on the market and
so it is likely that they had an eﬀect on risk premia through a portfolio rebalancing eﬀect or a liquidity
premium eﬀect. On the other hand, LTROs imply the injection of liquidity into the credit sector in
exchange for securities to deliver as guarantee. These securities were pre-existing in the bank's balance
sheet and so, in principle, this operation should not imply any direct change in yields. However a change
in yields can occur depending on what banks decide to do with the liquidity. This chapter will explore
this issue.
1.3 Literature Review
This section reviews the theoretical and econometric aspects of the event-study approach and presents
some recent works in which this methodology is applied.
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1.3.1 The Event-Study Methodology
The original application of the event-study methodology was in accounting and corporate ﬁnance re-
search to study the wealth and price eﬀects of mergers and acquisitions, earnings announcements,
ﬁnancing decisions by ﬁrms, change in the regulatory environment and macroeconomic variables. Pas-
torello (2001) explains the econometrics of event-studies and MacKinlay (1997) provides a review of the
methodology with focus on corporate ﬁnance issues. An important contribution to this literature is the
work of Fama, Fisher, Jensen, and Roll (1969) that formulated the methodology that is essentially the
same as the one which is in use today. In general, the objective of an event study is to evaluate whether
movements of a time series around a certain date are consistent with normal returns or they can be con-
sidered abnormal in a statistically signiﬁcant way. As a matter of fact, the event study approach relies
ﬁrmly on the eﬃcient market hypothesis, by which prices and returns incorporates all the information
available, and on the rational expectation hypothesis. Therefore, in the present framework, bond yields
should react to announcements regarding monetary policy because expectations are aﬀected by those
announcements.
The ﬁrst step to conduct an event-study analysis is to identify the events of interest and the event-
period. Then it is necessary to decompose the observed returns into two components, the normal and
the abnormal return. The objective of the analysis is to verify the statistical signiﬁcance of abnormal
returns for individual (or asset) i on an event date τ , which can be obtained as the diﬀerence between
the actual return (Riτ ) and the normal or expected return (E [Riτ | Xτ ]):
ARiτ = Riτ − E [Riτ | Xτ ]
Here Xτ is the information available to markets and that, combined with the market equilibrium
relationship, allows to formulate expectations of future returns.
In general, the underlying assumption is that a security's return follows a general process of the
form:
Rt = xtβ + εt (1.1)
Then, when an event occurs the model is assumed to change:
Rτ = xτβ + zα+ ετ (1.2)
Here xt is a vector of independent variables at time t, β is the relative vector of parameters, z is a
vector containing asset's characteristics that inﬂuence the return when the event occurs, α is a vector of
coeﬃcient measuring the eﬀect of z and εt is a disturbance term with zero mean that possibly changes
in event and non-event periods. So, the event study analysis amounts at evaluating the signiﬁcance of
the diﬀerence between the return generated by model 1.1 and the one coming from model 1.2, i.e. the
abnormal return deﬁned above.
This can be achieved in two diﬀerent ways which diﬀer from each other by the way they estimate
the abnormal returns. The ﬁrst approach estimates abnormal returns as forecast errors from a market
equilibrium model and so the necessary tools are model 1.1 and the actual returns during the event
of interest, which are assumed to be generated by model 1.2. The second approach estimates directly
18
CHAPTER 1. An Event-Study Analysis of ECB Unconventional Monetary Policy Measures
model 1.2 and evaluates the signiﬁcance of parameters contained in α, where the null hypothesis is that
such coeﬃcients are zero. The second approach is the one I will apply for my study but it is useful to
brieﬂy review also the ﬁrst approach.
Concerning the ﬁrst approach, the models used to obtain market expectations are various in nature
and types but generally they can be divided between statistical or economic models. The diﬀerence
is that economic models are based on identifying assumptions while statistical models simply rely on
statistical regularities. The selected model must be estimated on a pre-event sample and then the
forecast will be used as expected returns to obtain estimated abnormal returns AˆRiτ for each asset.
Then abnormal returns should be aggregated across assets and time to be able to perform statistical
tests that will allow to draw inference about the overall eﬀect of the event. In particular, the variable
of interest is the average cumulative return:
¯CAR =
1
N
N∑
i=1
ˆCARi
Where ¯CARi =
∑
τ AˆRiτ is the cumulative return of asset i, N is the total number of assets
considered and τ is the event period.
Several diﬀerent statistical tests can be applied and, in general, signiﬁcance tests can be grouped
in parametric and nonparametric tests. Parametric tests rely on the assumption that individual ﬁrm's
abnormal returns are jointly normally and independently distributed, whereas nonparametric tests do
not rely on any such assumptions. Normality is veriﬁed when the equilibrium model is estimated on a
large sample, while independence is veriﬁed when both the event windows and the pre-event sample on
which the equilibrium model is estimated do not overlap across individuals. The null hypothesis of the
test is that the event had no eﬀects on prices and so in this case a t-statistics can be used.
When the event windows are overlapping across individuals the covariance between abnormal prices
is diﬀerent from zero, i.e. we are in the case of clustering. Clustering leads to a distorted inference
because the variance of ¯CAR is underestimated and the null hypothesis is too often rejected, i.e. the test
makes a type I error. This issue can be faced either without aggregating abnormal return by individuals
but analysing them separately or estimating the equilibrium model directly on the portfolio of the N
assets. On the other hand, the issue of clustering can be dealt with by accounting for cross-correlation
among abnormal returns in the speciﬁcation of statistical tests3.
A more general and complementary approach for conducting an event-study analysis consists of
3There is an extensive literature on the speciﬁcation of statistical tests for event studies as researchers tried to correct
for several sources of bias like cross-correlation among abnormal returns and event-induced variance increases. Brown
and Warner (1980) account for dependence across individuals' average residuals by estimating the the standard deviation
of average residuals from the time series of average abnormal returns over the estimation period and then the test is
constructed as the ratio between the average abnormal return in the event-time and this standard deviation. Patell
(1976) and Brown and Warner (1985) proposed to use standardized abnormal returns when performing statistical tests.
Standardized abnormal returns (SARs) are deﬁned as the ratio between abnormal returns and the standard deviation of
regression residuals. The purpose of the standardization is to weight less more volatile abnormal returns while giving more
weight to less volatile observations. This test assumes that SARs have the same variance while Boehmer, Masumeci, and
Poulsen (1991) build a test that adjusts for event-induced variance increases by estimating cross-sectionally the average
volatility during the event-day with the sample standard deviation of standardized abnormal returns. However, when the
event day is the same for all individuals, the scaled abnormal returns can be correlated with each other. To account for
this additional source of bias in the variance of returns, Kolari and Pynnönen (2010) propose cross-correlation adjustments
for both the Patell test and the Boehmer, Musumeci and Poulsen test.
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estimating a multivariate regression model with dummy variables for the event date, which is the
second methodology mentioned before. In particular, it is possible to deﬁne an event dummy which has
value of one during the event of interest and zero otherwise. This dummy can be added to the market
equilibrium model to capture the eﬀect of the event in a speciﬁc date.
In section 1.5 I will apply a modiﬁed version of the latter approach as my regressors will only be
time-varying dummy variables.
1.3.2 Applied Literature
Some drawbacks are connected to the event-study methodology. First of all, the assumptions of market
rationality and eﬃciency are very strong and their indiscriminate application may invalidate any econo-
metric study of ﬁnancial markets. Another problem is the impossibility of controlling for other factors
that occurs at the same time as the change in policy to analyse and that can by themselves justify the
changes in prices and yields.
However, the event study methodology applied by Swanson (2011) seems to provide a solution to
these two problems. He studies the ﬁrst Operation Twist4 implemented in 1961 to forecast the eﬀects
of the second quantitative easing operation5 (QE2) of the Federal Reserve announced in November
2010. The methodology consists of looking at the major announcements regarding the ﬁrst Operation
Twist and of focusing the attention on changes in Treasury yields in a narrow window of time (about
2 days) around each announcement. This very narrow window allows to consider the macroeconomic
framework as stable so that changes in prices and returns are only due to the policy announcement.
Moreover, regarding the assumptions on eﬃciency and rationality, the considered announcements are
the most relevant ones and so it is plausible that the market responded to them. The only drawback
of this methodology is the inability to capture delayed eﬀects of policy decisions. The econometric test
is based on a two-sided t-test and the null hypothesis is the ineﬀectiveness of the announcements on
the term structure at any maturity. Under the alternative hypothesis, long-term yields should decrease
and short-term yields should increase or stay the same. Six diﬀerent announcements are tested and the
result is that four of them had signiﬁcant eﬀects on the yield curve. Their cumulative eﬀect, although
quite low (15 basis points), is also statistically signiﬁcant. Finally he investigates the response of agency
and corporate yields. His conclusion is that, given the similarities between Operation Twist and QE2,
we should expect QE2 to lead to a decrease in long-term Treasury yields by about 15 basis points and
to a much smaller eﬀect on corporate bond yields. The result of this paper are opposite with respect
to the ﬁndings of Modigliani and Sutch (1966), but at the end of their paper is stated that any eﬀects,
direct or indirect, of Operation Twist in narrowing the spread which further study might establish, are
4With this operation the Federal Reserve aimed at inﬂuencing the term structure raising yields on short-term securities
and lowering yields on long-term securities. Practically this was done by selling short-term bonds and purchasing long-
term bonds. In September 2011 the Fed announced the Maturity Extension Programme which has been informally
called Operation Twist 2 for the similarities with the ﬁrst Operation Twist. Following this programme, the Fed sold
shorter-term Treasury securities, i.e. securities with maturities of 3 years or less, and used the proceeds to buy longer-term
Treasury securities, i.e. securities with maturities between 6 and 30 years.
5In November 2010 the Fed announced a second large-scale asset purchase operation (LSAP2) also known as the
second quantitative easing program (QE2). The programme consisted in the expansion of the Fed holdings of securities
by purchasing a further $600 billion of longer-term Treasury securities by the end of June 2011. The Federal Open Market
Committee declared that the aim of the program was to promote a stronger pace of economic recovery and to help ensure
that inﬂation, over time, is at levels consistent with its mandate.
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most unlikely to exceed some ten to twenty base points, in line with the 15 basis points decline found
by Swanson (2011).
Other examples of event-study analysis can be found in Bernanke, Reinhart, and Sack (2004), in
Gagnon, Raskin, Remache, and Sack (2011), in Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen (2011) and in
Neely (2013).
Bernanke, Reinhart, and Sack (2004) conducted a wide range of econometric tests to evaluate the
eﬀectiveness of the Fed measures that could be used when the zero lower bound is reached. The results
shows that the Fed's communications were successful in shaping market expectations and that assets
purchases inﬂuenced the yield curve. On the other hand, the other three papers produce evidence on
the eﬀects of recent quantitative easing policies in the United States.
As regards the Euro area, Dell'Erba (2012) applies an event-study methodology to evaluate the
eﬀects of sovereign rating actions on yield spreads of European countries during the current debt crisis.
The events of interest are both changes in ratings and outlooks by the three main credit rating agencies
(Fitch, Moody's and Standard & Poor's). He builds two panel datasets: in the ﬁrst one the dependent
variables are 2-year and 10-year yield spreads of nine European countries while in the second one the
dependent variables are credit default swap spreads. In both cases the regressors are time-varying
dummy variables identifying periods surrounding rating and outlook changes. This methodology is very
similar to the one that I apply in section 1.5.
The eﬀect of policy measures related to the European crisis resolution is analysed also by Kilponen,
Laakkonen, and Vilmunen (2015). They develop an empirical model for the long-term sovereign bond
yield spreads of seven Euro-area countries where the regressors are proxies to capture the three main risk
factors (credit risk, liquidity risk and general risk appetite) and, to allow for the possibility of contagion,
also the lagged bond yield spread is included. Policy decisions are included as dummy variables on the
day of the announcement. As they consider a wide set of events, policy decisions are grouped into
ten categories and dummy variables belonging to the same category are combined. Results show that
the proxies for credit and liquidity risk are signiﬁcant while those for risk appetite do not seem to
correctly capture the eﬀect of uncertainty on the bond market. As regards policy decisions, the LTROs
signiﬁcantly reduced yields especially in the larger countries like France, Spain and Italy and appear
to have had the strongest stabilizing eﬀect in the short-run. Direct support to governments led to a
decrease in yields of countries for which the ECB granted the purchases while increased those of Italy
and Spain. The evidence on the remaining policy decisions is mixed but in general coeﬃcients have the
expected sign and some pieces of evidence can be also interpreted as a result of a ﬂight to safety. Overall,
announcements regarding the stabilization of the European debt crisis produced signiﬁcant eﬀects at
least in the short run.
More recently, Falagiarda and Reitz (2013) study the eﬀects of ECB communications about uncon-
ventional monetary policy measures on the perceived sovereign risk of Italy over the period 2008-2012.
The event-study analysis considers the changes in government bond yield spreads around announcement
dates ﬁnding that they have been able to reduce the sovereign risk of Italy. Stronger yields reductions
are associated mainly to announcements of the CBPP, the SMP and OMTs and more in general to
all announcements in the period 2010-2012. The second part of the analysis is based on a GARCH
model estimated with high-frequency data. The ﬁrst diﬀerence of the spread is regressed on its ﬁrst and
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second lag, on a monetary policy surprise indicator and on a set of control variables. Results conﬁrm
the previous ﬁndings.
Szczerbowicz (2014) measures the impact of ECB announcements on money market spreads, covered
bond spreads and sovereign bond spreads in the Euro area by estimating event-based regressions and she
ﬁnds that the SMP, OMTs, CBPP1, CBPP2 and 3-years LTROs succeed in diminishing the borrowing
costs for banks and governments. An interesting ﬁnding is that the ECB's asset purchases had important
spillover eﬀects. As a matter of fact, sovereign bond purchases had an impact also on covered bond
spreads and covered bond purchases aﬀected also sovereign bond spreads.
Finally, Altavilla, Giannone, and Lenza (2014) focused on the eﬀect of OMT announcements with
both an event-study analysis and a conditional scenario exercise. They ﬁnd that the announcements
had major eﬀects on the Italian and Spanish economy by reducing their bond yields by about 200 basis
points and fostering credit and economic growth with limited spillover eﬀects in France and Germany.
1.4 Analysis of Policy Announcements
In this section I will consider all the main policy announcements of the European Central Bank from
2007 on. In particular I will focus on announcements regarding unconventional measures such as sup-
plementary LTROs, the Securities Markets Programme, the Covered Bonds Purchase Programme and
the Outright Monetary Transactions. The aim is to evaluate whether policy announcements had the
power to move markets, i.e. if an expectational channel was operative, for which type of announcements
and to what extent.
From a theoretical point of view, announcements regarding unconventional monetary policy mea-
sures can inﬂuence ﬁnancial markets because the central bank provides the market with a signal of its
willingness to restore the correct functioning of some market segments (in the case of the ECB, inter-
ventions involved the banking sector and sovereign debt markets) but also because they push upwards
inﬂation expectations so that the real interest rates stay low leading to an expansionary eﬀect on the
economy. The existence of such transmission channels would reinforce the eﬀectiveness of the recent
extraordinary policy actions.
To conduct this analysis I will apply the same methodology as Swanson (2011) and my variables of
interest are government bond yields with maturities from 3 months to 30 years.
By looking through the ECB website, 20 interesting events among the ones described in section 1.2
have been identiﬁed and they are summarized in table 1.1. The considered events cover a timely broad
sample starting with the very ﬁrst announcement of a supplementary liquidity injection in August 2007,
when market tensions were low, and ending with the OMT program announced in the summer of 2012.
In particular, most of the selected events are pure announcements in the sense that I take note
of the days in which ECB communicated his future plans to the public, but the actual implementation
of the announced measures is typically done later in time. The only measures for which I consider
the eﬀects on yields of the actual implementation are the SMP (because implementation immediately
follows the announcements) and the LTROs with maturity of one or more years. It is necessary to point
out that the actual implementation of an LTRO consists of three days: the ﬁrst is the announcement
day, the second is the allotment day (when the ECB receive all the bids) and the third is the settlement
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day (when the ECB allocates money to the bidders). For LTROs I consider both the days in which the
ECB communicated the intention of implementing such measures, and the days in which the call for
bids took place.
Another relevant issue is the timing of the announcements as this piece of information is necessary to
correctly decide the size of the event window. I consider a 1-day event window for announcements made
early in the trading day or after the market closure, while I consider a 2-day event windows when the
announcement was made in a late time for the investment community to completely inﬂuence markets.
To get these information I searched on the platform for ﬁnancial and economic news Bloomberg. There,
in the ECB news section, I found the timing of the snaps releases which I consider as indicative of the
eﬀective time in which ﬁnancial markets got the news.
1.4.1 Data
For the analysis on bond yields I use series calculated by Thomson Reuters and available on Datastream.
The yield curves are calculated by Thomson Reuters using a cubic spline interpolation6 based on
data of a minimum of ﬁve bonds of the required currency/rating/sector/issuer combination. Since not
all bonds quote ask prices, to be sure to have a liquid price, bid prices are used. Finally, no extrapolation
is performed: if no assets are available beyond a certain maturity date, the curve ends with the last
standard term available.
I have decided to consider government bonds' yields of countries with diﬀerent ratings, namely:
Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Netherlands, Portugal and Spain. My aim
is to give a stylized but detailed view of what happened along the yield curve and so the considered
maturities are: 3 months, 6 months, 1 year, 2 years, 3 years, 5 years, 7 years, 10 years, 15 years, 20 years
and 30 years. These data are not provided for all countries and in such a case I have integrated the
dataset with the series of the closest maturities to the ones selected. However this has not always been
possible (e.g. for Greece data on intermediate maturities are completely missing) and so my dataset is
not complete from the point of view of maturities. Moreover some series are short, i.e. observations start
after the 2007: I have not dropped these series from my dataset because I wanted to use all information
available.
Each year is made up from 260 to 262 observations which correspond roughly to the number of
working days in one year. When a national holiday happens to fall on a working day the value registered
in the previous working day is applied. This smooths a little the variability of data but, on the other
hand, it allows to have the same number of observations in each time series. This is one of the reasons
that convinced me to use this dataset.
1.4.2 Econometric Methodology
In this part of my work I will apply the event-study methodology used by Swanson (2011). In particular,
the econometric methodology is based on a two-sided t-test, by which the null hypothesis is rejected
6Spline interpolation is a form of interpolation where the interpolant is spline, a smooth polynomial function that is
piecewise-deﬁned (it has a diﬀerent shape in diﬀerent areas of the horizontal axis variable), and possesses a high degree of
smoothness at the places where the polynomial pieces connect (knots). So the spline ﬁt is a data analysis technique that
uses the least squares criterion to estimate the parameters of the spline polynomial model.
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when the value of the test statistic is either suﬃciently small or suﬃciently large, i.e. there are two
alternative hypothesis, one positive and one negative. This contrasts with a one-sided t-test, in which
there is only one alternative hypothesis that represents either the rejection region "suﬃciently small" or
"suﬃciently large". Concerning the objectives of this work, I consider as null hypothesis the fact that
bond yields remained unchanged after the announcements of unconventional monetary policy measures.
By contrast, the alternative hypothesis is that those announcements had some kind of eﬀects on bond
yields and so the null hypothesis is rejected when the value of the test statistic is either suﬃciently small
or suﬃciently large.
In particular, the t-statistic is distributed as a Student-T with T − 1 degree of freedom (where T is
the number of observation in the sample) and it is calculated as follows:
tcij =
vcij,tl − v0
sdcij,l
∼ T (T − 1)
Here vcij,tl is the variation in yields of bond i of country c in event j at time t, which can be a 1-day
variation or a 2-day variation (l = 1, 2), depending on the timing of the announcement and v0 is the
value under the null hypothesis. The 1-day change is calculated as the diﬀerence between the yield in
t and the yield in t − 1, while the 2-day change is calculated as the diﬀerence between the yield in t
and the yield in t− 2. Concerning the objectives of my work, I consider as null hypothesis the fact that
bond yields remained unchanged after the announcements of unconventional monetary policy measures.
By contrast, the alternative hypothesis is that those announcements had some kind of eﬀects on bond
yields. So vcij,tl = ycij,t − ycij,t−l with l = 1, 2, v0 = 0 and the statistics becomes:
tcij =
vcij,tl
sdcij,l
To reconcile this analysis with the general framework presented in Section 1.3.1, here the estimated
variation is v0 and the abnormal variation is vcij,tl.
As I want to study the signiﬁcance of the change in yields, the diﬀerence in yield variations is scaled on
the standard deviation of 1- or 2-day changes of bond i in event j. The standard deviation is calculated
on the 30 yield variations prior to the announcement day so it is not inﬂuenced by the variability caused
by the announcement itself. A deeper explanation about the calculation of the standard deviation is
needed. First of all I derived the series of 1- and 2-day changes, then the standard deviation is calculated
as the square root of the yield changes' sample variance:
sdcij,l =
√∑n
t=1 (vcij,tl − v¯cij,l)2
T − 1
So T is equal to 30 and v¯cij,l =
1
T
∑T
t=1 vcij,tl is the average variation in the time-window of event
j. However, as I mentioned before, not all the time series are available for the sample period needed
because they start after the beginning of 2007. If observations are not enough to calculate the 30-days
standard deviation I cannot compute the t-statistics and so the related yield change is not evaluated.
This however happens in very few cases and not much information is lost.
To evaluate the joint signiﬁcance of yields' changes for the same announcement I use a Wald test
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which is distributed as a chi-squared with q degrees of freedom (where q is the number of restrictions).
The most simple Wald statistic to test the signiﬁcance of a single coeﬃcient is given by:
W =
(
coefficient
std.error (coefficient)
)2
This is the square of the t-statistic and it is distributed as a chi-squared with 1 degree of freedom
(because it tests only one restriction).
As I want to test the signiﬁcance of q values, I can calculate the joint Wald statistic as the sum of
q single Wald statistics which is asymptotically distributed as a chi-square with q degrees of freedom7:
Wcj =
q∑
i=1
(
vcij,tl
sdcij,l
)2
=
q∑
i=1
(tcij)
2 → χ2 (q)
Such a formulation is valid under the assumption that the t-statistics are independent implying that
also the variations in yields are independent. At a macroeconomic level this might seem a quite strong
assumption, but for daily data we can apply the assumption coming from theoretical ﬁnance that prices
evolve following a random walk, which makes variations in yields independent.
Summarizing, the procedure consists of shrinking the dimensionality of data to obtain the statistics
of interest. I start from yields of diﬀerent bonds (i) for diﬀerent countries (c) in diﬀerent events (j)
and I aggregate yield variations by time (t) to obtain q t-statistics for each event. Then I aggregate
t-statistics by bonds to obtain Wald statistics speciﬁc for country and events.
As regards results, following the theory I would expect that all the announcements brought a decline
in bond yields for at least two reasons. First, the direct purchase of bonds by the ECB decreased the total
supply of bonds in the market producing a rise in prices and a decline in returns. On the other hand,
liquidity injections increased the banks' availability of funds which should in principle have raised the
amount of funds invested in ﬁnancial markets both because banks may have decided to directly invest in
bonds but also through an increase in lending ﬂows to the private sector. Moreover positive spillovers on
sovereign debt can be due to the fact that if banks are less liquidity-constrained it is less likely that the
government would have to intervene to sustain the credit sector. Indeed, evidence about the importance
of the banking sector in determining the level of bond yield spreads is presented by Gerlach, Schulz,
and Wolﬀ (2010) and Acharya, Drechsler, and Schnabl (2011). Second, these unconventional measures
may be interpreted as a serious engagement of the ECB to maintain stability in credit and ﬁnancial
markets. Therefore any announcement should have shaped expectations towards an improvement of
market functioning and might be interpreted as a signal of the fact that the expansionary monetary
policy would be longlasting in the future.
7This result is true asymptotically. Here the t-statistics have many degrees of freedom, they are asymptotically normally
distributed, and then the sum of q normal distribution is a chi-square. To get the true distribution of this Wald statistics
it would be necessary to sum q F -distributions as:
t2 =
 N2√
χ2
V
 = χ2/1
χ2/v
= F (1, v) .
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1.4.3 Results
Results are presented in tables 1.2 to 1.11.
The ﬁrst event is the announcement on August 22nd 2007 of a supplementary LTRO with 3-month
maturity and for an amount of 40 billion euros that, although conducted with the standard variable-rate
tender procedure, represents the start of the ECB injection of liquidity to support markets. Most of the
short- and medium-term yields experienced signiﬁcant positive changes. The most signiﬁcant eﬀects
occurred for Belgium, Finland and Germany, while there has been no signiﬁcant change for Greek and
Dutch bond yields. This implies that the investment community exited the government bond market.
Probably investors interpreted the ECB action as a conﬁrmation of their fears about ﬁnancial market
instability. The Wald test for the joint signiﬁcance of the movements along the yield curve ﬁnds that
changes in Austrian, German, Finnish ans Spanish yields are signiﬁcant at a 1% level, changes in Belgian
yields are signiﬁcant at a 5% level while French yields' changes are signiﬁcant at the 10% level.
One month after the Lehman's Brothers bankruptcy, on October 15th 2009, the ECB started to
intervene on money markets more aggressively announcing several LTROs with 3/6-month maturity and
ﬁxed-rate full allotment procedure and the expansion of the list of eligible collaterals. This is the oﬃcial
beginning of the unconventional monetary policy measures. This event produced the expected eﬀect,
i.e. almost all bond yields declined on short and medium maturities. Changes are highly signiﬁcant
for Italy, Portugal and Spain. Yields of France, Austria and Germany have been aﬀected with a lower
signiﬁcance. The Wald test ﬁnds signiﬁcant changes at a 5% level for Italy and Portugal while overall
changes in Spanish yields are signiﬁcant at the 10% level.
On May 7th 2009 the ECB announced the Enhanced Credit Support programme and the ﬁrst
Covered Bond Purchase Programme. The ﬁrst consisted of three LTROs with 12-month maturity and
ﬁxed-rate full allotment procedure to be conducted in June, September and December. Furthermore the
European Investment Bank (EIB) became an eligible counterparty in the Eurosystem's monetary policy
operations. With the the ECB engaged itself in directly purchasing of euro-denominated covered bonds
for an amount of 60 billion euros. It must be also recalled that on the same day the Governing Council
decided to cut interest rates by 25 basis points. The eﬀects of these three interventions are diﬃcult to
disentangle as bond yields display changes of diﬀerent sign and magnitude along the yield curve. In
general, yields of bonds with shorter maturities (up to 10 years) declined, while the opposite happened
in longer-term maturities. The most signiﬁcant changes are for Belgian, French, German, Greek, Dutch
and Spanish bonds. On the other hand, all Greek long-term yields declined signiﬁcantly. Concerning the
joint signiﬁcance, changes for Belgium, France, Germany, Greece, Netherlands and Spain are signiﬁcant
at the 1% level. But why short-term yields decreased while long-term yields increased? This seems
to be the opposite eﬀect than the one produced by the Operation Twist implemented by the Federal
Reserve (the Fed was selling short-term government bonds and buying long-term government bonds).
These results are consistent with a shift in the investors' portfolio composition: they sold longer-term
bonds for shorter-term ones. This can be justiﬁed by a lowering in short-term risk perception due to an
improvement in liquidity conditions. Moreover, when the available liquidity in the credit and ﬁnancial
sector is increased, it is likely that a part of this liquidity will be invested also in government bonds.
Also the reduction in interest rates should induce a decrease in the yield curve. Nevertheless data show
a rise in long-term rates which represents an increase in bonds riskiness. The only way to explain this
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pattern is a ﬂight to quality due to the CBPP1: as the ECB announced that it would buy covered bonds,
investors might have switched to this type of assets. So the considered interventions had been able only
to ease short-term market tensions, while concerns about long-term ﬁnancial conditions remained high
meaning that there was no positive spillovers on sovereign debt.
Details of the CBPP1 were published on June 4th 2009. The ECB revealed that it would directly
buy covered bonds for an amount of 60 billion euros in both the primary and the secondary market, with
rating not lower than BBB- or equivalent and with underlying assets that include exposure to private or
public entities. Yields at all maturities and of all countries increased with very low p-values. Again, this
piece of evidence suggests that there has been a ﬂight to quality in investors' portfolio while no positive
spillovers from the banking sector on expected government ﬁnancial positions are detectable. However
it is necessary to mention that in the same day the ECB left the interest rate unchanged after a three
months of consecutive reductions. So there could have also been an expectation eﬀect over the ECB
decision: markets might have expected a further decrease in interest rates and the fact that this did not
happened could have led to a perception of increased risk that translated into higher government bond
yields.
On December 3rd 2009 the ECB published details of reﬁnancing operations up to April 2010 an-
nouncing that from then on the MROs would be conducted as ﬁxed rate tender procedure with full
allotment for as long as is needed. This tender procedure would also continue to be used in the special-
term reﬁnancing operations8 with a maturity of one maintenance period9. Both liquidity measures
would be in place at least until April 13th 2010. This announcement is relevant because it was the
ﬁrst time that the ECB used the words for as long as is needed, which is a quite binding claim and
gave to the ﬁnancial sector the feeling that the provision of extra liquidity would continue for long time.
However, this does not appear to have had the desired eﬀect on bond yields as most of them increased
signiﬁcantly. The same is conﬁrmed by the Wald statistic. As before, it is necessary to point out that
on this same day there had been the monthly meeting of the Governing Council that left the interest
rates unchanged.
On May 10th 2010 the ECB established the Securities Markets Programme and implemented the
ﬁrst government bonds' purchases which led to a strong decrease in yields of Belgium, Greece, Italy,
Portugal and Spain with t-statistics much higher than 3 in most of the cases. This is not however a pure
announcement eﬀect but the direct eﬀect of national central banks purchases. Yields of the remaining
countries display a mixed pattern with signiﬁcance mostly concentrated on long-term yields increases.
Furthermore the ECB decided to implement a supplementary LTRO with 6-months maturity and it
reactivated the US dollar liquidity-providing operations. Overall this intervention had the expected
eﬀect of easing market tensions on riskier bonds.
In August 2011 the ECB started again to purchase government bonds. The statement of the Pres-
ident announcing the action in the late evening of August 7th 2011 was followed by the beginning of
purchases on August 8th and this produced a signiﬁcant decline in many of the considered bond yields.
8Special-term reﬁnancing operations are additional open market operations with the aim to improve the overall liquidity
position of the euro area banking system. Neither the schedule nor the maturity of this operations is ﬁxed but they are
usually short-term (7 or 28 days).
9The maintenance period is the period over which compliance with reserve requirements is calculated, i.e. the time-
frame in which banks and other depository institutions must maintain a speciﬁed level of funds. The maintenance period
begins on the settlement day of the ﬁrst MRO following the monthly meeting of the Governing Council and usually it is
a four-week period that begins on a Wednesday and ends on a Tuesday.
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In particular a signiﬁcant decline is shown for Austrian, Belgian, Finnish, Italian, Portuguese and Span-
ish bonds, except for very short maturities. In contrast Greek yields increased in the 3-months maturity
with a t-statistic greater than 3 and declined on the long-medium term but not signiﬁcantly. Unfortu-
nately data on intermediate maturities are not available but these movements can be easily explained
by an increase in the probability of default in the short term while, for longer horizons, perspectives
remained relatively more benign. All these countries report very low p-values in the Wald test for the
joint signiﬁcance of changes.
On October 6th 2011 the ECB launched the second CBPP, whose technical details were published
on November 3rd, and announced two supplementary LTROs of 12-month maturity. Moreover there
had been the usual monthly meeting of the Governing Council that left interest rates unchanged. The
evidence on yields is mixed and overall very few changes are statistically signiﬁcant. As regards sig-
niﬁcant changes, Austria, Belgium, France, Greece and Netherlands recorded an increase in short-term
yields while only Portuguese bonds at 6-months maturity declined. The Wald statistics is in line with
these ﬁndings. Overall it seems that investors exited the bond market and it might be possible that
they preferred to buy covered bonds. There is no evidence of positive spillovers from the credit sector
to sovereign bonds.
On November 3rd the ECB published the details of the CBPP2 and lowered interest rates of 25
basis points. Again, in this situation the two events might have produced diﬀerent eﬀects in theory.
This can also be seen in data because evidence is mixed and few results are signiﬁcant, just like as two
forces were pulling yields in diﬀerent directions: in some cases the eﬀect of lower interest rates prevailed
and yields decreased, in other cases the ﬂight to quality due to covered bond purchases prevailed and
yields increased. In particular, yields of Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany and Netherlands
decreased and yields of Italy and Spain increased while Portugal display a mixed pattern. Few of these
changes are signiﬁcant. Signiﬁcant movements happened only in Greek yields on medium- and long-
term maturities with very low p-values. However this is in line with the high variability of November
yields which I argue is due more to political events, namely the change of the Prime Minister and the
connected high economic uncertainty, than to the ECB measures.
In the early afternoon of December 2nd some rumours about the future ECB monetary policy stance
to be announced on December 8th spread into markets. Goldman Sachs predicted an interest rate cut
of 25 basis point, the implementation of new LTROs with maturity of 2 years and the broadening of
collateral accepted10. New rumours from several diﬀerent sources came out on December 5th expecting
new LTROs with 2- or 3-year maturity11. The eﬀect of these rumours was that yields decreased all along
the curve for almost all countries except for Finland, Germany and Netherlands. However signiﬁcant
declines apply only to Italy and Belgium in long-term yields and to all Spanish yields. The yield pattern
is similar to the one presented at the implementation of the SMP. This is a relevant ﬁnding as it proves
that it is not necessary for investors to physically have money in their pockets to invest, but the simple
expectation of future liquidity is suﬃcient to move markets. It is interesting to notice that Finnish yields
remained almost unchanged and German and Dutch yields increased signiﬁcantly on short maturities.
10http://www.businessinsider.com/goldman-sachs-the-ecb-will-cut-rates-next-week-but-there-will-be-no-big-bazooka-
2011-12?op=1
11Bloomberg ticker of the news: NSN LVQBV86K50XY. See also: http://www.thisislondon.co.uk/business/european-
central-bank-expected-to-cut-interest-rates-6375411.html
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This might signal that, thanks to the expected higher liquidity, investors left safer assets for riskier
activities. This is the only case in which there had been positive spillovers from the banking sector to
government debt.
Once the eﬀects of rumours is taken into account it is not surprising to see that the formal an-
nouncement of the 36-months LTROs on December 8th led to signiﬁcant changes only in long-term
Greek yields which displayed a huge rise. Moreover the ECB cut the interest rate of 25 basis points,
it extended the range of securities eligible for collateral in credit operations and reduced the reserve
ratio to 1%. Evidence about yields of other countries is mixed, most of them increased but there is
no signiﬁcance. This lack of signiﬁcance is due to the high yields volatility. So the most aggressive
ECB liquidity intervention did not produce a big decrease in yields on impact just because the fall had
already happened few days earlier.
To evaluate the impact of the supplementary LTROs I investigate also if the call for bids had any
eﬀects on yields., i.e. whether the fact that the ECB asked for bids for the subsequent day led to any
change in yields.
In general, liquidity injections can aﬀect government bond yields because they reduce the systemic
banking risk with positive spillovers on sovereign debt, as it is less likely that governments would
intervene to support the ﬁnancial sector, leading to a decline in long-term rates, but also by increasing
monetary aggregates and then inﬂation. For the call for bids of June 23rd 2009, September 29th
2009, December 15th 2009, December 20th 2011 and February 28th 2012 only very few yields show a
signiﬁcant change but no common pattern is identiﬁable and the Wald test ﬁnds no signiﬁcant joint
changes for any country. Most probably the market did not react to these type of announcements
because they were expected. The only exception is the LTRO announced on the 25th of October 2011:
yields fell signiﬁcantly on longer-term bonds for Austria, Belgium, Finland, Netherlands and especially
in France. Some positive and signiﬁcant changes happened on Italian, Portuguese and Spanish medium-
term maturity bonds.
The last three events of this event-study regard the Outright Monetary Transaction program. On
the July 26th 2012 the President of the ECB declared that Within our mandate, the ECB is ready
to do whatever it takes to preserve the euro. And believe me, it will be enough.. This statement
referred to the ongoing tensions on sovereign debt markets and it had been followed by the oﬃcial
announcement of a new program called OMT on August 2nd 2012. The ﬁrst declaration of the ECB
President had a signiﬁcant eﬀect mainly on Italian and Spanish yields which decreased at all maturities
while German yields increased. On the other hand, the oﬃcial announcement of the OMT program led
to very few signiﬁcant changes in yields. The details of the program were announced on September 6th
and they had been followed by an increase in yields of German and Dutch bond yields and by a decline
in Italian, Portuguese and Spanish bond yields mainly at medium- and long-term maturities. Therefore
announcement eﬀects involved not only the government bonds that could be potentially bought by the
ECB, i.e. bonds up to 3-year maturity, but also bonds with longer maturities meaning that this program
led to positive spillovers all along the yield curve. These results are in line with the ﬁndings of Altavilla,
Giannone, and Lenza (2014).
This event-study analysis highlights that overall the unconventional monetary policy measures of
the ECB have been able to move market yields. However, the eﬀects diﬀer across countries and they are
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inﬂuenced by the general economic condition. Often ECB interventions led to a shift in the composition
of investors' portfolios as some yields increased and some other decreased. Eﬀects are almost always
diﬀerent between short- and long-term maturities and between speculative- and investment-grade coun-
tries. Moreover, the transmission mechanism is diﬀerent and it depends on the nature of the ECB
intervention. The SMP led to a decrease in yields for a direct supply eﬀect that pushes up prices. On
the other hand, announcements and implementations of the CBPP brought to an increase in yields
consistent with a ﬂight to quality eﬀect. Liquidity injections through LTROs overall led to a decrease
in yields which was always anticipated at the days of the announcement and so no signiﬁcant yields'
change is detectable on the implementation day. Signiﬁcant announcement eﬀects has been found also
for the OMT program as yields of some highly indebted countries declined. These are relevant ﬁndings
as they show the importance of expectations for markets' behaviour. Finally, interventions aimed at
supporting banks' funding conditions, i.e. the CBPPs and the LTROs, had almost no spillovers on
sovereign debt as they did not brought a decline in long-term yields.
1.5 Panel Analysis of Liquidity Injections
The previous sections found no relevant eﬀects of actual LTRO implementation on government bond
yields as in most cases markets anticipated the liquidity injection and yields moved on the announce-
ment day. These anticipated movements in yields can be due to the action of many diﬀerent types of
investor, also the ones that would not receive directly the liquidity from the ECB. For example, after
the announcement of a new LTRO to be implemented somewhere in the future, a private investor could
decide to immediately buy government bonds if he thinks that the liquidity will ease market tensions
pushing up prices. On the other hand, it is also likely that most of the banks asking for funds from the
ECB would invest once they will have actually received the liquidity. As a matter of fact, if markets
were eﬃcient there would only be an announcement eﬀects while if banks are liquidity constrained there
would be also an implementation eﬀect.
To go deeper into this matter, in this section I will focus on the actual implementation of long-term
reﬁnancing operations to assess the impact of liquidity injections by the European Central Bank. This
will allow me to see if there have been any supply eﬀect in markets, i.e. if actually banks invested
the received liquidity in government bonds or if market participants did that because of an increase
in lending from banks or because of a reduction in sovereign risk perception, as explained by Gerlach,
Schulz, and Wolﬀ (2010) and by Acharya, Drechsler, and Schnabl (2011). Therefore, the analysis
of implementation eﬀects will produce further evidence on whether positive spillovers from liquidity
injections to sovereign debt exist. For this purpose I will consider a modiﬁed measure of yields, namely
the cumulative percentage change.
As discussed before, there have been six main LTROs implemented by the ECB, four with a maturity
of 12 months and two with a maturity of 36 months. It takes three days for the ECB to complete an
LTRO: the ﬁrst day it calls for bids, the second day bids are collected in the auction and the third day
there is the settlement. These LTROs were unconventional not only for the maturity but also because
they are conducted at ﬁxed-rate tender and full-allotment procedure, meaning that the auction was not
competitive and the ECB accommodated all bids.
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For seek of simplicity I numbered the events chronologically so that in the following discussion:
• Event 1 refers to the 12-month maturity LTRO implemented in June 23rd - 25th 2009;
• Event 2 refers to the 12-month maturity LTRO implemented in September 29th - October 1st
2009;
• Event 3 refers to the 12-month maturity LTRO implemented in December 15th - 17th 2009;
• Event 4 refers to the 12-month maturity LTRO implemented in October 25th - 27th 2011;
• Event 5 refers to the 36-month maturity LTRO implemented in December 20th - 22nd 2011;
• Event 6 refers to the 36-month maturity LTRO implemented in February 28th - March 1st 2012.
The eﬀects of the last two events have been already evaluated by Darracq Pariés and De Santis (2013)
which uses a panel-VAR framework and identify the credit supply shock by means of the Bank Lending
Survey using quarterly data. Their results show that the 3-year LTROs are expansionary over the short
to the medium term as they led to an increase in GDP through the compression of lending rate spreads,
the decrease of inter-bank risk and the increase of loan volume, therefore producing evidence about the
importance of the bank lending channel in the transmission of these shocks.
1.5.1 Model Speciﬁcation and Econometric Methodology
Concerning the econometric methodology, I keep on applying an event-study approach but here I shift
the focus of the analysis from a single country to the aggregate eﬀect. In order to do so I construct
a panel where the dependent variables are bond yields of several diﬀerent countries and the regressors
are time-varying dummy variables capturing the changes in yields around LTROs implementations. In
particular I consider a 21-day window around the auction day so that the LTROs implementation is
perfectly centered and for each event I calculate the cumulative percentage change in yields:
yit =
Yit − Yi0
Yi0
Therefore yit is a series of 21 observations for each event but the ﬁrst element is always zero. The
aggregate vector Y has 126 observations for each country for a total of 1260 elements when considering
the 10 Euro-area countries and 2016 elements when the panel is expanded with 6 extra Euro-area
countries.
To reconcile the analysis with the general framework presented in section 1.3.1, here I consider as
market expectations the change in the very ﬁrst day of the event-window, i.e. zero. Therefore the test to
evaluate whether the percentage yield growth rate is abnormal compares the actual cumulative change
in yields with that measure of expectations leading to a t-test similar to the one in the previous section:
t =
yit
sdit
∼ T (n− 1)
I decided to use a medium-size event-window for several reasons. First of all, and as before, I need
to assume that the macroeconomic context is ﬁxed. For this assumption to be valid the event-window
31
CHAPTER 1. An Event-Study Analysis of ECB Unconventional Monetary Policy Measures
cannot be too wide otherwise many other events could inﬂuence yields. On the other hand, the window
cannot be too close to the implementation, otherwise I would not capture investment decisions that are
shifted of few days. There is also a statistical reason for the event-window not to be too narrow: if this
is the case, as I am considering cumulative changes, variations in data will be too low, reducing the
power of signiﬁcance tests. Moreover the choice of the 21-days window is in line with Dell'Erba (2012),
which performs a similar analysis on the eﬀects of rating changes on yield spreads.
The model I estimate is the following:
yitk = αik +
s∑
τ=−s+1
βmdiτk + εitk
Here yields of each country are regressed over 20 time-varying dummies for each event, each one
of them has a 1 on a diﬀerent day along the 21-days window across countries and zero otherwise. In
particular, the dummies capture the yield variations from the second day of the sample, which in the
output tables presented below is labelled as T-9 and T is the central day of the window. The T-10 day
has no dummy as it is taken as the reference day to calculate the signiﬁcance of the variation and clearly
including 21 dummies would lead to a perfect-collinearity problem. The model is estimated separately
for each event k and so I run the estimation six times, each time including the 20 dummies of the event
of interest and the sample consists of 126 observations.
The model has ﬁxed eﬀects because, as regressors are the same across countries, there should be
correlation between individual heterogeneity and residuals. Moreover I used standard errors consistent to
both autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity by clustering by individuals. Details about the econometric
speciﬁcation are reported in appendix A.
1.5.2 Euro-Area Countries
The ﬁrst step of the analysis is to consider only the usual 10 European countries as dependent variables,
namely Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Netherlands, Portugal and Spain.
Results are presented in table 1.12.
The events that produced more signiﬁcant results are the LTROs of June 2009 and September 2009.
The very ﬁrst 12-month maturity LTRO of June 2009 led to a signiﬁcant decrease in bond yields
across Europe starting from the 8th day preceding the auction meaning that investors anticipated the
liquidity injection and they kept on buying bonds also for several days after: the eﬀects of the LTRO
had been persistent. Figure 1.3 shows that the decline has been progressive in time.
The second LTRO, implemented in September 2009, led to a similar decline in yields. In the ﬁrst
days of the window, yields increased signiﬁcantly but then, from day T-4, changes become negative and
highly signiﬁcant. The highest declines are reached during the ﬁve days after the implementation, as
can be seen also from ﬁgure 1.4.
The remaining four events do not seems to produce signiﬁcant changes in yields' growth rates,
however some interesting insights can be taken combining the output of the panel analysis with ﬁgures
representing the evolution of single-country yields along the event windows.
The third event, i.e. the third 12-month LTRO of December 2009, produced an increase in yields
which is the opposite of what one should expect if there would have been a supply eﬀect. Signiﬁcant
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changes are concentrated at the end of the window. Figure 1.5 conﬁrms this pattern even though it
shows some other interesting details. The growth rates remained for most of the time positive for all
countries, but there were also days in which yields decreased slowing down the growth rate and also
making it negative for Belgium, Finland, France, Germany and Netherlands. This is not highlighted
by the panel analysis as it captures only the growth trend of yields, while it fails to evaluate changes
in this growth rate from one day to the other. Moreover it stands out that Greece yield growth trend
was nearly 10 times higher than the others and so this is the reason why the panel analysis always
reports positive coeﬃcients: Greece yields' changes dominates other bonds. This big diﬀerence in the
magnitude of changes also justiﬁes the big standard errors. Finally the most important thing to notice
is that on December 15th (the day when the ECB called for bids) all growth rates declined and, except
for Greece, Portugal and Spain, they went back to the previous levels after one week. This means that
the bond markets tensions in December had been eased by the liquidity injection of the ECB.
The fourth event is characterized by aggregate positive changes in yield growth rates with almost
no statistical signiﬁcance. This outcome is the result of very diﬀerent dynamics in single-countries
yields, as depicted in ﬁgure 1.6. Two aspects are worth noting. First, countries can be divided into two
groups, one that had negative changes in yields, and the other with positive changes in yields along the
event window: the countries of the ﬁrst group are the higher-rated ones, namely Germany, Netherlands
and Finland, while the countries of the second group are Belgium, France, Italy, Portugal and Spain.
Austrian yields ﬂuctuated around the zero-growth while Greek yields remained almost unchanged in
the ﬁrst half of the window and then soared in the second half. This is probably due to the Greek
internal political issues that increased the uncertainty around its future ﬁscal performance. Second,
during the ﬁrst ten days, yields moved almost in the same direction while after the injection of liquidity
they diverged. Greece, Italy ad Spain record a sharp increase while Finland, Germany and Netherlands
show a decline. This is captured by the increase in standard errors in the second half of the windows.
Overall the positive changes dominated over negative ones and so panel coeﬃcients are low but positive.
So, in this case the ECB intervention led to the expected decrease in yields only for safer countries.
Event 5, the ﬁrst 36-month maturity LTRO of December 20th 2011, did produce declines in bond
yields all around the implementation days and after. However these changes are not statistically sig-
niﬁcant because of the high variability in yields, as can be seen from ﬁgure 1.7. Yields declined for all
countries but Greece, Portugal and Italy and so the balancing between these two trends justiﬁes the
low magnitude of coeﬃcients. These ﬁndings can be justiﬁed by the fact that markets anticipated the
liquidity injections on December 2nd, when some rumours circulated about the decision of the ECB to
implement two LTROs with 3-year maturity, as shown by the previous event-study analysis on single-
country yields. So, this LTRO produced a decrease in yields only at announcements while the actual
liquidity injection did not lead to signiﬁcant supply eﬀects.
The last LTRO displays positive coeﬃcient for the ﬁrst part of the window and then, 2 days before
the implementation, they become negative but not signiﬁcant. Figure 1.8 gives useful insights. All
countries except Greece and Portugal exhibited a downward trend in yield changes that in most cases
were negative. On the other hand, Greece and Portugal recorded growing positive changes in yields.
The balancing of this diﬀerent pattern explains the lack of signiﬁcance of most coeﬃcients. Figure
1.8 also shows that on March 8th there had been an abrupt decline in Greek yields which was due
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to the decisions taken at the monthly ECB meeting to reaccept Greek debt instruments as collateral
in European credit operations and to activate a buyback scheme backed up by bonds issued by the
European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF). Hence the ECB liquidity injection led to declining yields
for all countries but Greece and Portugal.
Overall, from this ﬁrst panel analysis, it is possible to conclude that these six LTROs produced only
some of the expected supply eﬀect on yields leading at least to a decline in growth rates and so the
ECB had not always been able to mitigate bond market tensions. However, the most important thing
to notice is that the eﬀects of the ﬁrst two LTROs were similar for all countries while for the following
interventions it is not possible to identify a unique pattern in yields. This means that at the beginning of
the crisis there was an actual lack of liquidity in markets and so the LTROs were fully eﬀective but then
the nature of the crisis changed leading to diﬀerent responses in yields. This interpretation is supported
by the papers of Arghyrou and Kontonikas (2012) and Afonso, Arghyrou, Bagdatoglou, and Kontonikas
(2013) which ﬁnd that the crisis can be divided into two main sub-periods, i.e. August 2007 - February
2010 and March 2010 onwards, in which both the determinants of spreads and their relationship were
diﬀerent.
To better understand this last intuition and to evaluate how the monetary policy transmission
actually works inside a monetary union, in the following sections I will extend the analysis dividing the
European countries into two subsets.
1.5.3 Greece and Portugal
The analysis of the eﬀects of liquidity injections at the Euro-area level showed that during the last three
LTROs yields variability has been high which might be due to diﬀerences in the evolution of yields
across countries. To evaluate this hypothesis I replicate the analysis distinguishing between Greece and
Portugal and the remaining eight Euro-area countries.
Results are presented in table 1.13, where, for simplicity, NGP stands for no Greece and Portugal,
i.e. the other eight Euro-area countries, GP stands for Greece and Portugal and diﬀ indicates the
diﬀerence between the eﬀect on the yields of the remaining eight countries and the eﬀect on Greek and
Portuguese yields.
The ﬁrst LTRO, implemented at the end of June 2009, led to a decrease in all Euro-area yields that
intensiﬁed after the actual settlement. The impact was however weaker on Greek and Portuguese yields
as shown by the diﬀerence between the two coeﬃcients, which in some days is highly signiﬁcant. These
ﬁndings complement the results displayed in table 1.12 showing that the decline in yields was actually
uniform across countries.
For the second event, the LTRO implemented at the end of September 2009, the results are quite
similar. In the very ﬁrst days of the window, core-countries' yield growth increased signiﬁcantly, then
changes became negative few days before the LTRO and their magnitude increased. On the other hand,
Greece and Portugal always report negative and signiﬁcant changes in yields and the magnitude intensify
after the implementation date. The diﬀerence between the coeﬃcients is negative but not signiﬁcant.
This yield decomposition adds some interesting insights regarding the third event, i.e. the LTRO
implemented in mid December 2009. In the ﬁrst half of the window all yields increased signiﬁcantly.
The growth was stronger for Greece and Portugal with coeﬃcients that are more than double those of
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core countries. Starting from the day of implementation, changes became negative for the other Euro
area countries but they are not signiﬁcant.
For the fourth LTRO, implemented in the second half of October 2011, the current analysis does
not add much to what obtained when we do not distinguish Greece and Portugal from other countries.
Only few increases in Greece and Portugal yields are signiﬁcant in the second half of the window. In
this period core-countries' yields decreased but not signiﬁcantly.
The results for the two LTROs with 36-month maturity show that, in both cases, Greek and Por-
tuguese yields increased while other countries yields decreased. Coeﬃcients are almost always highly
signiﬁcant and Greece and Portugal experienced the largest movements. So these LTRO produced
supply eﬀects only on core-countries' yields meaning that investors decided to sell risky bonds and pur-
chased safer ones. Therefore, despite the high amount of liquidity injected, the ECB had not been able
to reduce the spreads of debt distressed countries.
Overall, this analysis highlights that liquidity injections had the expected supply eﬀect in most cases
and especially during event 1, 2, 5 and 6, in line with what obtained from the aggregate analysis. However
the distinction allows to understand that only during event 1 and 2 there had been a supply eﬀect on all
Euro-area bond yields while in the last two events supply eﬀects only concerned core-countries' yields.
1.5.4 Sovereign Ratings
As several coeﬃcients do not have the expected sign, to further understand the reasons behind yield
changes I replicated the analysis distinguishing countries on the base of their investment category, i.e.
investment grade or speculative grade. To obtain this classiﬁcation I considered the sovereign credit
ratings from the agency Standard & Poor's as they are publicly available on the oﬃcial website. Table
1.14 shows the long-term local currency credit rating12 of the 10 European countries considered for this
analysis.
By dividing the European countries in two subsets I can evaluate the eﬀects of the liquidity injections
on the two investment category meaning that I can evaluate whether the monetary policy transmission
mechanism is unique inside the monetary union.
Results are presented in table 1.15. For seek of simplicity, I used abbreviations: INVEST stands
for investment grade countries, i.e. Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany and Netherlands,
SPECUL stands for speculative grade countries, i.e. Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain, and diﬀ
indicates the diﬀerence between the eﬀect on the yields of investment grade countries and of speculative
grade countries.
The ﬁrst two events, the LTROs implemented in June and September 2009, produced a signiﬁcant
decrease in the growth rate of both investment-grade and speculative-grade countries yields along all
the time-window. The impact is higher for investment-grade countries and overall this does not add
much to the previous analysis: the ﬁrst LTRO led to the expected supply eﬀect on bond yields.
The third event is the LTRO of December 2009. This analysis conﬁrms the results reported in
tables 1.12 and 1.13 as most of the coeﬃcients are positive and signiﬁcant changes occurred mainly in
investment-grade countries yields. Therefore there had been no supply-eﬀect on bond yields.
12The local currency international rating measures the likelihood of repayment in the currency of the jurisdiction in
which the issuer is domiciled and hence does not take account of the possibility that it will not be possible to convert local
currency into foreign currency, or make transfers between sovereign jurisdictions (transfer and convertibility risk).
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Concerning the LTRO of October 2011, coeﬃcients of investment-grade countries are almost always
negative but not signiﬁcant while the opposite happens for speculative-grade countries.
A similar evolution of yields characterizes the ﬁfth event, i.e. the implementation of the ﬁrst LTRO
with 36-month maturity. Investment-grade countries display signiﬁcant and negative changes all along
the time-window while speculative-grade countries yields increased but signiﬁcant changes apply in the
ﬁrst six days and in the fourth day after the LTRO implementation. The diﬀerence between changes in
speculative- and investment-grade countries yields is signiﬁcant all along the time window.
Also the second LTRO with 36-month maturity had the expected supply eﬀects only on investment-
grade countries. Coeﬃcients of higher-rated bonds are signiﬁcant in several days both before and after
the LTRO implementation. Therefore during all these events there had been a substitution of riskier
bonds for safer ones: the LTRO had been eﬀective but not on the desired bonds because it actually
increased spreads rather than mitigate market tensions.
To conclude, the LTROs that produced the desired supply-eﬀects were only the ﬁrst two (for all
countries), while other supply eﬀects were in wrong directions.
1.5.5 Italy and Spain
Section 1.5.3 shows that Greek and Portuguese yields often followed a very diﬀerent pattern with respect
to the other Euro-area countries, especially in the last four events. For this reason, in this section I drop
yields of Greece and Portugal from the dataset and I distinguish the movements in Italian and Spanish
yields from changes in the remaining six countries.
Results are presented in table 1.16, where, for simplicity, NIS stands for no Italy and Spain, i.e.
the remaining six Euro-area countries, IS stands for Italy and Spain and diﬀ indicates the diﬀerence
between the eﬀect on the yields of the remaining six countries and the eﬀect on Italian and Spanish
yields.
The ﬁrst two LTRO led to substantial and highly signiﬁcant decreases in both categories conﬁrming
the previous ﬁndings. Coeﬃcients are always greater for the six core countries but the diﬀerence with
respect to Italy and Spain coeﬃcients is rarely signiﬁcant.
Interesting results appear analysing the third event, i.e. the LTRO implemented in December 2009.
Yields of Italian and Spanish bonds always increased and most changes are signiﬁcant. On the other
hand, yields of the remaining countries display a mixed pattern: they alternate some days in which
they rose with some others in which they decreased. In general, increases are always signiﬁcant while
declines are signiﬁcant only in two days right after the implementation. In this period bond market
tensions were high and the liquidity injection produced only a temporary stop in yield growth trend of
the core European countries.
During the fourth event yields of the two groups followed an opposite trend. Italian and Spanish
yields increased with high signiﬁcance while the other countries' yields declined but not signiﬁcantly.
The magnitude of changes is much greater for Italy and Spain meaning that in October 2011 investors
exited from this bond market segment. Therefore this LTRO produced a ﬂight to safety eﬀect: investors
sold riskier bonds for safer ones.
The ﬁfth event, which refers to the ﬁrst 36-month maturity LTRO implemented in December 20th
2011, produced signiﬁcant declines in core countries yields with p-values that are almost always lower
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that 0.01. As before, Italian and Spanish yields rose but signiﬁcance is present only in the ﬁrst ﬁve
changes. This is due to the high yields' variability, as shown by ﬁgure 1.7, which prevents from taking
clear conclusions about the eﬀects of this LTRO. Overall it seems reasonable to interpret these patterns
as consistent with a ﬂight to safety, even though eﬀects are less clear than those of the previous event.
The last LTRO shows signiﬁcant supply eﬀects for all the bonds considered. More precisely, the
event-window can be divided into two parts. The ﬁrst part includes the ﬁrst seven days and here Italian
and Spanish coeﬃcients are negative and signiﬁcant while the others are positive but not signiﬁcant.
Starting from the day T-2 also coeﬃcients of the six core countries become negative and after the LTRO
they become also highly signiﬁcant. Therefore, in the second half of the window all changes are negative
and signiﬁcant with Italian and Spanish yields experiencing the greatest movements.
Interesting insights can be deduced from this analysis. The ﬁrst two events are conﬁrmed to be the
only cases in which supply eﬀects involved all the considered yields. More relevant are the results of the
last three events: during event 4 and 5 there is clear evidence of a ﬂight to quality eﬀect, i.e. only yields
of higher-rated countries declined, while the last LTRO had been eﬀective in easing market tensions
also on Italian and Spanish bonds.
1.5.6 Extra Euro-Area Countries
After analysing the yield dynamics inside the Euro-area, in this last part I want to assess whether the
ECB liquidity injections had any eﬀect on bond yields outside the Euro area which is the usual area of
inﬂuence of ECB actions.
For this purpose I expand the panel adding as dependent variables the 10-year government bond
yields of Denmark, Japan, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom and United States. The regressors
are the usual 20 dummy variables for each event. By using categorical variables I am able to check
whether the dummy variables have any signiﬁcance for yields of extra-Euro countries and if the diﬀerence
between the eﬀect on Euro and extra-Euro countries yields is statistically signiﬁcant. Moreover I compare
variations in extra-Euro yields also with two subsets of European countries, namely Greece and Portugal
and the remaining eight countries13.
The results are presented in tables 1.17, 1.18 and 1.19. For seek of simplicity, I used the following
abbreviations: EURO stands for the usual ten Euro-area countries, EXEURO stands for the six extra-
Euro countries used as control variables, NGP stands for all countries but Greece and Portugal, GP
stands for Greece and Portugal and diﬀ indicates the diﬀerence between the previous two coeﬃcients.
The coeﬃcients for Euro-area countries are the same presented in tables 1.12 and 1.13 and so in the
following I focus mainly on the coeﬃcients of control variables, which capture the eﬀects of LTROs on
yields on extra-Euro countries, and on their magnitude and signiﬁcance with respect to the eﬀects on
Euro countries. On the other hand, standard errors diﬀer from the ones presented in previous tables
since here the dimensionality of the panel has changed. However diﬀerences are negligible as almost all
p-values remain in the same category of signiﬁcance.
13In practice, I constructed several dummy variables: the ﬁrst indicates Euro-area countries and is equal to one for
Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain and it is zero otherwise; the
second selects extra-Euro countries and so it is equal to one for Denmark, Japan, Sweden, Switzerland, UK, US while it
is zero otherwise; the last two dummy variables split Euro-area countries into two subsets, i.e. Greece and Portugal and
the core European countries.
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During the ﬁrst event, both yields of European and extra-Euro countries declined all along the time
window and ﬁgure 1.9 conﬁrms this pattern. P-values are always very low but the interesting point is
that the magnitude of the decrease is higher for extra-Euro countries and also signiﬁcant around the
implementation date. The same is true with respect to the two subsets of Euro countries.
Also the second event is connected to a decline in yields growth rate outside the Euro-area with high
statistical signiﬁcance. In this case supply eﬀects start from the fourth day before the auction. Figure
1.10 shows that yields followed a declining trend during the ﬁrst ﬁfteen days of the window and then
the trend shifted upwards but still remained negative. Here the magnitude of changes is much higher
for extra-Euro countries, with coeﬃcients that in most of the days are more than double the change in
European yields. As a matter of fact also the diﬀerence between coeﬃcients is statistically signiﬁcant.
So, these two LTROs had highly statistically signiﬁcant eﬀects both inside and outside the Euro-area
meaning that investors actually used the liquidity to buy bonds and most of the purchases involved extra
Euro-area countries bonds.
The LTRO of December 2009 led to signiﬁcant increases in yields of both Euro-area and extra-
Euro area countries. Here it is important to point out that increases are much higher for Greek and
Portuguese bonds signalling rising market tensions connected to debt sustainability issues. On the other
hand, extra-Euro countries' yields experienced greater movements with respect to core countries' yields,
even though their diﬀerence is never signiﬁcant. For extra Euro-area countries applies a reasoning
similar to the one used for Euro-area countries. An increase in yields is the opposite of one would have
expected after a liquidity injection. However ﬁgures 1.11 and 1.5 show that after the call for bids for
the LTRO (on December 15th) yields growth rates declined for all countries. So it is possible to say
that a little liquidity eﬀect appeared just as a temporary stop in the increasing trend of growth rates.
The fourth event is the LTRO implemented in October 2011. From an aggregate point of view, during
the ﬁrst half of the window, there is some signiﬁcance in both Euro-area yields, which always increased,
and in extra-Euro yields, which decreased in most of the cases. The interesting thing here is that extra-
Euro yields started to decrease signiﬁcantly in the second half of the window, as it is also clear from
ﬁgure 1.12. In contrast, Euro-area yields increased and so the diﬀerence between the coeﬃcients of the
two groups is statistically signiﬁcant. By considering the breakdown of Euro-area countries it is possible
to see that core countries yields have negative coeﬃcients in the second part of the window, while Greek
and Portuguese yields always increased. In particular, even though the magnitude of changes is relevant,
coeﬃcients of the two groups of Euro-area countries are never statistically signiﬁcant because of the high
variability in yields. Moreover, the diﬀerence between non-European countries coeﬃcients and those of
Greece and Portugal is much greater than the diﬀerence with respect to the core European countries.
This seems to indicate that investors moved out from the European bond market (and especially from
lower-rated bonds) and purchased non-Euro bonds. Finally, in contrast to what said for Euro-area
yields, extra-Euro countries yields movements seem to be highly correlated (except for Japan). So, for
this event, the supply eﬀect can be found mainly on extra-Euro yields and once again this is evidence
of a ﬂight to safety.
For the ﬁfth event the panel analysis ﬁnds no signiﬁcant liquidity eﬀects for the Euro countries as
a whole but Greece and Portugal bond yields rose with very low p-values and the other eight countries
yields declined from the fourth day before the implementation. On the other hand, extra Euro-area
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bond yields declined during all the time span with high statistical signiﬁcance, as conﬁrmed also by
ﬁgure 1.13. Therefore we had a supply eﬀect on both higher-rated Euro and non-Euro bonds meaning
that most of the injected liquidity had been used to purchase safe securities.
The analysis of the last LTRO does not provide very interesting information as yields of extra-Euro
countries almost always increased in several days at the beginning of the window with high statistical
signiﬁcance. This can be seen also in ﬁgure 1.14 that highlights that only the Swiss bonds followed
a declining trend in their growth rate, while other countries yields ﬂuctuated around the zero growth
rate. Interesting movements happened in the two Euro-countries subsets as Greek and Portuguese yields
always increased while yields of the core countries had been aﬀected by a supply eﬀect. So, in this case,
investors preferred to buy higher-rated Euro bonds.
This last analysis has been useful to show some relevant evidence about the transmission of liquidity
shocks outside the Euro-area. These channels fully worked during event 1, 2, 4 and 5.
1.5.7 Overall Eﬀects of the LTROs
The panel analysis produced lots of evidence about the eﬀects of the liquidity injections. Overall most
of the considered events produced some decrease in bond yields meaning that banks during the crisis
experienced some liquidity constraints and moreover there have been positive spillovers from the banking
sector to government debt.
The ﬁrst LTRO was implemented in June 23rd-25th 2009. All the bond yields considered declined
in the event-window with very low p-values. The eﬀect was much more prominent for investment-grade
countries than for lower-rated ones. I also presented evidence about the decline in yields of extra-Euro
countries meaning that there had been a transmission also outside the area of inﬂuence of the ECB. This
event caused the strongest and broader supply eﬀects suggesting that banks actually used the available
liquidity to buy government bonds.
The second LTRO took place in September 29th-October 1st 2009. Yield growth rates declined for
both investment-grade and speculative-grade countries starting from the fourth day before the auction.
Concerning extra-Euro countries the decrease in yields started with the same timing as European yields.
Overall supply eﬀects are evident as investors anticipated the liquidity injection buying both Euro-area
and non-Euro bonds.
It is necessary to notice that these ﬁrst two LTRO had been conducted in a period of high stress for
the banking sector. As a matter of fact, at the beginning of the ﬁnancial crisis, banks experienced a
liquidity crisis due to the lack of conﬁdence which made the interbank market dysfunctional. Therefore
banks actually used the received liquidity to invest in the bond market.
The third LTRO was implemented in December 15th-17th. All the analysis reported shows that no
supply eﬀects aﬀected any of the bond yields considered. All the considered categories of bonds recorded
an increase in yields which was more signiﬁcant for higher-rated European bonds and extra-Euro bonds
meaning that investors exited form the government bond market. The graphical analysis of Euro-area
yields shows that the LTRO seems to have temporary eased the yield growth rate for some countries
but this does not generate any statistically signiﬁcant result.
The fourth LTRO was implemented in October 25th-27th. Yields of speculative grade countries in-
creased during all the time-window and the signiﬁcance is higher in the last days. Greek and Portuguese
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yields followed this trend but coeﬃcients are not signiﬁcant while Italian and Spanish yield changes are
coupled with very low p-values. Core European countries' yields declined but not signiﬁcantly. On the
other hand, supply eﬀects are evident for extra-Euro countries. This pattern indicates that investors
sold risky bonds and purchased safer ones.
The ﬁfth LTRO was the ﬁrst one with 36-month maturity and it took place in December 20th-22nd
2011. Inside the Euro area investment-grade countries yields reduced signiﬁcantly during most of the
event-windows while Greek and Portuguese yields increased with high statistical signiﬁcance. Italian
and Spanish yields increased with low signiﬁcance. Yields growth of extra Euro-area countries declined
and changes are greater in the last days. Also in this case the liquidity injected was not used in the
expected way and it did not help to ease bond market tensions as spreads of highly indebted countries
increased.
The last LTRO was the second one with 36-month maturity and it took place in February 28th-
March 1st 2012. The outcome of the empirical analysis is similar to the previous ones as the expected
supply eﬀects mostly concentrated on higher-rated Euro bonds after the auction day. Moreover, here
there have been a signiﬁcant increase in yields of Greek and Portuguese bonds exacerbating the yield
spreads with respect to Germany. These yields declined only after the decisions taken by the ECB
Governing Council to reaccept Greek debt instruments as collateral in European credit operations. On
the contrary, Italian and Spanish bond yields decreased with high statistical signiﬁcance. Finally, yields
of extra Euro-area bonds reported some signiﬁcant positive changes at the beginning of the window and
some not-signiﬁcant negative changes after the LTRO implementation.
Overall these last three LTROs did not produce the expected supply eﬀect as investors only purchased
higher-rated bonds and the spreads of Greece and Portugal increased making the ECB intervention
detrimental for bond markets. Spreads of Italy and Spain increased during event 4 and 5 while they
reduced during event 6. It must however recalled that the event-study analysis of policy announcements
found that news about these last two interventions had signiﬁcant eﬀects on yields of almost all countries.
In these cases there have been an announcement eﬀect and a weaker supply eﬀect once banks actually
received the liquidity.
It is also important to notice that during event 1, 2, 4 and 5 non-European yields declined more
than Euro-area ones. This can be explained using the uncovered interest parity. This relationship
predicts that, when foreign interest rates decreases more than national ones, the national currency
should depreciate, which is what actually happened to the Euro currency with respect to the Japanese
yen, the Swedish krone and the Swiss franc. Figure 1.15 shows that the Euro exchange rate with respect
to the UK sterling and the US dollar alternated periods in which it depreciated with periods in which it
appreciated. In particular, it depreciated from mid October 2009 to mid June 2010 and from May 2011
on, while it appreciated from mid June 2010 to April 2011. These periods are consistent with event 1,
2, 4 and 5 and so it is possible to conclude that the uncovered interest parity fully explain the yields'
evolution over these events. On the other hand this evidence is not consistent with the Dornbusch (1976)
overshooting model which predicts that, after an expansionary monetary policy, national interest rates
should decline more than foreign ones and the exchange rate overshoots, i.e. it depreciates a lot so to
generate a subsequent appreciation.
Finally, the evidence supports also the idea that LTROs were eﬀective as long as the crisis was due
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to a lack of liquidity. Since the autumn 2009 the crisis became debt-oriented and liquidity injections lost
their eﬀectiveness. Debt sustainability issues led to a diﬀerentiation between European countries which
is the cause of the impaired transmission of monetary policy. Positive spillovers from the banking sector
to sovereign debt aﬀected only higher-rated countries. Therefore, inside a monetary union there can
be situations in which the monetary policy transmission mechanism is not unique making the eﬀects
of unconventional interventions ambiguous. Moreover, in the last days of the event-window of the
sixth LTRO the ECB announced to reaccept Greek bonds as collateral in European credit operations
and this led to an abrupt decline in Greek yields suggesting that direct interventions on bonds are
more eﬀective in containing spreads than liquidity injections. What makes the eﬀects of a monetary
policy action diﬃcult to forecast seems to be the lack of homogeneity between the single-countries
macroeconomic fundamentals and the impaired functioning of ﬁnancial markets. This ﬁnding raises
some issues regarding the eﬀectiveness of monetary policy during unconventional times.
1.6 Conclusion
In this work I focused on the eﬀects of unconventional monetary policy measures implemented by the
ECB on government bond yields. The aim was to evaluate whether banks actually invested the received
liquidity and so if there had been positive spillovers from the banking to sovereign debt.
The ﬁrst empirical analysis concerned the eﬀects of announcements on single-countries bond yields
to evaluate whether policy actions aﬀected markets through investors' expectations. The ﬁndings, even
though they are not all consistent with each-other, supports the eﬀectiveness of the expectational channel
in shaping market movements. The announcements that produced the most relevant eﬀects were the
ones about the Covered Bond Purchase Programmes, the Securities Markets Programme, the Outright
Monetary Transaction programme and the rumours about the lengthening in the maturity of LTROs in
early December 2011. On the other hand no signiﬁcant changes in yields had been found in conjunction
with the actual LTROs implementation.
For the second empirical analysis I constructed a panel of both Euro-area and extra Euro-area coun-
try yields and I analysed the direct eﬀects of extraordinary liquidity injections by the ECB, namely six
longer-term reﬁnancing operations. The most interesting ﬁnding here is that the transmission mecha-
nism of these liquidity injections was not unique. Indeed, the last three LTROs led to an increase in
market spreads for lower-rated Euro-area countries due to a ﬂight to safety eﬀect. This can be justiﬁed
by the change in the nature of the ﬁnancial crisis. At the beginning the ECB had been successful in
mitigate market tension because the crisis was due to a lack of conﬁdence between banks that led to
funding problems. All countries beneﬁted from the liquidity injections because they improved funding
conditions for both banks and ﬁrms and so there had been positive spillovers from the banking sector
to sovereign debt. However, in 2009 the liquidity-crisis evolved into a debt-crisis and from then on
the monetary policy eﬀects diﬀerentiated across countries. In a context of increasing sovereign default
risk for several European countries the monetary policy transmission started to be inﬂuenced by the
diﬀerences in macroeconomic fundamentals and the impaired functioning of ﬁnancial markets. Positive
spillovers from liquidity to government debt involved only higher-rated countries. This ﬁnding raises
some issues regarding the eﬀectiveness of monetary policy during unconventional times especially when
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market tensions are not due to monetary issues like the lack of liquidity but rather they are caused by
ﬁscal issues like debt sustainability. In this context liquidity injections had the eﬀect of exacerbating
rather than mitigating market tensions.
As a matter of fact, the ﬁrst part of this work showed that the interventions that proved to be more
eﬀective in containing bond spreads during the debt crisis were the direct interventions on bonds, like
the Securities Market Programme and the acceptance of bonds as collateral as they led to strong declines
in yields. Therefore, even though liquidity injections in credit markets proved not to be eﬀective during
the debt-crisis to mitigate spreads, the ECB is not powerless: direct bond purchases are eﬀective and it
should keep on implementing that kind of actions if it wanted to reduce spreads.
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Appendix A. Econometric Details of the Panel Model
In section 1.5 I speciﬁed the following model:
yitk = αik +
s∑
τ=−s+1
βmdiτk + εitk
Here the subscript k capture the six events over which the model is estimated, while i and t represent,
respectively, countries and time.
The regressors are 20 time-varying dummies for each event (s = 10), each one of them has a 1 on a
diﬀerent day along the 21-days window across countries and zero otherwise. In particular, the dummies
capture the yield variations from the second day of the sample, which in the output tables presented
below is labelled as T-9 and T is the central day of the window. The T-10 day has no dummy as it is
taken as the reference day to calculate the signiﬁcance of the variation and clearly including 21 dummies
would lead to a perfect-collinearity problem. The model is estimated separately for each event and so I
run the estimation six times, each time including the 20 dummies of the event of interest and the sample
consists of 126 observations.
As this is not a structural model, it can suﬀer from diﬀerent misspeciﬁcation problems. In the
following I analyse these problems and explain how I accounted for them.
Fixed Eﬀects vs. Random Eﬀects
In this context, regressors are the same across individuals and so there should be correlation between
individual heterogeneity and residuals. To capture this heterogeneity I added the ﬁxed eﬀect to the
model. Fixed eﬀects are actually non-signiﬁcant as estimation outputs always report a zero correlation
between the matrix of regressors and individual heterogeneity meaning that the results from the ﬁxed-
eﬀects model are very similar to the ones coming from a random-eﬀects model. Moreover, the model
had been estimated also with random eﬀects and standard errors are equal to the ones in the ﬁxed-
eﬀects case up to the 5th decimal so that the signiﬁcance of coeﬃcient does not change between the two
speciﬁcations.
Overall, for the theoretical reason explained here, I preferred to use the ﬁxed-eﬀect model.
Robust Standard Errors
Following the classical assumptions, errors should be independent and identically distributed but in
reality this is often not the case. When this assumption is violated the OLS standard errors are not
consistent anymore and to obtain an accurate statistical inference it is necessary to take into account
the structure of the variance-covariance matrix.
Here errors are both autocorrelated and heteroskedastic. Autocorrelation comes form the fact that
the event-windows are the same for all the bonds considered, while heteroskedasticity is typical of
ﬁnancial data at high frequency.
Concerning the correlation structure, in a panel context there can be several levels of correlation
which in general are referred to as clustered errors. Clustered refers to the fact that the correlation
is grouped along diﬀerent dimensions. The simplest case is when the clustering is along one dimension:
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individuals or time. When errors are clustered within individuals it means that there are individual
eﬀects, i.e. errors are correlated across time for each individual (E (εitεik | xit, xik) 6= 0∀ t 6= k). When
errors are clustered within time it means that there are time eﬀects, i.e. errors are correlated across
individuals for each moment in time (E (εitεjt | xit, xjt) 6= 0 ∀ i 6= j). The extended case is when the
clustering involves multiple levels but only one dimension. For example the correlation can be through
individuals and cities and in this case clusters are said to be nested. On the other hand, errors can be
clustered by the two diﬀerent dimensions of the panel: individuals and time. In this case clusters are
said to be non-nested. If errors are correlated between diﬀerent individuals in diﬀerent time we have
persistent common shocks, meaning that shocks are common to all individuals and autocorrelated for
L periods (E (εitεjk | xit, xjk) 6= 0 ∀ i 6= j and |t− k| > L). Of course errors can be clustered also by
more than two dimensions and this would complicate the procedure. For each of this case the corrections
needed to obtain robust errors are diﬀerent.
In the present framework the regressors are independent of each other and of the errors because they
are dummy variables. So, even though errors are correlated across individuals in each time because the
event-windows are the same, Cov (xitεit, xjtεjt) = 0 and then I don't need to cluster by time. The only
correction needed is to cluster by individual which can be easily done with STATA.
Heteroskedasticity implies that the variance of the error term is not constant over time. To ac-
count for this kind of misspeciﬁcation it is necessary to use Huber-White standard errors. Stock
and Watson (2008) prove that the heteroskedasticity-consistent estimator in case of ﬁxed-eﬀects and
the autocorrelation-consistent estimator are asymptotically equivalent for T = 3 while if T > 3 the
autocorrelation-consistent estimator should be used. For this reason, in STATA the command to cluster
by individual produces a variance-covariance matrix which is consistent also to heteroskedasticity.
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Appendix B. Figures
Figure 1.1: ECB purchases of covered bonds under the two CBPPs
Source: Datastream
Figure 1.2: ECB purchases of bonds under the SMP
Source: Bloomberg
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Figure 1.3: Event 1: cumulative percentage change in yields (11/06/09 - 08/07/09)
Figure 1.4: Event 2: cumulative percentage change in yields (17/09/09 - 14/10/09)
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Figure 1.5: Event 3: cumulative percentage change in yields (3/12/09 - 30/12/09)
Figure 1.6: Event 4: cumulative percentage change in yields (13/10/11 - 9/11/11)
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Figure 1.7: Event 5: cumulative percentage change in yields (8/12/11 - 4/01/12)
Figure 1.8: Event 6: cumulative percentage change in yields (16/02/12 - 14/03/12)
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Figure 1.9: Event 1: cumulative percentage change in yields (11/06/09 - 08/07/09)
Figure 1.10: Event 2: cumulative percentage change in yields (17/09/09 - 14/10/09)
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Figure 1.11: Event 3: cumulative percentage change in yields (3/12/09 - 30/12/09)
Figure 1.12: Event 4: cumulative percentage change in yields (13/10/11 - 9/11/11)
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Figure 1.13: Event 5: cumulative percentage change in yields (8/12/11 - 4/01/12)
Figure 1.14: Event 6: cumulative percentage change in yields (16/02/12 - 14/03/12)
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Figure 1.15: Euro nominal exchange rates
Source: ECB
*Nominal exchange rate is deﬁned as the ratio between the foreign currency and the Euro currency
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Appendix C. Tables
Table 1.1: Main ECB announcements of unconventional monetary policy measures
Date Time Description Event Window
August 22, 2007 15.34
Announcement of the 1st supplementary LTRO
(3-month maturity, standard procedure)
2 days
(Aug. 21-23 )
October 15, 2008 16.32
Announcement of several LTROs (3/6-month maturity,
ﬁxed-rate full allotment procedure) and expansion of
the list of eligible collaterals
2 days
(Oct. 14-16)
May 7, 2009 14.35
Announcement of the Enhanced Credit Support
programme and of the Covered Bonds Purchase
Programme 1
2 days
(May 6-8)
June 4, 2009 14.30
Publication of the technical details of the Covered
Bonds Purchase Programme 1
2 days
(June 3-5)
June 23, 2009 15.35 Call for bids of a LTRO with 12-month maturity
2 days
(June 22-24)
September 29, 2009 15.35 Call for bids of a LTRO with 12-month maturity
2 days
(Sep. 28-30)
December 3, 2009 15.40
Announcement of details on reﬁnancing operations
(MROs conducted as ﬁxed-rate and full-allotment
procedure for as long as is needed)
2 days
(Dec. 2-4)
December 15, 2009 15.35 Call for bids of a LTRO with 12-month maturity
2 days
(Dec. 14-16)
May 10, 2010 3.15 Announcement of the Securities Markets Programme
1 days
(May 9-10)
August 7, 2011 23.00
Statement about the active implementation of the
Securities Markets Programme
1 day
(Aug. 7-8)
October 6, 2011 14.45
Announcement of the Covered Bonds Purchase
Programme 2 and of two LTROs with 12-month
maturity
2 days
(Oct. 5-7)
October 25, 2011 15.35 Call for bids of a LTRO with 12-month maturity
2 days
(Oct. 24-26)
November 3, 2011 15.30
Publication of the technical details of the Covered
Bonds Purchase Programme 2
2 days
(Nov. 2-4)
December 2, 2011 Rumours about ECB's LTROs with 36-month maturity
2 days
(Dec. 1-5)
December 8, 2011 14.30 Announcement of two LTROs with 36-month maturity
2 days
(Dec. 7-9)
December 20, 2011 15.35 Call for bids of a LTRO with 36-month maturity
2 days
(Dec. 19-21)
February 28, 2012 15.35 Call for bids of a LTRO with 36-month maturity
2 days
(Feb. 27-29)
July 26 2012 12.00
Statement about the commitment of the ECB to do
whatever it takes to preserve the euro
2 days
(Jul. 25-27)
August 2 2012 14.30
Announcement of the Outright Monetary Transactions
program
2 days
(Aug. 1-3)
September 6 2012 14.30
Publication of the details of the Outright Monetary
Transactions program
2 days
(Sep. 5-7)
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Table 1.2: Austria: eﬀects of ECB announcements on government bond yields
EVENTS
RESPONSES TO ANNOUNCEMENTS Joint
1y 2y 3y 5y 7y 10y Signiﬁcance
Aug. 22, 2007 (2d) 0.106 0.151 0.146 0.1 0.074 0.577
p-value 0.0007 0.0547 0.0562 0.1426 0.2047 0.0001
Oct. 15, 2008 (2d) 0.047 -0.029 -0.263 -0.161 -0.117 -0.058 -0.581
p-value 0.7747 0.8400 0.0921 0.2589 0.3212 0.5871 0.4454
May 7, 2009 (2d) -0.082 -0.077 -0.088 -0.006 0.034 0.097 -0.122
p-value 0.0777 0.1246 0.2484 0.9326 0.5617 0.0680 0.0830
Jun. 4, 2009 (2d) 0.152 0.253 0.286 0.309 0.267 0.213 1.48
p-value 0.0914 0.0769 0.2261 0.0050 0.0063 0.0002 0.0000
Jun. 23, 2009 (2d) -0.051 -0.065 -0.047 -0.033 -0.029 -0.008 -0.233
p-value 0.5804 0.6734 0.8439 0.7878 0.7911 0.9066 0.9947
Sept. 29, 2009 (2d) 0.021 0.041 0.038 0.033 0.018 0.021 0.172
p-value 0.3156 0.3009 0.3402 0.4915 0.7211 0.6634 0.6900
Dec. 3, 2009 (2d) -0.052 0.042 0.095 0.089 0.081 0.038 0.293
p-value 0.1400 0.2219 0.0445 0.0710 0.1063 0.3888 0.0178
Dec. 15, 2009 (2d) 0.005 -0.024 -0.006 0.017 0.045 0.036 0.073
p-value 0.9347 0.4401 0.9016 0.7085 0.3006 0.3580 0.8382
May 10, 2010 (1d) -0.182 0.064 0.15 0.047 0.107 0.114 0.3
p-value 0.0000 0.1194 0.0182 0.5149 0.0254 0.0245 0.0000
Aug. 7, 2011 (1d) -0.052 -0.143 -0.099 -0.11 -0.113 -0.087 -0.604
p-value 0.3947 0.0231 0.1172 0.0665 0.0421 0.0592 0.0017
Oct. 6, 2011 (2d) 0.166 0.082 0.116 0.109 0.084 0.151 0.708
p-value 0.0621 0.3141 0.2111 0.2457 0.4141 0.1345 0.0912
Oct. 25, 2011 (2d) -0.13 -0.202 -0.168 -0.182 -0.148 -0.161 -0.991
p-value 0.2000 0.0103 0.0556 0.0301 0.1060 0.1035 0.0005
Nov. 3, 2011 (2d) -0.222 -0.138 -0.022 -0.048 -0.055 0.001 -0.484
p-value 0.0336 0.1355 0.8066 0.5734 0.5626 0.9927 0.2335
Dec. 2, 2011 (2d) 0.022 -0.012 -0.091 -0.125 -0.168 -0.066 -0.44
p-value 0.8652 0.9575 0.6997 0.6034 0.4680 0.7179 0.9800
Dec. 8, 2011 (2d) 0.094 0.048 0.072 0.045 -0.007 0.039 0.291
p-value 0.4630 0.8334 0.7629 0.8538 0.9762 0.8322 0.9928
Dec. 20, 2011 (2d) -0.008 -0.044 -0.08 -0.043 0.057 0.064 -0.054
p-value 0.9468 0.8446 0.7482 0.8641 0.8098 0.7309 0.9992
Feb. 28, 2012 (2d) -0.056 0.048 -0.009 -0.037 0.001 -0.011 -0.064
p-value 0.2431 0.6143 0.8596 0.6074 0.9888 0.8660 0.9188
Jul. 26, 2012 (2d) 0.092 -0.033 -0.096 -0.097 -0.086 -0.064 -0.284
p-value 0.1234 0.6125 0.2472 0.2785 0.3366 0.4358 0.3233
Aug. 2, 2012 (2d) 0.032 0.026 0.032 0.021 0.008 0.004 0.123
p-value 0.6069 0.6972 0.6821 0.8092 0.9245 0.9576 0.9952
Sep. 6, 2012 (2d) -0.003 0.07 0.053 0.055 0.034 0.047 0.256
p-value 0.9449 0.1606 0.2790 0.2821 0.4670 0.2756 0.3932
Signiﬁcant changes are in bold font.
54
CHAPTER 1. An Event-Study Analysis of ECB Unconventional Monetary Policy Measures
Table 1.3: Belgium: eﬀects of ECB announcements on government bond yields
EVENTS
RESPONSES TO ANNOUNCEMENTS Joint
3m 6m 1y 2y 3y 5y 7y 10y 15y 20y 30y Signiﬁcance
Aug. 22, 2007 (2d) 0.062 0.123 0.148 0.13 0.107 0.067 0.037 0.02 0.009 0.703
p-value 0.0947 0.0613 0.0412 0.0670 0.0928 0.2416 0.4766 0.6843 0.8454 0.0171
Oct. 15, 2008 (2d) -0.202 0.101 -0.164 -0.226 -0.193 -0.128 -0.087 -0.006 0.076 -0.829
p-value 0.3066 0.6495 0.2977 0.1269 0.1918 0.2923 0.4299 0.9593 0.5936 0.4597
May 7, 2009 (2d) -0.042 -0.053 -0.042 -0.027 0.024 0.065 0.135 0.162 0.189 0.411
p-value 0.6475 0.3446 0.6082 0.6924 0.6211 0.2005 0.0096 0.0014 0.0009 0.0000
Jun. 4, 2009 (2d) 0.048 0.149 0.283 0.296 0.291 0.204 0.142 0.12 0.077 1.61
p-value 0.3560 0.0013 0.0000 0.0000 0.0185 0.0001 0.0058 0.0319 0.2086 0.0000
Jun. 23, 2009 (2d) -0.197 0.022 -0.035 -0.066 -0.061 -0.023 0.002 0.01 0.016 -0.332
p-value 0.0343 0.7341 0.7107 0.4498 0.6588 0.7486 0.9737 0.8584 0.7612 0.7188
Sept. 29, 2009 (2d) 0.009 0.027 0.059 0.049 0.003 0.029 0.002 0.004 0.016 -0.014 -0.027 0.157
p-value 0.8808 0.3795 0.1936 0.2185 0.9414 0.5072 0.9660 0.9362 0.7373 0.7930 0.6425 0.9291
Dec. 3, 2009 (2d) -0.074 -0.033 -0.001 0.036 0.074 0.089 0.07 0.043 0.046 0.007 0.028 0.285
p-value 0.1500 0.6775 0.9857 0.3580 0.1205 0.0537 0.1150 0.3080 0.2975 0.8884 0.5666 0.1807
Dec. 15, 2009 (2d) 0.006 0.124 -0.028 -0.012 -0.025 -0.011 -0.009 -0.002 -0.035 -0.038 -0.021 -0.051
p-value 0.8833 0.0755 0.6084 0.7681 0.6050 0.8237 0.8490 0.9611 0.4055 0.4273 0.6459 0.8916
May 10, 2010 (1d) -0.050 -0.040 0.303 -0.188 -0.177 -0.090 -0.046 -0.068 -0.025 0.108 0.110 -0.163
p-value 0.1327 0.0693 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0247 0.2044 0.0719 0.4642 0.0077 0.0024 0.0000
Aug. 7, 2011 (1d) -0.095 -0.109 -0.233 -0.238 -0.217 -0.255 -0.260 -0.199 -0.250 -0.192 -0.165 -2.213
p-value 0.0111 0.3831 0.0012 0.0156 0.0138 0.0001 0.0001 0.0016 0.0000 0.0000 0.0002 0.0000
Oct. 6, 2011 (2d) 0.153 0.009 0.008 0.004 0.063 0.011 -0.013 -0.033 0.003 0.005 0.017 0.227
p-value 0.0555 0.8976 0.9322 0.9797 0.7142 0.9438 0.9298 0.8046 0.9789 0.9650 0.8666 0.9621
Oct. 25, 2011 (2d) -0.167 -0.037 -0.134 -0.215 -0.266 -0.265 -0.252 -0.182 -0.216 -0.242 -0.216 -2.192
p-value 0.0812 0.6153 0.2981 0.2690 0.1583 0.1228 0.1106 0.2021 0.1188 0.0558 0.0715 0.0091
Nov. 3, 2011 (2d) -0.241 -0.092 -0.091 -0.069 -0.062 -0.025 -0.016 -0.032 -0.046 -0.023 -0.04 -0.737
p-value 0.0160 0.2278 0.4351 0.7205 0.7305 0.8724 0.9129 0.8130 0.7072 0.8445 0.7147 0.5889
Dec. 2, 2011 (2d) -0.345 -0.323 -0.554 -0.417 -0.499 -0.463 -0.495 -0.509 -0.44 -0.479 -0.426 -4.950
p-value 0.1136 0.1470 0.1577 0.3455 0.2386 0.2262 0.1548 0.0875 0.0631 0.0536 0.0632 0.0036
Dec. 8, 2011 (2d) -0.005 0.132 0.249 -0.066 -0.005 -0.001 0.016 0.106 0.036 0.039 -0.007 0.494
p-value 0.9833 0.5804 0.5565 0.8825 0.9907 0.9980 0.9647 0.7406 0.8902 0.8861 0.9774 1.0000
Dec. 20, 2011 (2d) -0.211 -0.32 -0.167 -0.15 -0.179 -0.026 -0.117 -0.065 -0.077 -0.081 -0.05 -1.443
p-value 0.4266 0.2836 0.7219 0.7451 0.6906 0.9489 0.7507 0.8413 0.7737 0.7718 0.8439 0.9950
Feb. 28, 2012 (2d) 0.01 0.043 -0.105 -0.075 -0.078 -0.069 -0.055 -0.055 -0.071 -0.053 -0.039 -0.547
p-value 0.9158 0.5856 0.2680 0.3801 0.4588 0.4273 0.4940 0.4754 0.2810 0.4379 0.5042 0.8085
Jul. 26, 2012 (2d) 0.011 0.008 -0.01 -0.08 -0.142 -0.114 -0.092 -0.066 -0.05 -0.059 -0.064 -0.658
p-value 0.8067 0.8840 0.8559 0.4708 0.2741 0.4272 0.4773 0.5740 0.6395 0.5681 0.5104 0.9573
Aug. 2, 2012 (2d) -0.078 0.027 0.021 -0.04 -0.079 -0.102 -0.089 -0.102 -0.039 -0.074 -0.059 -0.614
p-value 0.0883 0.6631 0.7090 0.7206 0.5432 0.4725 0.4807 0.3645 0.7106 0.4495 0.5219 0.7996
Sep. 6, 2012 (2d) 0.005 0.035 0 -0.016 -0.061 -0.067 -0.04 -0.025 -0.039 -0.043 -0.033 -0.284
p-value 0.9278 0.2905 1.0000 0.6862 0.2398 0.2639 0.4579 0.6406 0.4856 0.4205 0.5365 0.8440
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Table 1.4: Finland: eﬀects of ECB announcements on government bond yields
EVENTS
RESPONSES TO ANNOUNCEMENTS Joint
2m 2y 3y 5y 8y 10y 15y Signiﬁcance
Aug. 22, 2007 (2d) 0.214 0.181 0.143 0.075 0.613
p-value 0.0062 0.0182 0.0491 0.1817 0.0003
Oct. 15, 2008 (2d) -0.06 -0.282 -0.269 -0.172 0.008 -0.775
p-value 0.3974 0.1243 0.1128 0.2587 0.9468 0.2027
May 7, 2009 (2d) -0.01 -0.036 0.084 0.04 0.107 0.215 0.4
p-value 0.5395 0.6414 0.2674 0.6611 0.1324 0.0100 0.0602
Jun. 4, 2009 (2d) 0.01 0.303 0.248 0.34 0.17 0.149 1.22
p-value 0.6085 0.0001 0.0025 0.0005 0.0714 0.1389 0.0000
Jun. 23, 2009 (2d) -0.03 -0.14 -0.036 -0.104 -0.004 0.007 -0.307
p-value 0.1847 0.1519 0.7146 0.3472 0.9670 0.9490 0.5352
Sept. 29, 2009 (2d) 0 0.044 0.013 0.052 0.032 -0.014 0.127
p-value 1.0000 0.3088 0.8256 0.3698 0.5649 0.7944 0.8837
Dec. 3, 2009 (2d) -0.05 0.014 0.093 0.09 0.087 0.071 0.017 0.322
p-value 0.0492 0.7733 0.0347 0.0829 0.0712 0.1635 0.7368 0.0115
Dec. 15, 2009 (2d) 0 -0.02 -0.088 -0.028 -0.029 0.004 -0.015 -0.176
p-value 1.0000 0.6765 0.0894 0.6319 0.5986 0.9396 0.7375 0.7907
May 10, 2010 (1d) 0.000 0.018 0.016 0.067 0.166 0.117 0.063 0.447
p-value 1.0000 0.7381 0.7549 0.2883 0.0002 0.0168 0.1425 0.0002
Aug. 7, 2011 (1d) -0.051 -0.159 -0.179 -0.187 -0.163 -0.201 -0.143 -1.083
p-value 0.0667 0.0443 0.0052 0.0063 0.0120 0.0011 0.0071 0.0000
Oct. 6, 2011 (2d) 0.083 0.068 0.05 0.098 0.124 0.127 0.097 0.647
p-value 0.2891 0.3473 0.6045 0.3677 0.2541 0.2548 0.3508 0.4507
Oct. 25, 2011 (2d) -0.015 -0.142 -0.155 -0.177 -0.13 -0.106 -0.159 -0.884
p-value 0.8882 0.0676 0.0631 0.0751 0.2201 0.3347 0.1338 0.0282
Nov. 3, 2011 (2d) 0.079 -0.023 -0.046 -0.021 -0.012 0.02 -0.002 -0.005
p-value 0.5098 0.7919 0.6317 0.8613 0.9282 0.8808 0.9877 0.9973
Dec. 2, 2011 (2d) 0.02 0.056 0.034 -0.025 0 0.005 -0.02 0.07
p-value 0.8530 0.6242 0.7776 0.8568 1.0000 0.9731 0.8867 0.9997
Dec. 8, 2011 (2d) 0.017 0.05 0.021 0.047 0.06 0.04 0.084 0.319
p-value 0.8752 0.6532 0.8574 0.7295 0.6897 0.7921 0.5591 0.9953
Dec. 20, 2011 (2d) -0.016 0.005 0.021 0.033 0.024 0.023 0.047 0.137
p-value 0.8754 0.9616 0.8434 0.7811 0.8529 0.8625 0.7154 0.9998
Feb. 28, 2012 (2d) 0.002 -0.023 -0.015 0.01 -0.02 -0.009 0.002 -0.053
p-value 0.9358 0.7718 0.9037 0.9463 0.8221 0.9048 0.9824 1.0000
Jul. 26, 2012 (2d) 0 0.025 0.005 0.036 0.069 0.057 0.083 0.275
p-value 1.0000 0.6199 0.9309 0.6467 0.4434 0.5292 0.3500 0.9355
Aug. 2, 2012 (2d) 0 0.03 0.047 0.092 0.053 0.045 0.011 0.278
p-value 1.0000 0.4676 0.3127 0.1878 0.5132 0.5719 0.8900 0.7563
Sep. 6, 2012 (2d) 0 0.06 0.07 0.031 0.06 0.056 0.12 0.397
p-value 1.0000 0.0299 0.0851 0.6719 0.4074 0.5192 0.1003 0.0828
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Table 1.5: France: eﬀects of ECB announcements on government bond yields
EVENTS
RESPONSES TO ANNOUNCEMENTS Joint
3m 6m 1y 2y 3y 5y 7y 10y 15y 20y 30y Signiﬁcance
Aug. 22, 2007 (2d) -0.011 0.076 0.149 0.127 0.121 0.079 0.052 0.017 0.001 0.008 -0.004 0.615
p-value 0.7724 0.0890 0.0068 0.1344 0.1325 0.2858 0.4185 0.7608 0.9857 0.8761 0.9374 0.0726
Oct. 15, 2008 (2d) -0.092 0.482 -0.194 -0.35 -0.241 -0.25 -0.151 -0.069 0.004 0.036 0.031 -0.794
p-value 0.8278 0.0473 0.1542 0.0705 0.2079 0.1417 0.3045 0.5590 0.9757 0.8056 0.8421 0.1611
May 7, 2009 (2d) -0.016 -0.063 -0.054 -0.064 0.018 0.124 0.132 0.191 0.17 0.19 0.201 0.829
p-value 0.7236 0.3615 0.3490 0.5802 0.8611 0.1406 0.0824 0.0015 0.0036 0.0021 0.0017 0.0000
Jun. 4, 2009 (2d) 0.087 0.082 0.162 0.277 0.37 0.284 0.202 0.157 0.121 0.073 0.057 1.872
p-value 0.0774 0.1724 0.0014 0.0535 0.0000 0.0009 0.0055 0.0242 0.0523 0.2578 0.3675 0.0000
Jun. 23, 2009 (2d) -0.11 -0.089 -0.074 -0.095 -0.049 -0.04 0.006 0.021 0.031 0.006 0.009 -0.384
p-value 0.0392 0.1535 0.2664 0.5309 0.7024 0.6908 0.9401 0.7619 0.6051 0.9100 0.8631 0.6012
Sept. 29, 2009 (2d) 0.01 0.039 -0.006 0.036 -0.012 0.007 0.017 0.005 -0.007 -0.029 -0.045 0.015
p-value 0.6190 0.0692 0.8442 0.4277 0.8473 0.8954 0.7414 0.9273 0.9016 0.6315 0.4589 0.9052
Dec. 3, 2009 (2d) -0.048 -0.049 -0.008 0.089 0.088 0.078 0.092 0.063 0.035 0.026 0.033 0.399
p-value 0.0176 0.1804 0.7898 0.0437 0.0877 0.1567 0.0722 0.2177 0.4388 0.6034 0.5316 0.0113
Dec. 15, 2009 (2d) 0.04 -0.029 -0.028 -0.042 -0.035 -0.016 -0.025 -0.01 -0.04 -0.036 -0.006 -0.227
p-value 0.0676 0.4044 0.3885 0.4220 0.6082 0.7715 0.6403 0.8349 0.3621 0.4633 0.9097 0.7316
May 10, 2010 (1d) -0.002 -0.020 0.002 0.049 -0.009 0.077 0.066 0.059 0.076 0.122 0.125 0.545
p-value 0.8691 0.5449 0.9304 0.2805 0.8606 0.1423 0.1430 0.1344 0.0461 0.0063 0.0048 0.0011
Aug. 7, 2011 (1d) -0.009 0.003 -0.138 -0.043 0.061 0.059 -0.044 -0.029 -0.021 -0.013 -0.032 -0.206
p-value 0.8168 0.9492 0.0518 0.4931 0.3525 0.3654 0.3676 0.4866 0.6395 0.7925 0.5532 0.6789
Oct. 6, 2011 (2d) 0.113 0.082 0.103 0.045 0.102 0.092 0.111 0.105 0.102 0.112 0.115 1.082
p-value 0.0812 0.2027 0.1580 0.5854 0.1914 0.2928 0.2653 0.2455 0.3133 0.2550 0.2209 0.1088
Oct. 25, 2011 (2d) -0.109 -0.008 -0.049 -0.271 -0.299 -0.357 -0.303 -0.255 -0.277 -0.287 -0.276 -2.491
p-value 0.1048 0.8754 0.5354 0.0006 0.0002 0.0001 0.0017 0.0087 0.0086 0.0071 0.0094 0.0000
Nov. 3, 2011 (2d) -0.155 -0.07 -0.071 -0.028 -0.067 -0.074 -0.06 -0.029 -0.041 0.011 0.048 -0.536
p-value 0.0554 0.1947 0.3724 0.7451 0.4935 0.5123 0.5854 0.7851 0.7220 0.9242 0.6722 0.6864
Dec. 2, 2011 (2d) -0.073 0.054 0.011 -0.082 -0.031 -0.021 -0.013 -0.017 -0.054 -0.034 -0.056 -0.316
p-value 0.4184 0.5834 0.9226 0.6582 0.8760 0.9191 0.9428 0.9169 0.7549 0.8323 0.7085 0.9996
Dec. 8, 2011 (2d) -0.006 0.048 0.003 -0.085 0 0 0.038 0.002 -0.042 -0.04 -0.042 -0.124
p-value 0.9407 0.6200 0.9770 0.6356 1.0000 1.0000 0.8244 0.9898 0.7956 0.7860 0.7573 1.0000
Dec. 20, 2011 (2d) 0.015 -0.04 -0.035 0.04 0.039 0.005 -0.005 0.02 0.048 0.065 0.067 0.219
p-value 0.9031 0.6853 0.7639 0.8288 0.8404 0.9799 0.9777 0.9027 0.7723 0.6773 0.6451 1.0000
Feb. 28, 2012 (2d) -0.048 -0.04 -0.035 -0.12 -0.064 -0.059 -0.041 -0.06 -0.045 -0.025 -0.027 -0.564
p-value 0.0785 0.2152 0.3060 0.2014 0.5879 0.5202 0.6142 0.3989 0.4283 0.6431 0.6229 0.4813
Jul. 26, 2012 (2d) -0.008 0.006 0.118 -0.141 -0.138 -0.115 -0.086 -0.072 -0.073 -0.079 -0.056 -0.644
p-value 0.8747 0.8868 0.0048 0.0641 0.1202 0.2267 0.3661 0.4240 0.4054 0.3345 0.4899 0.0353
Aug. 2, 2012 (2d) -0.011 -0.019 -0.105 -0.006 -0.009 -0.019 -0.006 -0.006 -0.026 -0.026 -0.011 -0.244
p-value 0.8282 0.6533 0.0607 0.9371 0.9179 0.8345 0.9468 0.9440 0.7549 0.7335 0.8824 0.9577
Sep. 6, 2012 (2d) 0.001 0.008 0.011 0.054 0.009 -0.011 -0.031 -0.029 -0.023 -0.012 -0.024 -0.047
p-value 0.9223 0.5937 0.8047 0.1793 0.8424 0.8361 0.5524 0.5670 0.6776 0.8283 0.6760 0.9835
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Table 1.6: Germany: eﬀects of ECB announcements on government bond yields
EVENTS
RESPONSES TO ANNOUNCEMENTS Joint
3m 6m 1y 2y 3y 5y 7y 10y 20y 30y Signiﬁcance
Aug. 22, 2007 (2d) -0.005 0.074 0.166 0.155 0.142 0.118 0.077 0.052 0.028 0.017 0.824
p-value 0.9481 0.1407 0.0046 0.0447 0.0482 0.0787 0.1965 0.3200 0.5645 0.7238 0.0027
Oct. 15, 2008 (2d) -0.530 -0.27 0.054 -0.288 -0.258 -0.164 -0.089 -0.011 0.055 0.055 -1.446
p-value 0.0924 0.1954 0.7812 0.0928 0.1282 0.3003 0.5312 0.9250 0.7156 0.7123 0.2762
May 7, 2009 (2d) -0.044 -0.131 -0.068 -0.016 0.029 0.143 0.181 0.206 0.182 0.216 0.698
p-value 0.3146 0.0558 0.2274 0.8642 0.7733 0.1363 0.0601 0.0076 0.0171 0.0027 0.0000
Jun. 4, 2009 (2d) 0.062 0.082 0.154 0.317 0.297 0.262 0.213 0.103 0.113 0.085 1.688
p-value 0.1749 0.1482 0.0049 0.0002 0.0002 0.0019 0.0093 0.1376 0.1182 0.2543 0.0000
Jun. 23, 2009 (2d) 0.000 0.031 -0.015 -0.063 -0.04 -0.038 -0.014 -0.014 0.045 0.046 -0.062
p-value 1.0000 0.5543 0.8211 0.5794 0.6849 0.6979 0.8696 0.8420 0.4820 0.4652 0.9949
Sept. 29, 2009 (2d) 0.000 0.036 0.049 0.047 0.01 -0.012 -0.032 -0.026 -0.019 -0.052 0.001
p-value 1.0000 0.1140 0.0817 0.4905 0.8833 0.8331 0.5691 0.6192 0.7578 0.4090 0.6439
Dec. 3, 2009 (2d) -0.044 -0.05 0.005 0.113 0.105 0.119 0.1 0.038 0.029 0.038 0.453
p-value 0.1332 0.0399 0.8839 0.0425 0.0225 0.0394 0.0819 0.4795 0.5848 0.4920 0.0031
Dec. 15, 2009 (2d) -0.013 -0.021 -0.03 -0.026 -0.035 0.006 0.008 0.034 -0.016 -0.011 -0.104
p-value 0.6802 0.5255 0.2966 0.6744 0.5238 0.9248 0.8937 0.5023 0.7440 0.8382 0.9825
May 10, 2010 (1d) -0.005 -0.017 -0.027 0.052 0.083 0.092 0.119 0.186 0.149 0.185 0.817
p-value 0.8708 0.6555 0.5453 0.3047 0.0949 0.1316 0.0298 0.0000 0.0032 0.0004 0.0000
Aug. 7, 2011 (1d) -0.048 -0.055 -0.027 -0.072 -0.080 -0.087 -0.085 -0.088 -0.047 -0.065 -0.654
p-value 0.7162 0.4906 0.6641 0.3319 0.2586 0.2641 0.2422 0.1952 0.4790 0.3299 0.5232
Oct. 6, 2011 (2d) 0.131 0.087 0.102 0.122 0.120 0.146 0.161 0.165 0.160 0.143 1.337
p-value 0.2246 0.3846 0.1302 0.1982 0.2300 0.2375 0.1807 0.1798 0.1745 0.1979 0.0770
Oct. 25, 2011 (2d) -0.007 -0.023 -0.064 -0.132 -0.140 -0.149 -0.107 -0.080 -0.090 -0.099 -0.891
p-value 0.9115 0.6617 0.2477 0.1178 0.1239 0.1864 0.3580 0.4948 0.4373 0.3989 0.3388
Nov. 3, 2011 (2d) -0.262 -0.087 -0.074 -0.050 -0.050 -0.059 -0.046 -0.023 -0.033 -0.031 -0.715
p-value 0.0001 0.1190 0.2012 0.6002 0.6438 0.6763 0.7589 0.8808 0.8177 0.8274 0.0038
Dec. 2, 2011 (2d) 0.298 0.022 0.112 -0.002 -0.005 -0.030 -0.039 -0.034 -0.113 -0.117 0.092
p-value 0.0000 0.6575 0.0693 0.9801 0.9590 0.8243 0.7843 0.8206 0.4262 0.3871 0.0012
Dec. 8, 2011 (2d) 0.040 0.076 0.060 0.003 0.026 -0.001 0.015 0.046 0.061 0.051 0.377
p-value 0.6841 0.1414 0.3700 0.9685 0.7792 0.9939 0.9142 0.7625 0.6809 0.7149 0.9568
Dec. 20, 2011 (2d) -0.027 -0.022 -0.010 0.009 0.021 0.039 0.035 0.053 0.067 0.068 0.233
p-value 0.7459 0.6438 0.8702 0.8752 0.7537 0.6961 0.7284 0.6413 0.5690 0.5297 0.9981
Feb. 28, 2012 (2d) -0.147 0.007 -0.017 0.005 -0.004 0.027 0.011 0.006 0.024 0.023 -0.065
p-value 0.0459 0.7940 0.7408 0.8641 0.9398 0.6722 0.8744 0.9355 0.7368 0.7509 0.8912
Jul. 26, 2012 (2d) 0.143 0.011 0.095 0.034 0.055 0.091 0.110 0.131 0.107 0.107 0.884
p-value 0.0025 0.7846 0.0029 0.3697 0.2538 0.2058 0.1484 0.0882 0.2042 0.2010 0.0002
Aug. 2, 2012 (2d) 0.006 0.041 0.010 0.034 0.038 0.052 0.032 0.017 0.001 0.006 0.237
p-value 0.9275 0.4288 0.7986 0.2549 0.3132 0.3809 0.6255 0.8022 0.9889 0.9287 0.9364
Sep. 6, 2012 (2d) -0.084 0.083 0.019 0.070 0.075 0.097 0.096 0.115 0.124 0.142 0.737
p-value 0.3871 0.0547 0.6480 0.0035 0.0339 0.0939 0.1497 0.1278 0.0934 0.0714 0.0002
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Table 1.7: Greece: eﬀects of ECB announcements on government bond yields
EVENTS
RESPONSES TO ANNOUNCEMENTS Joint
3m 10y 15y 30y Signiﬁcance
Aug. 22, 2007 (2d) 0.006 -0.018 -0.014 -0.026
p-value 0.9576 0.8764 0.9228 0.9981
Oct. 15, 2008 (2d) -0.032 0.007 -0.003 -0.028
p-value 0.7763 0.9517 0.9835 0.9934
May 7, 2009 (2d) -0.13 -0.135 -0.145 -0.41
p-value 0.0185 0.0617 0.0106 0.0006
Jun. 4, 2009 (2d) 0.147 0.144 0.191 0.482
p-value 0.1219 0.1183 0.0417 0.0216
Jun. 23, 2009 (2d) -0.016 0.064 0.07 0.118
p-value 0.8763 0.4473 0.4027 0.7198
Sept. 29, 2009 (2d) 0.029 0.02 -0.024 0.025
p-value 0.6375 0.7060 0.7238 0.9191
Dec. 3, 2009 (2d) 0.205 0.147 0.146 0.498
p-value 0.0877 0.2349 0.1101 0.0626
Dec. 15, 2009 (2d) 0.089 0.188 -0.01 0.267
p-value 0.6270 0.2354 0.9386 0.6335
May 10, 2010 (1d) -4.009 -1.979 -0.665 -6.653
p-value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0003 0.0000
Aug. 7, 2011 (1d) 5.543 -0.412 -0.163 -0.198 4.770
p-value 0.0002 0.3786 0.5715 0.4109 0.0005
Oct. 6, 2011 (2d) 4.925 0.946 0.144 -0.108 5.907
p-value 0.0002 0.5583 0.9194 0.8883 0.0009
Oct. 25, 2011 (2d) 0.103 -0.235 -0.207 0.802 0.463
p-value 0.9725 0.8772 0.8722 0.1738 0.7365
Nov. 3, 2011 (2d) -0.187 3.948 4.86 1.359 9.980
p-value 0.9468 0.0019 0.0000 0.0257 0.0000
Dec. 2, 2011 (2d) -0.004 -0.679 0.739 -0.608 -0.552
p-value 0.9991 0.7965 0.7173 0.4379 0.9357
Dec. 8, 2011 (2d) 0.014 1.283 1.314 2.001 4.612
p-value 0.9969 0.6279 0.5230 0.0240 0.1758
Dec. 20, 2011 (2d) -1.683 0.203 0.21 -0.551 -1.821
p-value 0.7244 0.9317 0.9074 0.4161 0.9346
Feb. 28, 2012 (2d) 0.019 0.589 0.185 -0.122 0.671
p-value 0.9924 0.6614 0.8949 0.9060 0.9940
Jul. 26, 2012 (2d) -0.02 -0.938 -0.996 -1.535 -3.489
p-value 0.9675 0.3107 0.3500 0.1089 0.3189
Aug. 2, 2012 (2d) -0.25 -0.88 -1.247 -1.376 -3.753
p-value 0.6098 0.3245 0.2162 0.1513 0.2831
Sep. 6, 2012 (2d) 0.13 -0.188 -0.257 -0.184 -0.499
p-value 0.5436 0.7616 0.6660 0.7646 0.9446
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Table 1.8: Italy: eﬀects of ECB announcements on government bond yields
EVENTS
RESPONSES TO ANNOUNCEMENTS Joint
3m 6m 1y 2y 3y 5y 7y 10y 15y 30y Signiﬁcance
Aug. 22, 2007 (2d) 0.133 0.126 0.071 0.018 0.012 -0.033 0.312
p-value 0.0794 0.0933 0.2694 0.7336 0.7966 0.4771 0.2102
Oct. 15, 2008 (2d) -0.275 -0.328 -0.299 -0.215 -0.057 -0.01 -1.237
p-value 0.0802 0.0492 0.0511 0.1118 0.5658 0.9378 0.0208
May 7, 2009 (2d) -0.165 -0.038 0.051 0.073 0.039 0.049 0.043
p-value 0.0915 0.6604 0.5547 0.1650 0.4095 0.2791 0.2324
Jun. 4, 2009 (2d) 0.294 0.287 0.254 0.178 0.14 0.144 1.47
p-value 0.0009 0.0020 0.0031 0.0009 0.0168 0.0127 0.0000
Jun. 23, 2009 (2d) -0.083 -0.106 -0.079 -0.048 -0.005 0.058 -0.234
p-value 0.3746 0.3170 0.3367 0.4587 0.9394 0.3136 0.5917
Sept. 29, 2009 (2d) 0.006 0.016 0.029 -0.075 0.024 0.078 0.019 0.008 0 -0.041 0.064
p-value 0.9448 0.2291 0.4534 0.5253 0.5841 0.1414 0.6826 0.8681 1.0000 0.4414 0.8231
Dec. 3, 2009 (2d) -0.032 -0.073 -0.027 0.056 0.084 0.059 0.013 0.006 -0.014 -0.025 0.047
p-value 0.7641 0.0038 0.5925 0.3727 0.2631 0.3222 0.8209 0.9293 0.7539 0.5525 0.1751
Dec. 15, 2009 (2d) -0.001 -0.036 -0.035 -0.061 -0.096 -0.05 -0.051 -0.018 -0.035 -0.039 -0.422
p-value 0.9925 0.2723 0.5126 0.4120 0.0967 0.3615 0.3283 0.7665 0.4347 0.3209 0.5399
May 10, 2010 (1d) 0.004 -0.296 -0.349 -0.554 -0.718 -0.507 -0.441 -0.280 -0.237 -0.169 -3.547
p-value 0.9631 0.0008 0.0053 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0003 0.0001 0.0000
Aug. 7, 2011 (1d) -0.093 -0.250 -0.544 -0.946 -0.969 -0.929 -0.869 -0.811 -0.528 -0.405 -6.344
p-value 0.6998 0.2730 0.0217 0.0001 0.0002 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0001 0.0010 0.0000
Oct. 6, 2011 (2d) 0.144 -0.159 -0.04 -0.135 -0.089 -0.109 -0.054 -0.002 0.025 -0.033 -0.452
p-value 0.6792 0.5294 0.8736 0.5958 0.7179 0.6136 0.7610 0.9898 0.8750 0.8440 0.9991
Oct. 25, 2011 (2d) 0.37 0.573 0.619 0.082 -0.005 -0.025 0.001 -0.027 -0.099 -0.065 1.424
p-value 0.0471 0.0055 0.0167 0.6011 0.9746 0.8827 0.9939 0.7957 0.2799 0.4839 0.0160
Nov. 3, 2011 (2d) 0.713 0.105 0.307 0.398 0.362 0.26 0.218 0.18 0.151 0.053 2.747
p-value 0.0002 0.6606 0.3687 0.0427 0.0492 0.1256 0.0903 0.0827 0.0867 0.5304 0.0000
Dec. 2, 2011 (2d) 0.247 -1.062 -0.698 -0.857 -0.838 -0.956 -0.888 -0.284 -0.507 -0.38 -6.223
p-value 0.8150 0.0441 0.5240 0.1184 0.1514 0.0530 0.0329 0.3767 0.0883 0.1065 0.0046
Dec. 8, 2011 (2d) 0.095 0.345 0.742 0.404 0.293 0.531 0.432 0.35 0.345 0.148 3.685
p-value 0.9305 0.5650 0.4998 0.5056 0.6487 0.3492 0.3737 0.3151 0.2995 0.5567 0.8385
Dec. 20, 2011 (2d) 0.005 -0.295 0.251 -0.083 0.02 -0.042 -0.064 -0.055 -0.065 -0.058 -0.386
p-value 0.9965 0.6484 0.8185 0.8875 0.9749 0.9414 0.8941 0.8773 0.8487 0.8152 1.0000
Feb. 28, 2012 (2d) -0.246 -0.253 -0.334 -0.55 -0.389 -0.371 -0.307 -0.269 -0.203 -0.191 -3.113
p-value 0.1096 0.1292 0.0470 0.0065 0.0336 0.0651 0.0872 0.0755 0.1291 0.1040 0.0000
Jul. 26, 2012 (2d) -0.041 -0.706 -0.738 -1.135 -0.965 -0.765 -0.637 -0.495 -0.426 -0.354 -6.262
p-value 0.9206 0.0008 0.0296 0.0028 0.0028 0.0047 0.0038 0.0060 0.0067 0.0179 0.0000
Aug. 2, 2012 (2d) 0.224 -0.301 -0.752 -0.577 -0.496 -0.267 -0.093 0.144 0.104 0.159 -1.855
p-value 0.5460 0.4696 0.0926 0.2826 0.3144 0.5145 0.7819 0.5768 0.6298 0.3952 0.6292
Sep. 6, 2012 (2d) 0.028 -0.145 -0.065 -0.213 -0.274 -0.391 -0.406 -0.43 -0.326 -0.29 -2.512
p-value 0.8810 0.4506 0.8416 0.5449 0.3621 0.1283 0.0540 0.0153 0.0334 0.0489 0.0070
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Table 1.9: Netherlands: eﬀects of ECB announcements on government bond yields
EVENTS
RESPONSES TO ANNOUNCEMENTS Joint
3m 6m 1y 2y 3y 5y 7y 10y 20y 30y Signiﬁcance
Aug. 22, 2007 (2d) 0.07 0.126 0.107 0.064 0.044 0.02 -0.014 -0.016 0.401
p-value 0.7806 0.2244 0.1863 0.3667 0.4671 0.7203 0.7898 0.7541 0.7426
Oct. 15, 2008 (2d) 0.33 0 -0.342 -0.226 -0.12 -0.057 0.049 0.041 -0.325
p-value 0.1052 1.0000 0.0859 0.1680 0.4078 0.6396 0.7132 0.7912 0.3343
May 7, 2009 (2d) -0.044 -0.073 -0.02 0.044 0.105 0.193 0.177 0.149 0.531
p-value 0.4648 0.4835 0.8219 0.5608 0.1065 0.0013 0.0142 0.0300 0.0003
Jun. 4, 2009 (2d) 0.157 0.276 0.275 0.304 0.231 0.161 0.095 0.078 1.577
p-value 0.0201 0.0006 0.0002 0.0002 0.0023 0.0262 0.1575 0.2384 0.0000
Jun. 23, 2009 (2d) -0.104 -0.084 -0.047 -0.045 -0.024 0.015 0.03 0.026 -0.233
p-value 0.1424 0.4056 0.6039 0.6323 0.7668 0.8318 0.5979 0.6465 0.8452
Sept. 29, 2009 (2d) 0.012 0.025 0.035 -0.004 0.034 -0.004 -0.024 -0.056 0.018
p-value 0.7030 0.6635 0.4812 0.9409 0.5213 0.9423 0.6855 0.3779 0.9723
Dec. 3, 2009 (2d) -0.043 0.038 0.093 0.087 0.058 0.044 0.043 0.037 0.357
p-value 0.0734 0.3229 0.0250 0.1148 0.2568 0.3536 0.3967 0.5077 0.0409
Dec. 15, 2009 (2d) -0.031 -0.025 -0.123 -0.028 -0.034 -0.03 -0.029 -0.032 -0.332
p-value 0.1708 0.5360 0.0252 0.6323 0.4906 0.5052 0.5512 0.5632 0.2782
May 10, 2010 (1d) 0.015 0.000 0.019 0.104 0.086 0.083 0.149 0.145 0.601
p-value 0.7345 1.0000 0.7725 0.1690 0.1938 0.1464 0.0136 0.0188 0.0134
Aug. 7, 2011 (1d) -0.087 -0.101 -0.134 -0.084 -0.068 -0.082 -0.102 -0.084 -0.125 -0.066 -0.933
p-value 0.0457 0.4371 0.0078 0.1918 0.2446 0.1791 0.0809 0.1106 0.0467 0.3124 0.0010
Oct. 6, 2011 (2d) 0.151 0.113 0.112 0.098 0.088 0.117 0.147 0.158 0.169 0.14 1.293
p-value 0.0130 0.0702 0.0955 0.2275 0.3156 0.2235 0.1476 0.1221 0.1406 0.1836 0.0031
Oct. 25, 2011 (2d) -0.053 -0.051 -0.065 -0.138 -0.146 -0.177 -0.162 -0.13 -0.111 -0.093 -1.126
p-value 0.4278 0.4591 0.3327 0.0873 0.0778 0.0660 0.1247 0.2320 0.3303 0.4202 0.0559
Nov. 3, 2011 (2d) -0.045 -0.049 -0.058 -0.089 -0.083 -0.091 -0.067 -0.043 -0.072 -0.041 -0.638
p-value 0.4763 0.4507 0.3850 0.3256 0.3927 0.4619 0.6156 0.7556 0.6063 0.7635 0.8970
Dec. 2, 2011 (2d) 0.077 0.11 0.056 0.001 -0.031 -0.067 -0.027 -0.013 -0.077 -0.112 -0.083
p-value 0.0872 0.0697 0.4190 0.9932 0.8135 0.6538 0.8440 0.9199 0.5761 0.3822 0.5538
Dec. 8, 2011 (2d) -0.008 -0.001 -0.032 -0.018 0.003 -0.001 0.02 0.018 0.049 0.04 0.070
p-value 0.8846 0.9885 0.6713 0.8756 0.9812 0.9945 0.8818 0.8886 0.7308 0.7638 1.0000
Dec. 20, 2011 (2d) -0.043 -0.025 -0.005 0.032 0.047 0.061 0.077 0.072 0.073 0.079 0.368
p-value 0.3865 0.7006 0.9412 0.7588 0.6908 0.6255 0.4905 0.4762 0.5239 0.4424 0.9684
Feb. 28, 2012 (2d) 0.001 0.006 0.009 -0.008 0.003 0.033 0.015 0.005 0.003 0.017 0.084
p-value 0.9493 0.6609 0.5442 0.8746 0.9730 0.6912 0.8374 0.9406 0.9657 0.8091 0.9999
Jul. 26, 2012 (2d) 0.029 -0.006 0 -0.015 -0.038 -0.004 0.016 0.031 0.033 0.046 0.092
p-value 0.1213 0.6234 1.0000 0.6866 0.4915 0.9591 0.8467 0.7129 0.7129 0.5892 0.9445
Aug. 2, 2012 (2d) 0.013 0.028 0.01 0.028 0.03 0.036 0.029 0.017 0.018 -0.018 0.191
p-value 0.4757 0.0340 0.6435 0.4247 0.5309 0.6155 0.6882 0.8191 0.8221 0.8136 0.6938
Sep. 6, 2012 (2d) 0 0.011 0.021 0.042 0.07 0.083 0.078 0.07 0.055 0.112 0.542
p-value 1.0000 0.3240 0.1096 0.0821 0.0533 0.1288 0.2166 0.3018 0.4519 0.1129 0.0351
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Table 1.10: Portugal: eﬀects of ECB announcements on government bond yields
EVENTS
RESPONSES TO ANNOUNCEMENTS Joint
6m 2y 3y 5y 7y 10y 15y 30y Signiﬁcance
Aug. 22, 2007 (2d) 0.152 0.117 0.094 0.053 0.009 -0.004 0.421
p-value 0.0392 0.1539 0.1337 0.3647 0.8510 0.9365 0.1214
Oct. 15, 2008 (2d) -0.239 -0.378 -0.261 -0.133 -0.109 -0.03 -1.15
p-value 0.0930 0.0207 0.0733 0.3208 0.3234 0.8087 0.0241
May 7, 2009 (2d) -0.104 -0.031 0.037 0.04 0.077 0.112 0.131
p-value 0.1537 0.7425 0.5850 0.5611 0.2108 0.0307 0.1375
Jun. 4, 2009 (2d) 0.328 0.388 0.253 0.226 0.196 0.162 1.553
p-value 0.0000 0.0001 0.0036 0.0006 0.0083 0.0091 0.0000
Jun. 23, 2009 (2d) -0.059 -0.1 -0.05 -0.045 0.019 0.043 -0.192
p-value 0.5428 0.4165 0.5774 0.5495 0.8019 0.5033 0.8936
Sept. 29, 2009 (2d) 0.006 0.043 0.069 0.054 0.021 0.007 -0.007 0.193
p-value 0.8695 0.4824 0.1491 0.3120 0.6940 0.9041 0.9107 0.7827
Dec. 3, 2009 (2d) 0.036 0.102 0.055 0.053 0.042 -0.024 -0.008 0.256
p-value 0.3604 0.0741 0.2593 0.2294 0.4042 0.6222 0.8702 0.3222
Dec. 15, 2009 (2d) -0.031 -0.046 0.027 -0.019 0.003 -0.013 -0.028 -0.107
p-value 0.4665 0.4471 0.6406 0.7639 0.9582 0.8043 0.6049 0.9704
May 10, 2010 (1d) -3.218 -2.710 -1.381 -1.784 -1.739 -1.356 -0.236 -12.424
p-value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0202 0.0000
Aug. 7, 2011 (1d) 0.321 -1.798 -2.001 -1.417 -1.500 -0.415 -0.438 -0.050 -7.298
p-value 0.7042 0.1000 0.0933 0.0633 0.0353 0.3976 0.3179 0.8314 0.0362
Oct. 6, 2011 (2d) -1.423 -0.163 0.067 -0.053 0.026 -0.056 0.138 -0.025 -1.489
p-value 0.0022 0.8571 0.9248 0.9287 0.9540 0.8774 0.4793 0.8997 0.1577
Oct. 25, 2011 (2d) -0.017 0.924 0.959 0.458 0.259 -0.16 -0.159 0.143 2.407
p-value 0.9822 0.1401 0.0439 0.1714 0.3908 0.5964 0.4825 0.4896 0.2162
Nov. 3, 2011 (2d) -0.22 -0.733 0.356 0.155 0.143 -0.02 -0.087 -0.007 -0.413
p-value 0.8225 0.2560 0.5443 0.7663 0.7255 0.9486 0.7604 0.9754 0.9783
Dec. 2, 2011 (2d) -0.434 -0.434 -2.186 -0.837 -0.707 -0.406 -0.171 -0.211 -5.386
p-value 0.7211 0.7069 0.0477 0.3268 0.3366 0.4228 0.6932 0.3804 0.4226
Dec. 8, 2011 (2d) 0.02 0.647 0.72 -0.212 0.69 0.366 0.061 -0.018 2.274
p-value 0.9864 0.6080 0.5568 0.8076 0.3825 0.5071 0.8882 0.9359 0.9826
Dec. 20, 2011 (2d) -0.12 -0.353 -0.302 -0.015 -0.072 -0.122 -0.008 -0.016 -1.008
p-value 0.9012 0.7608 0.7959 0.9847 0.9239 0.8212 0.9840 0.9362 1.0000
Feb. 28, 2012 (2d) 0.103 -0.616 0.896 0.315 0.937 0.775 0.565 0.182 3.157
p-value 0.8670 0.7486 0.6002 0.8266 0.4502 0.4225 0.5121 0.7021 0.9704
Jul. 26, 2012 (2d) 0.121 -0.417 1.092 0.243 0.184 -0.13 -0.149 -0.304 0.64
p-value 0.4619 0.4967 0.0276 0.6307 0.6675 0.6776 0.5987 0.0597 0.1939
Aug. 2, 2012 (2d) -0.093 -0.235 -0.128 -0.406 -0.279 -0.217 0 -0.146 -1.504
p-value 0.6719 0.6798 0.7919 0.4064 0.5287 0.5022 1.0000 0.3829 0.9468
Sep. 6, 2012 (2d) -0.186 -0.971 -0.993 -1.124 -0.877 -1.025 0 -0.509 -5.685
p-value 0.3814 0.0629 0.1325 0.0259 0.0163 0.0007 1.0000 0.0037 0.0000
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Table 1.11: Spain: eﬀects of ECB announcements on government bond yields
EVENTS
RESPONSES TO ANNOUNCEMENTS Joint
3m 6m 1y 2y 3y 5y 7y 10y 15y 20y 30y Signiﬁcance
Aug. 22, 2007 (2d) 0.14 0.186 0.073 0.048 0.024 0.02 0.009 0.5
p-value 0.1341 0.0000 0.1036 0.2792 0.5284 0.5536 0.8066 0.0000
Oct. 15, 2008 (2d) -0.405 -0.238 -0.277 -0.241 -0.132 -0.026 0.041 -0.002 -1.28
p-value 0.0406 0.1086 0.0771 0.0867 0.2491 0.9054 0.7846 0.9897 0.0533
May 7, 2009 (2d) -0.048 -0.039 0.014 0.09 0.124 0.169 0.196 0.175 0.681
p-value 0.5946 0.5233 0.8188 0.1515 0.0198 0.0036 0.0070 0.0141 0.0000
Jun. 4, 2009 (2d) 0.293 0.29 0.271 0.219 0.136 0.119 0.123 0.077 1.528
p-value 0.0004 0.0000 0.0007 0.0026 0.0517 0.0944 0.1256 0.3113 0.0000
Jun. 23, 2009 (2d) -0.002 -0.071 -0.106 -0.084 -0.022 0.03 0.03 0.033 -0.192
p-value 0.9842 0.4215 0.2554 0.2954 0.7672 0.6215 0.6230 0.5982 0.8557
Sept. 29, 2009 (2d) 0.012 -0.009 0.036 0.047 0.017 0.021 0.018 0 0.142
p-value 0.9010 0.8471 0.5174 0.3794 0.7782 0.7248 0.7838 1.0000 0.9916
Dec. 3, 2009 (2d) 0.068 0.046 0.026 0.077 0.023 0.023 0.035 0.021 0.319
p-value 0.3495 0.3028 0.6644 0.1567 0.6473 0.6104 0.5280 0.6844 0.7178
Dec. 15, 2009 (2d) -0.139 0.013 0.046 -0.01 -0.006 -0.024 -0.032 -0.025 -0.177
p-value 0.0442 0.7799 0.4217 0.8573 0.9127 0.6315 0.5717 0.6608 0.6503
May 10, 2010 (1d) -1.035 -0.797 -0.919 -0.681 -0.507 -0.349 -0.261 -0.174 -4.723
p-value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Aug. 7, 2011 (1d) -0.429 -0.458 -0.654 -1.194 -1.202 -1.129 -1.157 -1.056 -0.863 -0.732 -0.696 -9.57
p-value 0.0053 0.0242 0.0129 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Oct. 6, 2011 (2d) -0.194 -0.123 -0.17 -0.055 -0.072 -0.024 -0.068 -0.086 -0.063 -0.054 -0.036 -0.945
p-value 0.1208 0.3565 0.3559 0.7519 0.6327 0.8724 0.5915 0.4914 0.6320 0.6614 0.7826 0.8759
Oct. 25, 2011 (2d) 0.127 0.232 -0.153 -0.166 -0.165 -0.108 -0.074 -0.057 -0.056 -0.058 -0.07 -0.548
p-value 0.3297 0.0715 0.3102 0.2285 0.2248 0.3401 0.5180 0.5856 0.5664 0.5079 0.4387 0.3884
Nov. 3, 2011 (2d) 0.267 0.102 0.127 0.354 0.319 0.214 0.15 0.131 0.112 0.107 0.082 1.965
p-value 0.1218 0.3920 0.4036 0.0246 0.0330 0.0677 0.2163 0.2577 0.3081 0.2918 0.4092 0.0123
Dec. 2, 2011 (2d) -0.7 -0.981 -0.856 -0.981 -0.863 -0.758 -0.741 -0.607 -0.651 -0.522 -0.456 -8.116
p-value 0.2740 0.0283 0.0093 0.0019 0.0060 0.0046 0.0022 0.0092 0.0070 0.0168 0.0347 0.0000
Dec. 8, 2011 (2d) 0.178 0.682 0.125 0.389 0.297 0.345 0.319 0.322 0.364 0.379 0.284 3.684
p-value 0.7955 0.1743 0.7433 0.3462 0.4602 0.3247 0.3330 0.2890 0.2330 0.1616 0.2767 0.4016
Dec. 20, 2011 (2d) -0.091 -0.171 0.131 0.324 0.223 0.076 0.097 0.088 0.06 0.053 0.038 0.828
p-value 0.8981 0.7590 0.7548 0.4893 0.6223 0.8431 0.7859 0.7909 0.8588 0.8602 0.8964 0.9999
Feb. 28, 2012 (2d) -0.048 -0.058 -0.193 -0.202 -0.182 -0.075 -0.063 -0.056 -0.075 -0.057 -0.059 -1.068
p-value 0.7331 0.6937 0.1455 0.2407 0.2602 0.5906 0.6320 0.7295 0.5728 0.6759 0.6554 0.8285
Jul. 26, 2012 (2d) -0.819 -1.008 -1.562 -1.133 -1.104 -0.915 -0.762 -0.671 -0.536 -0.465 -0.494 -9.469
p-value 0.2056 0.0893 0.0034 0.0576 0.0450 0.0398 0.0459 0.0444 0.0400 0.0462 0.0226 0.0000
Aug. 2, 2012 (2d) -0.218 -0.283 -0.224 -1.002 -0.742 -0.247 0.02 0.192 0.252 0.218 0.235 -1.799
p-value 0.7393 0.6529 0.6893 0.1389 0.2346 0.6198 0.9618 0.5947 0.3813 0.3980 0.3297 0.7723
Sep. 6, 2012 (2d) -0.032 -0.201 -0.092 -0.262 -0.459 -0.61 -0.695 -0.707 -0.582 -0.574 -0.554 -4.768
p-value 0.9035 0.4779 0.7861 0.5714 0.2772 0.0816 0.0194 0.0088 0.0142 0.0066 0.0082 0.0000
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Table 1.12: Eﬀects of LTROs on Euro-area 10-year government bond yields
Time Event 1 Event 2 Event 3 Event 4 Event 5 Event 6
T-9
-0.0004
[0.00176]
0.0033*
[0.00178]
0.0036**
[0.00134]
-0.0076
[0.00746]
0.0226**
[0.00974]
0.0057
[0.00405]
T-8
-0.0133***
[0.00121]
0.0040*
[0.00185]
0.0148***
[0.00369]
0.0190***
[0.00587]
0.0263***
[0.00649]
0.0131
[0.00802]
T-7
-0.0345***
[0.00175]
0.0079***
[0.0017]
0.0092
[0.00568]
0.0029
[0.01072]
0.0198
[0.0126]
0.0084
[0.01047]
T-6
-0.0311***
[0.00358]
0.0103***
[0.00236]
0.0092
[0.01082]
-0.0001
[0.01664]
0.0149
[0.01286]
0.0115
[0.01227]
T-5
-0.0406***
[0.00229]
0.0061**
[0.00244]
0.0228
[0.01727]
0.0161
[0.01501]
-0.0033
[0.0206]
0.0080
[0.01123]
T-4
-0.0286***
[0.00227]
-0.0109***
[0.00207]
0.0313*
[0.01579]
0.0091
[0.01743]
-0.0214
[0.02025]
0.0007
[0.01169]
T-3
-0.0368***
[0.00135]
-0.0220***
[0.00223]
0.0264**
[0.00825]
0.0249
[0.01414]
-0.0362
[0.02352]
0.0051
[0.016]
T-2
-0.0474***
[0.0026]
-0.0194***
[0.00193]
0.0217
[0.0136]
0.0343*
[0.016]
-0.0320
[0.02144]
-0.0045
[0.01491]
T-1
-0.0419***
[0.00348]
-0.0236***
[0.00205]
0.0377*
[0.01792]
0.0149
[0.01652]
-0.0270
[0.01623]
-0.0115
[0.01692]
T
-0.0474***
[0.00266]
-0.0180***
[0.00284]
0.0240
[0.01553]
-0.0004
[0.01705]
-0.0241
[0.0182]
-0.0057
[0.02256]
T+1
-0.0538***
[0.00293]
-0.0195***
[0.0041]
0.0210
[0.02107]
0.0138
[0.00967]
-0.0239
[0.01976]
-0.0197
[0.02643]
T+2
-0.0619***
[0.0029]
-0.0333***
[0.00379]
0.0223
[0.02301]
0.0203
[0.01118]
-0.0255
[0.02207]
-0.0265
[0.02604]
T+3
-0.0719***
[0.00289]
-0.0357***
[0.0033]
0.0414*
[0.02362]
0.0042
[0.01905]
-0.0244
[0.02328]
-0.0196
[0.02629]
T+4
-0.0687***
[0.003]
-0.0306***
[0.0031]
0.0466**
[0.01846]
-0.0147
[0.04113]
-0.0228
[0.02738]
-0.0094
[0.02746]
T+5
-0.0641***
[0.00331]
-0.0388***
[0.00355]
0.0474**
[0.01728]
-0.0024
[0.034]
-0.0400
[0.0254]
-0.0141
[0.02861]
T+6
-0.0820***
[0.00328]
-0.0406***
[0.003]
0.0493**
[0.01705]
0.0148
[0.03746]
-0.0377
[0.02727]
-0.0163
[0.03296]
T+7
-0.0804***
[0.00354]
-0.0227***
[0.00249]
0.0502**
[0.01695]
0.0155
[0.04708]
-0.0326
[0.03072]
-0.0181
[0.03111]
T+8
-0.0877***
[0.00481]
-0.0264***
[0.00263]
0.0635***
[0.01658]
0.0196
[0.04781]
-0.0185
[0.02257]
-0.0798
[0.04894]
T+9
-0.0846***
[0.00434]
-0.0254***
[0.00309]
0.0649***
[0.01568]
0.0139
[0.05113]
-0.0109
[0.02178]
-0.0704
[0.05023]
T+10
-0.0839***
[0.00444]
-0.0125***
[0.00305]
0.0756***
[0.01717]
0.0311
[0.06009]
0.0016
[0.02291]
-0.0551
[0.05388]
Signiﬁcance levels: * for 10%, ** for 5%, *** for 1%.
Standard errors in brackets.
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Table 1.13: Eﬀects of LTROs on 10-year government bond yields of Greece-Portugal and of
other Euro-area countries
Time Subject Event 1 Event 2 Event 3 Event 4 Event 5 Event6
T-9
NGP 0.0003 0.0038 0.0030* -0.0084 0.0183 0.0012
GP -0.0031*** 0.0014 0.0064** -0.0046*** 0.0397 0.0237***
diﬀ 0.0034 0.0023 -0.0034 -0.0038 -0.0215 -0.0226***
T-8
NGP -0.0122*** 0.0048** 0.0118*** 0.0209** 0.0242** 0.0077
GP -0.0177*** 0.0008 0.0268* 0.0115 0.0347*** 0.0346***
diﬀ 0.0055 0.0040 -0.0150 0.0094 -0.0105 -0.0269**
T-7
NGP -0.0332*** 0.0084*** 0.0030 0.0013 0.0175 0.0063
GP -0.0396*** 0.0058*** 0.0336 0.0094 0.0289*** 0.0166***
diﬀ 0.0064 0.0025 -0.0306 -0.0081 -0.0114 -0.0103
T-6
NGP -0.0292*** 0.0110*** -0.0031* -0.0028 0.0087 0.0071
GP -0.0384*** 0.0073*** 0.0585 0.0108 0.0398*** 0.0293***
diﬀ 0.0092 0.0037 -0.0617 -0.0136 -0.0311 -0.0222
T-5
NGP -0.0410*** 0.0074** 0.0020 0.0146 -0.0147 -0.0007
GP -0.0388*** 0.0011 0.1062** 0.0225 0.0424*** 0.0429***
diﬀ -0.0022 0.0063 -0.1042** -0.0079 -0.0572* -0.0437**
T-4
NGP -0.0287*** -0.0110*** 0.0124** 0.0067 -0.0381 -0.0105
GP -0.0281*** -0.0105** 0.1070** 0.0188 0.0456*** 0.0454***
diﬀ -0.0006 -0.0006 -0.0946* -0.0121 -0.0838*** -0.0559***
T-3
NGP -0.0376*** -0.0227*** 0.0158*** 0.0225 -0.0570 -0.0127
GP -0.0339*** -0.0191*** 0.0688*** 0.0342 0.0471*** 0.0764***
diﬀ -0.0037 -0.0036 -0.0530** -0.0117 -0.1041*** -0.0891***
T-2
NGP -0.0500*** -0.0201*** 0.0057*** 0.0324 -0.0530** -0.0210
GP -0.0371*** -0.0167*** 0.0861* 0.0423 0.0519*** 0.0617***
diﬀ -0.0129*** -0.0033 -0.0805* -0.0100 -0.1049*** -0.0827***
T-1
NGP -0.0452*** -0.0248*** 0.0177*** 0.0101 -0.0466*** -0.0309**
GP -0.0287*** -0.0190*** 0.1178* 0.0341 0.0512** 0.0659**
diﬀ -0.0165*** -0.0058 -0.1001 -0.0241 -0.0978*** -0.0967***
T
NGP -0.0501*** -0.0198*** 0.0061* -0.0082 -0.0427** -0.0328**
GP -0.0365*** -0.0109** 0.0957* 0.0307 0.0504** 0.1024**
diﬀ -0.0136*** -0.0090* -0.0896* -0.0389 -0.0931*** -0.1351***
T+1
NGP -0.0559*** -0.0232*** -0.0033 0.0143 -0.0444** -0.0492**
GP -0.0451*** -0.0048 0.1180* 0.0117 0.0581*** 0.0983**
diﬀ -0.0108 -0.0184* -0.1213* 0.0026 -0.1025*** -0.1474**
T+2
NGP -0.0648*** -0.0357*** -0.0048 0.0252* -0.0468* -0.0574***
GP -0.0504*** -0.0240*** 0.1307* 0.0007 0.0595*** 0.0971*
diﬀ -0.0144** -0.0117 -0.1355* 0.0245 -0.1063*** -0.1545**
T+3
NGP -0.0737*** -0.0377*** 0.0131* 0.0046 -0.0469* -0.0517***
GP -0.0643*** -0.0278*** 0.1550** 0.0022 0.0655** 0.1089**
diﬀ -0.0094 -0.0100* -0.1419* 0.0024 -0.1124*** -0.1605***
T+4
NGP -0.0700*** -0.0319*** 0.0244*** -0.0398 -0.0519** -0.0455***
GP -0.0635*** -0.0256*** 0.1353** 0.0857* 0.0933** 0.1348***
diﬀ -0.0065 -0.0063 -0.1110** -0.1256* -0.1452** -0.1803***
T+5
NGP -0.0641*** -0.0412*** 0.0270*** -0.0262 -0.0666** -0.0519***
GP -0.0638*** -0.0293*** 0.1291** 0.0926* 0.0665*** 0.1369***
diﬀ -0.0003 -0.0119 -0.1021* -0.1188* -0.1331*** -0.1887***
T+6
NGP -0.0822*** -0.0420*** 0.0292*** -0.0167 -0.0656** -0.0604***
GP -0.0814*** -0.0347*** 0.1295** 0.1408 0.0739*** 0.1598***
diﬀ -0.0008 -0.0073 -0.1003* -0.1575 -0.1395*** -0.2202***
T+7
NGP -0.0813*** -0.0236*** 0.0303*** -0.0236 -0.0644** -0.0591***
GP -0.0771*** -0.0195*** 0.1295** 0.1718 0.0947** 0.1460***
diﬀ -0.0041 -0.0040 -0.0992* -0.1954 -0.1590*** -0.2052***
T+8
NGP -0.0880*** -0.0278*** 0.0453*** -0.0181 -0.0411 -0.0640***
GP -0.0864*** -0.0206*** 0.1362*** 0.1700 0.0719 -0.1426
diﬀ -0.0016 -0.0072 -0.0909* -0.1881 -0.1130 0.0785
T+9
NGP -0.0844*** -0.0263*** 0.0482*** -0.0231 -0.0304 -0.0525***
GP -0.0852*** -0.0219*** 0.1316** 0.1618 0.0670 -0.1422
diﬀ 0.0008 -0.0044 -0.0834* -0.1849 -0.0974 0.0897
T+10
NGP -0.0871*** -0.0135*** 0.0567*** -0.0025 -0.0158 -0.0316
GP -0.0711*** -0.0084* 0.1514*** 0.1655 0.0711 -0.1491
diﬀ -0.0160 -0.0051 -0.0947* -0.1680 -0.0869 0.1175
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Table 1.14: Credit ratings of European countries from S&P
Country Local Currency Rating Grade
Austria AA+ Investment
Belgium AA Investment
Finland AAA Investment
France AA+ Investment
Germany AAA Investment
Greece CCC Speculative
Italy BBB+ Speculative
Netherlands AAA Investment
Portugal BB Speculative
Spain BBB+ Speculative
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Table 1.15: Eﬀects of LTROs on investment- and speculative-grade 10-year government
bond yields
Time Subject Event 1 Event 2 Event 3 Event 4 Event 5 Event6
T-9
INVEST 0.0015 0.0040 0.0044** -0.0164 0.0079 0.0036
SPECUL -0.0033*** 0.0023 0.0026 0.0055 0.0445*** 0.0089
diﬀ 0.0048 0.0016 0.0018 -0.0219 -0.0365* -0.0053
T-8
INVEST -0.0126*** 0.0049* 0.0145*** 0.0221** 0.0135*** 0.0191**
SPECUL -0.0143*** 0.0026 0.0153 0.0144** 0.0456*** 0.0040
diﬀ 0.0018 0.0022 -0.0008 0.0077 -0.0321*** 0.0150
T-7
INVEST -0.0341*** 0.0096*** 0.0051*** -0.0067 -0.0034 0.0227**
SPECUL -0.0350*** 0.0053*** 0.0152 0.0173* 0.0546*** -0.0132
diﬀ 0.0009 0.0043 -0.0101 -0.0240 -0.0580*** 0.0359
T-6
INVEST -0.0302*** 0.0131*** -0.0038* -0.0155 -0.0096 0.0265**
SPECUL -0.0323*** 0.0061*** 0.0287 0.0231* 0.0517*** -0.0110
diﬀ 0.0021 0.0070* -0.0324 -0.0386 -0.0613*** 0.0375
T-5
INVEST -0.0444*** 0.0087* -0.0027 0.0052 -0.0444** 0.0139
SPECUL -0.0349*** 0.0022 0.0612 0.0326** 0.0584*** -0.0008
diﬀ -0.0095** 0.0065 -0.0639 -0.0274 -0.1028*** 0.0147
T-4
INVEST -0.0310*** -0.0099*** 0.0082** -0.0117 -0.0642*** 0.0018
SPECUL -0.0250*** -0.0124*** 0.0660* 0.0404** 0.0429** -0.0010
diﬀ -0.0060 0.0025 -0.0578 -0.0521 -0.1072*** 0.0027
T-3
INVEST -0.0380*** -0.0219*** 0.0144*** 0.0140 -0.0829*** 0.0020
SPECUL -0.0352*** -0.0221*** 0.0443** 0.0411** 0.0340 0.0098
diﬀ -0.0028 0.0002 -0.0299 -0.0271 -0.1170*** -0.0078
T-2
INVEST -0.0528*** -0.0213*** 0.0037*** 0.0230 -0.0717*** -0.0092
SPECUL -0.0395*** -0.0166*** 0.0488 0.0514** 0.0275 0.0026
diﬀ -0.0133*** -0.0047 -0.0450 -0.0283 -0.0992*** -0.0118
T-1
INVEST -0.0486*** -0.0257*** 0.0179*** -0.0063 -0.0535*** -0.0194
SPECUL -0.0317*** -0.0204*** 0.0674 0.0466** 0.0127 0.0004
diﬀ -0.0169*** -0.0054 -0.0494 -0.0529 -0.0662* -0.0198
T
INVEST -0.0518*** -0.0221*** 0.0054 -0.0284 -0.0593*** -0.0153*
SPECUL -0.0407*** -0.0120*** 0.0520 0.0416** 0.0287 0.0085
diﬀ -0.0112** -0.0100* -0.0466 -0.0700** -0.0879*** -0.0238
T+1
INVEST -0.0581*** -0.0239*** -0.0067** 0.0084 -0.0656*** -0.0258*
SPECUL -0.0473*** -0.0129* 0.0626 0.0219 0.0386* -0.0106
diﬀ -0.0108* -0.0110 -0.0693 -0.0135 -0.1042*** -0.0152
T+2
INVEST -0.0665*** -0.0370*** -0.0104* 0.0129 -0.0728*** -0.0383***
SPECUL -0.0552*** -0.0277*** 0.0714 0.0314 0.0454* -0.0088
diﬀ -0.0113* -0.0093 -0.0818 -0.0185 -0.1182*** -0.0295
T+3
INVEST -0.0749*** -0.0396*** 0.0073 -0.0198 -0.0751*** -0.0333***
SPECUL -0.0672*** -0.0300*** 0.0926* 0.0400 0.0516** 0.0011
diﬀ -0.0077 -0.0096 -0.0853 -0.0598 -0.1267*** -0.0344
T+4
INVEST -0.0715*** -0.0329*** 0.0217*** -0.0839 -0.0793*** -0.0334**
SPECUL -0.0645*** -0.0272*** 0.0839* 0.0891*** 0.0618* 0.0265
diﬀ -0.0071 -0.0057 -0.0622 -0.1730*** -0.1411*** -0.0599
T+5
INVEST -0.0642*** -0.0420*** 0.0266*** -0.0587 -0.0921*** -0.0396**
SPECUL -0.0638*** -0.0341*** 0.0787* 0.0820*** 0.0382 0.0241
diﬀ -0.0005 -0.0079 -0.0521 -0.1407** -0.1302*** -0.0637
T+6
INVEST -0.0827*** -0.0426*** 0.0282*** -0.0461 -0.0928*** -0.0450***
SPECUL -0.0810*** -0.0375*** 0.0809* 0.1063* 0.0451 0.0267
diﬀ -0.0016 -0.0051 -0.0527 -0.1524** -0.1379*** -0.0717
T+7
INVEST -0.0820*** -0.0232*** 0.0292*** -0.0647 -0.0882*** -0.0412***
SPECUL -0.0782*** -0.0220*** 0.0816* 0.1358* 0.0509 0.0166
diﬀ -0.0038 -0.0012 -0.0524 -0.2006** -0.1390** -0.0578
T+8
INVEST -0.0901*** -0.0269*** 0.0483*** -0.0629 -0.0560** -0.0508***
SPECUL -0.0841*** -0.0256*** 0.0862** 0.1433** 0.0378 -0.1233
diﬀ -0.0059 -0.0013 -0.0379 -0.2062** -0.0938** 0.0725
T+9
INVEST -0.0870*** -0.0277*** 0.0506*** -0.0745* -0.0465* -0.0373***
SPECUL -0.0809*** -0.0220*** 0.0864** 0.1465* 0.0425 -0.1202
diﬀ -0.0061 -0.0057 -0.0358 -0.2210** -0.0890** 0.0829
T+10
INVEST -0.0912*** -0.0146** 0.0588*** -0.0718 -0.0313 -0.0093
SPECUL -0.0731*** -0.0092*** 0.1008** 0.1855** 0.0510** -0.1238
diﬀ -0.0181** -0.0054 -0.0420 -0.2573** -0.0823** 0.1145
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Table 1.16: Eﬀects of LTROs on 10-year government bond yields of Italy and Spain and of
other Euro-area countries (ex Greece and Portugal)
Time Subject Event 1 Event 2 Event 3 Event 4 Event 5 Event6
T-9
NIS 0.0015 0.0040 0.0044** -0.0164 0.0079 0.0036
IS -0.0035** 0.0032 -0.0012 0.0155*** 0.0492*** -0.0060
diﬀ 0.0051 0.0008 0.0056** -0.0319** -0.0413*** 0.0096
T-8
NIS -0.0126*** 0.0049* 0.0145*** 0.0221* 0.0135** 0.0191**
IS -0.0110*** 0.0045*** 0.0038* 0.0173** 0.0564*** -0.0265***
diﬀ -0.0016 0.0003 0.0107*** 0.0048 -0.0429*** 0.0456***
T-7
NIS -0.0341*** 0.0096*** 0.0051*** -0.0067 -0.0034 0.0227**
IS -0.0304*** 0.0047*** -0.0032* 0.0252* 0.0803*** -0.0431***
diﬀ -0.0037* 0.0049 0.0083*** -0.0319 -0.0837*** 0.0658***
T-6
NIS -0.0302*** 0.0131*** -0.0038 -0.0155 -0.0096 0.0265**
IS -0.0262*** 0.0049* -0.0012* 0.0353*** 0.0635*** -0.0513***
diﬀ -0.0040 0.0082* -0.0026 -0.0509 -0.0731*** 0.0778***
T-5
NIS -0.0444*** 0.0087** -0.0027 0.0052 -0.0444** 0.0139
IS -0.0309*** 0.0034 0.0161* 0.0427*** 0.0744** -0.0446***
diﬀ -0.0135*** 0.0053 -0.0189** -0.0375 -0.1188*** 0.0585***
T-4
NIS -0.0310*** -0.0099*** 0.0082** -0.0117 -0.0642*** 0.0018
IS -0.0220*** -0.0144** 0.0250** 0.0621*** 0.0402 -0.0473**
diﬀ -0.0090** 0.0045 -0.0168* -0.0738** -0.1044** 0.0491**
T-3
NIS -0.0380*** -0.0219*** 0.0144*** 0.0140 -0.0829*** 0.0020
IS -0.0364*** -0.0251*** 0.0199*** 0.0481** 0.0209 -0.0568***
diﬀ -0.0015 0.0032 -0.0054* -0.0341 -0.1039* 0.0588**
T-2
NIS -0.0528*** -0.0213*** 0.0037*** 0.0230 -0.0717*** -0.0092
IS -0.0418*** -0.0164** 0.0114*** 0.0604** 0.0031 -0.0565***
diﬀ -0.0110** -0.0049 -0.0077*** -0.0374 -0.0748 0.0473**
T-1
NIS -0.0486*** -0.0257*** 0.0179*** -0.0063 -0.0535*** -0.0194
IS -0.0347*** -0.0218*** 0.0170*** 0.0591** -0.0258 -0.0651***
diﬀ -0.0139* -0.0040 0.0010 -0.0654* -0.0277 0.0457**
T
NIS -0.0518*** -0.0221*** 0.0054 -0.0284 -0.0593*** -0.0153
IS -0.0448*** -0.0132** 0.0083*** 0.0525** 0.0069 -0.0853***
diﬀ -0.0070 -0.0088 -0.0030 -0.0809** -0.0662* 0.0700***
T+1
NIS -0.0581*** -0.0239*** -0.0067* 0.0084 -0.0656*** -0.0258*
IS -0.0495*** -0.0210*** 0.0071 0.0320*** 0.0191 -0.1194***
diﬀ -0.0086 -0.0029 -0.0139 -0.0236* -0.0847** 0.0937***
T+2
NIS -0.0665*** -0.0370*** -0.0104* 0.0129 -0.0728*** -0.0383***
IS -0.0599*** -0.0315*** 0.0122 0.0621*** 0.0313 -0.1146***
diﬀ -0.0066 -0.0055 -0.0226 -0.0493** -0.1041** 0.0764***
T+3
NIS -0.0749*** -0.0396*** 0.0073 -0.0198 -0.0751*** -0.0333***
IS -0.0701*** -0.0322*** 0.0303* 0.0779*** 0.0376 -0.1067***
diﬀ -0.0049 -0.0073 -0.0230 -0.0976*** -0.1127** 0.0734**
T+4
NIS -0.0715*** -0.0329*** 0.0217*** -0.0839 -0.0793*** -0.0334**
IS -0.0654*** -0.0288*** 0.0324 0.0924*** 0.0303 -0.0818**
diﬀ -0.0062 -0.0041 -0.0107 -0.1764*** -0.1096** 0.0484
T+5
NIS -0.0642*** -0.0420*** 0.0266*** -0.0587 -0.0921*** -0.0396***
IS -0.0637*** -0.0388*** 0.0283 0.0713*** 0.0098 -0.0887**
diﬀ -0.0006 -0.0032 -0.0017 -0.1300** -0.1019* 0.0491
T+6
NIS -0.0827*** -0.0426*** 0.0282*** -0.0461 -0.0928*** -0.0450***
IS -0.0807*** -0.0403*** 0.0323* 0.0717*** 0.0162 -0.1064**
diﬀ -0.0020 -0.0023 -0.0041 -0.1179** -0.1091* 0.0614
T+7
NIS -0.0820*** -0.0232*** 0.0292*** -0.0647 -0.0882*** -0.0412***
IS -0.0792*** -0.0245*** 0.0337* 0.0998*** 0.0071 -0.1129***
diﬀ -0.0028 0.0012 -0.0045 -0.1645*** -0.0952 0.0716*
T+8
NIS -0.0901*** -0.0269*** 0.0483*** -0.0629 -0.0560** -0.0508***
IS -0.0818*** -0.0306*** 0.0363** 0.1165*** 0.0037 -0.1039**
diﬀ -0.0082 0.0037 0.0121 -0.1795*** -0.0597 0.0532
T+9
NIS -0.0870*** -0.0277*** 0.0506*** -0.0745 -0.0465* -0.0373***
IS -0.0766*** -0.0220*** 0.0412** 0.1312*** 0.0179 -0.0982**
diﬀ -0.0104 -0.0057 0.0095 -0.2056*** -0.0644 0.0610
T+10
NIS -0.0912*** -0.0146*** 0.0588*** -0.0718 -0.0313 -0.0093
IS -0.0750*** -0.0100*** 0.0502*** 0.2054*** 0.0308 -0.0985*
diﬀ -0.0162 -0.0046 0.0086 -0.2772*** -0.0621 0.0892*
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Table 1.17: Eﬀects of LTROs on Euro-area and non Euro-area 10-year govenment bond
yields
Time Subject Event 1 Event 2 Event 3 Event 4 Event 5 Event6
T-9
EURO -0.0004 0.0033* 0.0036** -0.0076 0.0226** 0.0057
EXEURO 0.0043 0.0008 0.0109*** -0.0178* -0.0257*** 0.0089
diﬀ -0.0047 0.0025 -0.0073** 0.0101 0.0483*** -0.0032
T-8
EURO -0.0133*** 0.0040** 0.0148*** 0.0190*** 0.0263*** 0.0131
EXEURO -0.0175** 0.0043 0.0286*** 0.0082 -0.0169 0.0275**
diﬀ 0.0042 -0.0003 -0.0138* 0.0108 0.0432*** -0.0144
T-7
EURO -0.0345*** 0.0079*** 0.0092 0.0029 0.0198 0.0084
EXEURO -0.0406*** 0.0037 0.0196*** -0.0212* -0.0290** 0.0394***
diﬀ 0.0062 0.0042 -0.0104 0.0241 0.0487*** -0.0310*
T-6
EURO -0.0311*** 0.0103*** 0.0092 -0.0001 0.0149 0.0115
EXEURO -0.0453*** 0.0043 0.0113 -0.0383** -0.0377** 0.0465***
diﬀ 0.0142 0.0060 -0.0021 0.0382 0.0526** -0.0350**
T-5
EURO -0.0406*** 0.0061** 0.0228 0.0161 -0.0033 0.0080
EXEURO -0.0517*** -0.0015 0.0041 -0.0293* -0.0626*** 0.0272***
diﬀ 0.0111 0.0076 0.0187 0.0455** 0.0594** -0.0192
T-4
EURO -0.0286*** -0.0109*** 0.0313* 0.0091 -0.0214 0.0007
EXEURO -0.0398*** -0.0137 0.0205 -0.0312** -0.0578*** 0.0204***
diﬀ 0.0112 0.0028 0.0108 0.0404* 0.0364* -0.0198
T-3
EURO -0.0368*** -0.0220*** 0.0264*** 0.0249* -0.0362 0.0051
EXEURO -0.0462*** -0.0249*** 0.0395*** -0.0097 -0.0804*** 0.0138**
diﬀ 0.0094* 0.0029 -0.0131 0.0345* 0.0442* -0.0086
T-2
EURO -0.0474*** -0.0194*** 0.0217 0.0343** -0.0320 -0.0045
EXEURO -0.0541*** -0.0342*** 0.0386*** -0.0111 -0.0845*** -0.0123
diﬀ 0.0066 0.0148* -0.0169 0.0454** 0.0525** 0.0078
T-1
EURO -0.0419*** -0.0236*** 0.0377* 0.0149 -0.0270 -0.0115
EXEURO -0.0634*** -0.0373*** 0.0465*** -0.0271** -0.0503*** -0.0134
diﬀ 0.0216** 0.0137* -0.0088 0.0419* 0.0232 0.0019
T
EURO -0.0474*** -0.0180*** 0.0240 -0.0004 -0.0241 -0.0057
EXEURO -0.0666*** -0.0391*** 0.0378** -0.0365*** -0.0579*** 0.0032
diﬀ 0.0192** 0.0211** -0.0138 0.0361* 0.0338 -0.0090
T+1
EURO -0.0538*** -0.0195*** 0.0210 0.0138 -0.0239 -0.0197
EXEURO -0.0774*** -0.0545*** 0.0202 0.0197 -0.0641*** 0.0125
diﬀ 0.0237** 0.0350*** 0.0008 -0.0059 0.0403 -0.0322
T+2
EURO -0.0619*** -0.0333*** 0.0223 0.0203* -0.0255 -0.0265
EXEURO -0.0803*** -0.0655*** 0.0207 0.0290*** -0.0539*** -0.0069
diﬀ 0.0183** 0.0322*** 0.0016 -0.0087 0.0283 -0.0196
T+3
EURO -0.0719*** -0.0357*** 0.0414* 0.0042 -0.0244 -0.0196
EXEURO -0.0889*** -0.0672*** 0.0320 -0.0324* -0.0535*** -0.0015
diﬀ 0.0171** 0.0315*** 0.0094 0.0365 0.0290 -0.0181
T+4
EURO -0.0687*** -0.0306*** 0.0466** -0.0147 -0.0228 -0.0094
EXEURO -0.0821*** -0.0655*** 0.0490** -0.1129*** -0.0655*** -0.0175
diﬀ 0.0134 0.0349*** -0.0025 0.0982* 0.0427 0.0081
T+5
EURO -0.0641*** -0.0388*** 0.0474** -0.0024 -0.0400 -0.0141
EXEURO -0.0667*** -0.0716*** 0.0542** -0.0933*** -0.0731*** -0.0185
diﬀ 0.0026 0.0327*** -0.0067 0.0909** 0.0331 0.0044
T+6
EURO -0.0820*** -0.0406*** 0.0493** 0.0148 -0.0377 -0.0163
EXEURO -0.0838*** -0.0726*** 0.0584** -0.0799*** -0.0923*** -0.0048
diﬀ 0.0018 0.0320*** -0.0091 0.0948** 0.0546 -0.0116
T+7
EURO -0.0804*** -0.0227*** 0.0502*** 0.0155 -0.0326 -0.0181
EXEURO -0.0882*** -0.0469*** 0.0594** -0.1016*** -0.1019*** 0.0018
diﬀ 0.0077 0.0242*** -0.0093 0.1171** 0.0693* -0.0199
T+8
EURO -0.0877*** -0.0264*** 0.0635*** 0.0196 -0.0185 -0.0798
EXEURO -0.0953*** -0.0517*** 0.0728*** -0.1133*** -0.0908*** -0.0160
diﬀ 0.0076 0.0253*** -0.0093 0.1329** 0.0724** -0.0637
T+9
EURO -0.0846*** -0.0254*** 0.0649*** 0.0139 -0.0109 -0.0704
EXEURO -0.0966*** -0.0525*** 0.0807*** -0.1103*** -0.0804*** 0.0230
diﬀ 0.0120 0.0271*** -0.0158 0.1242** 0.0694** -0.0934*
T+10
EURO -0.0839*** -0.0125*** 0.0756*** 0.0311 0.0016 -0.0551
EXEURO -0.1112*** -0.0378*** 0.0802*** -0.1491*** -0.0852** 0.0882***
diﬀ 0.0272 0.0254*** -0.0045 0.1802** 0.0868** -0.1432**
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Table 1.18: Eﬀects of LTROs on Euro-area (ex Greece and Portugal) and non Euro-area
10-year government bond yields
Time Subject Event 1 Event 2 Event 3 Event 4 Event 5 Event6
T-9
EURO (NGP) 0.0003 0.0038* 0.0030* -0.0084 0.0183* 0.0012
EXEURO 0.0043 0.0008 0.0109*** -0.0178* -0.0257*** 0.0089
diﬀ -0.0040 0.0030 -0.0079** 0.0094 0.0440*** -0.0077
T-8
EURO (NGP) -0.0122*** 0.0048** 0.0118*** 0.0209*** 0.0242*** 0.0077
EXEURO -0.0175** 0.0043 0.0286*** 0.0082 -0.0169 0.0275**
diﬀ 0.0053 0.0005 -0.0168*** 0.0127 0.0411** -0.0198
T-7
EURO (NGP) -0.0332*** 0.0084*** 0.0030* 0.0013 0.0175 0.0063
EXEURO -0.0406*** 0.0037 0.0196*** -0.0212* -0.0290** 0.0394**
diﬀ 0.0075 0.0047 -0.0165*** 0.0225 0.0464** -0.0331*
T-6
EURO (NGP) -0.0292*** 0.0110*** -0.0031* -0.0028 0.0087 0.0071
EXEURO -0.0453*** 0.0043 0.0113 -0.0383* -0.0377** 0.0465***
diﬀ 0.0160 0.0067 -0.0144* 0.0355 0.0464** -0.0395*
T-5
EURO (NGP) -0.0410*** 0.0074** 0.0020 0.0146 -0.0147 -0.0007
EXEURO -0.0517*** -0.0015 0.0041 -0.0293* -0.0626*** 0.0272***
diﬀ 0.0107 0.0089 -0.0022 0.0439* 0.0479* -0.0279**
T-4
EURO (NGP) -0.0287*** -0.0110*** 0.0124*** 0.0067 -0.0381* -0.0105
EXEURO -0.0398*** -0.0137 0.0205 -0.0312** -0.0578*** 0.0204***
diﬀ 0.0111 0.0027 -0.0081 0.0380 0.0197 -0.0309**
T-3
EURO (NGP) -0.0376*** -0.0227*** 0.0158*** 0.0225 -0.0570** -0.0127
EXEURO -0.0462*** -0.0249*** 0.0395*** -0.0097 -0.0804*** 0.0138**
diﬀ 0.0087 0.0022 -0.0237* 0.0322 0.0234 -0.0265*
T-2
EURO (NGP) -0.0500*** -0.0201*** 0.0057*** 0.0324 -0.0530** -0.0210*
EXEURO -0.0541*** -0.0342*** 0.0386*** -0.0111 -0.0845*** -0.0123
diﬀ 0.0040 0.0141 -0.0330** 0.0435* 0.0315 -0.0087
T-1
EURO (NGP) -0.0452*** -0.0248*** 0.0177*** 0.0101 -0.0466*** -0.0309**
EXEURO -0.0634*** -0.0373*** 0.0465*** -0.0271** -0.0503*** -0.0134
diﬀ 0.0183** 0.0125 -0.0288** 0.0371 0.0037 -0.0175
T
EURO (NGP) -0.0501*** -0.0198*** 0.0061** -0.0082 -0.0427** -0.0328**
EXEURO -0.0666*** -0.0391*** 0.0378** -0.0365*** -0.0579*** 0.0032
diﬀ 0.0165* 0.0193* -0.0317* 0.0283 0.0152 -0.0360
T+1
EURO (NGP) -0.0559*** -0.0232*** -0.0033 0.0143 -0.0444** -0.0492**
EXEURO -0.0774*** -0.0545*** 0.0202 0.0197 -0.0641*** 0.0125
diﬀ 0.0215** 0.0313*** -0.0234 -0.0054 0.0197 -0.0617**
T+2
EURO (NGP) -0.0648*** -0.0357*** -0.0048 0.0252* -0.0468** -0.0574***
EXEURO -0.0803*** -0.0655*** 0.0207 0.0290*** -0.0539*** -0.0069
diﬀ 0.0155* 0.0299*** -0.0255 -0.0038 0.0071 -0.0505*
T+3
EURO (NGP) -0.0737*** -0.0377*** 0.0131* 0.0046 -0.0469** -0.0517***
EXEURO -0.0889*** -0.0672*** 0.0320 -0.0324* -0.0535*** -0.0015
diﬀ 0.0152* 0.0295*** -0.0189 0.0370 0.0066 -0.0502*
T+4
EURO (NGP) -0.0700*** -0.0319*** 0.0244*** -0.0398 -0.0519** -0.0455***
EXEURO -0.0821*** -0.0655*** 0.0490** -0.1129*** -0.0655*** -0.0175
diﬀ 0.0121 0.0336*** -0.0247 0.0730 0.0136 -0.0280
T+5
EURO (NGP) -0.0641*** -0.0412*** 0.0270*** -0.0262 -0.0666*** -0.0519***
EXEURO -0.0667*** -0.0716*** 0.0542** -0.0933*** -0.0731*** -0.0185
diﬀ 0.0026 0.0304*** -0.0271 0.0671 0.0065 -0.0333
T+6
EURO (NGP) -0.0822*** -0.0420*** 0.0292*** -0.0167 -0.0656** -0.0604***
EXEURO -0.0838*** -0.0726*** 0.0584** -0.0799*** -0.0923*** -0.0048
diﬀ 0.0016 0.0306*** -0.0292 0.0633 0.0267 -0.0556**
T+7
EURO (NGP) -0.0813*** -0.0236*** 0.0303*** -0.0236 -0.0644** -0.0591***
EXEURO -0.0882*** -0.0469*** 0.0594** -0.1016*** -0.1019*** 0.0018
diﬀ 0.0069 0.0234** -0.0291 0.0780 0.0375 -0.0610**
T+8
EURO (NGP) -0.0880*** -0.0278*** 0.0453*** -0.0181 -0.0411* -0.0640***
EXEURO -0.0953*** -0.0517*** 0.0728** -0.1133*** -0.0908*** -0.0160
diﬀ 0.0073 0.0239** -0.0274 0.0953* 0.0498 -0.0480*
T+9
EURO (NGP) -0.0844*** -0.0263*** 0.0482*** -0.0231 -0.0304 -0.0525***
EXEURO -0.0966*** -0.0525*** 0.0807*** -0.1103*** -0.0804*** 0.0230
diﬀ 0.0122 0.0262** -0.0325 0.0872 0.0500 -0.0755***
T+10
EURO (NGP) -0.0871*** -0.0135*** 0.0567*** -0.0025 -0.0158 -0.0316
EXEURO -0.1112*** -0.0378*** 0.0802*** -0.1491*** -0.0852** 0.0882***
diﬀ 0.0240 0.0244*** -0.0235 0.1466* 0.0694* -0.1198***
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Table 1.19: Eﬀects of LTROs on Euro-area (Greece and Portugal) and non Euro-area 10-year
government bond yields
Time Subject Event 1 Event 2 Event 3 Event 4 Event 5 Event6
T-9
EURO (GP) -0.0031*** 0.0014 0.0064* -0.0046*** 0.0397 0.0237***
EXEURO 0.0043 0.0008 0.0109*** -0.0178 -0.0257*** 0.0089
diﬀ -0.0074 0.0006 -0.0045 0.0132 0.0655** 0.0149
T-8
EURO (GP) -0.0177*** 0.0008 0.0268* 0.0115 0.0347*** 0.0346***
EXEURO -0.0175* 0.0043 0.0286*** 0.0082 -0.0169 0.0275
diﬀ -0.0002 -0.0035 -0.0018 0.0033 0.0516** 0.0071
T-7
EURO (GP) -0.0396*** 0.0058** 0.0336 0.0094 0.0289** 0.0166***
EXEURO -0.0406*** 0.0037 0.0196** -0.0212 -0.0290** 0.0394**
diﬀ 0.0010 0.0021 0.0140 0.0306 0.0579*** -0.0228
T-6
EURO (GP) -0.0384*** 0.0073** 0.0585 0.0108 0.0398*** 0.0293**
EXEURO -0.0453*** 0.0043 0.0113 -0.0383* -0.0377* 0.0465***
diﬀ 0.0069 0.0030 0.0473 0.0491* 0.0775*** -0.0173
T-5
EURO (GP) -0.0388*** 0.0011 0.1062* 0.0225 0.0424*** 0.0429***
EXEURO -0.0517*** -0.0015 0.0041 -0.0293 -0.0626*** 0.0272***
diﬀ 0.0129 0.0026 0.1020* 0.0518* 0.1051*** 0.0158*
T-4
EURO (GP) -0.0281*** -0.0105** 0.1070** 0.0188 0.0456*** 0.0454***
EXEURO -0.0398*** -0.0137 0.0205 -0.0312* -0.0578*** 0.0204**
diﬀ 0.0117 0.0033 0.0865 0.0500* 0.1034*** 0.0250***
T-3
EURO (GP) -0.0339*** -0.0191** 0.0688*** 0.0342 0.0471** 0.0764***
EXEURO -0.0462*** -0.0249** 0.0395** -0.0097 -0.0804*** 0.0138*
diﬀ 0.0124* 0.0058 0.0293 0.0439 0.1275*** 0.0627***
T-2
EURO (GP) -0.0371*** -0.0167*** 0.0861* 0.0423 0.0519*** 0.0617***
EXEURO -0.0541*** -0.0342*** 0.0386** -0.0111 -0.0845*** -0.0123
diﬀ 0.0169*** 0.0174 0.0475 0.0534 0.1364*** 0.0740***
T-1
EURO (GP) -0.0287*** -0.0190*** 0.1178* 0.0341 0.0512** 0.0659**
EXEURO -0.0634*** -0.0373*** 0.0465** -0.0271* -0.0503*** -0.0134
diﬀ 0.0348*** 0.0183* 0.0713 0.0612 0.1015*** 0.0793**
T
EURO (GP) -0.0365*** -0.0109** 0.0957* 0.0307 0.0504* 0.1024**
EXEURO -0.0666*** -0.0391*** 0.0378* -0.0365** -0.0579*** 0.0032
diﬀ 0.0301** 0.0283** 0.0579 0.0672* 0.1083*** 0.0991**
T+1
EURO (GP) -0.0451*** -0.0048 0.1180 0.0117 0.0581** 0.0983*
EXEURO -0.0774*** -0.0545*** 0.0202 0.0197 -0.0641*** 0.0125
diﬀ 0.0323** 0.0497*** 0.0979 -0.0079 0.1223*** 0.0857
T+2
EURO (GP) -0.0504*** -0.0240*** 0.1307* 0.0007 0.0595*** 0.0971*
EXEURO -0.0803*** -0.0655*** 0.0207 0.0290** -0.0539** -0.0069
diﬀ 0.0299** 0.0416*** 0.1100 -0.0283 0.1134*** 0.1040*
T+3
EURO (GP) -0.0643*** -0.0278*** 0.1550** 0.0022 0.0655** 0.1089**
EXEURO -0.0889*** -0.0672*** 0.0320 -0.0324 -0.0535** -0.0015
diﬀ 0.0246 0.0394*** 0.1229 0.0346 0.1190*** 0.1104**
T+4
EURO (GP) -0.0635*** -0.0256*** 0.1353** 0.0857 0.0933* 0.1348***
EXEURO -0.0821*** -0.0655*** 0.0490* -0.1129** -0.0655*** -0.0175
diﬀ 0.0186 0.0399*** 0.0863 0.1986** 0.1588** 0.1523***
T+5
EURO (GP) -0.0638*** -0.0293*** 0.1291** 0.0926 0.0665*** 0.1369***
EXEURO -0.0667*** -0.0716*** 0.0542* -0.0933*** -0.0731*** -0.0185
diﬀ 0.0029 0.0423*** 0.0750 0.1859** 0.1396*** 0.1554***
T+6
EURO (GP) -0.0814*** -0.0347*** 0.1295** 0.1408 0.0739*** 0.1598***
EXEURO -0.0838*** -0.0726*** 0.0584* -0.0799*** -0.0923*** -0.0048
diﬀ 0.0024 0.0379*** 0.0712 0.2208* 0.1662*** 0.1646***
T+7
EURO (GP) -0.0771*** -0.0195*** 0.1295** 0.1718 0.0947** 0.1460***
EXEURO -0.0882*** -0.0469*** 0.0594* -0.1016*** -0.1019*** 0.0018
diﬀ 0.0110 0.0274** 0.0701 0.2735* 0.1965*** 0.1442***
T+8
EURO (GP) -0.0864*** -0.0206** 0.1362** 0.1700 0.0719*** -0.1426
EXEURO -0.0953*** -0.0517*** 0.0728** -0.1133*** -0.0908*** -0.0160
diﬀ 0.0089 0.0310** 0.0635 0.2833** 0.1628*** -0.1265
T+9
EURO (GP) -0.0852*** -0.0219*** 0.1316** 0.1618 0.0670*** -0.1422
EXEURO -0.0966*** -0.0525*** 0.0807*** -0.1103*** -0.0804** 0.0230
diﬀ 0.0114 0.0305** 0.0509 0.2720* 0.1474*** -0.1652
T+10
EURO (GP) -0.0711*** -0.0084* 0.1514** 0.1655 0.0711*** -0.1491
EXEURO -0.1112*** -0.0378*** 0.0802*** -0.1491*** -0.0852** 0.0882***
diﬀ 0.0400 0.0294*** 0.0712 0.3146* 0.1563*** -0.2372
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Chapter 2
The Conduct of Monetary Policy in
the Euro Area: Evidence from
Time-Varying Parameters Reaction
Functions
2.1 Introduction
The beginning of the European Monetary Union (EMU) in 1999 has brought several new issues to the
attention of economists. At that time the main interest was to analyse the economic eﬀects of the
monetary policy uniﬁcation in the Euro-area. Then, in subsequent years, researchers started to study
the conduct of monetary policy by the European Central Bank (ECB henceforth) mainly by estimating
Taylor-type monetary policy rules. This chapter aims at contributing to this strand of literature by
producing further evidence on the conduct of monetary policy in the Euro area. In particular, I am
going to estimate monetary policy reaction functions for the ECB with time varying coeﬃcients from
1999 until the end of 2013 considering monthly data.
The reason why I consider time-varying coeﬃcients is that assuming constant coeﬃcients is a too
strong restriction since policymakers can react diﬀerently to changes in economic variables depending
on the actual economic conditions. The importance of allowing for some degree of discretion in the
application of a monetary policy rule is stressed, beyond others, by Taylor (1993) that, besides formu-
lating the well-known Taylor rule, critically deal with the practical aspects of taking policy decisions.
In particular he pointed out that (..) in my view, a policy rule need not be a mechanical formula (...).
A policy rule can be implemented and operated more informally by policymakers who recognize the
general instrument responses that underlie the policy rule, but who also recognize that operating the
rule requires judgment and cannot be done by computer.
The change in policy can take the form of a gradual change or a sudden shift to another regime.
These two diﬀerent views require diﬀerent model speciﬁcations and so it is important to clarify that
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in this work time variation is assumed to occur smoothly over time. As a matter of fact, the problem
with models considering discrete breaks is that they cannot properly account for gradual policy changes
leading to problematic interpretations when the actual policy changes do not exactly ﬁt the speciﬁed
model regimes. On the contrary, considering smooth transitions appears to be the most suited approach
to deal with monetary policy. It must however be noted that, even though the model is well-suited for
capturing gradual time variation, it can also capture jumps in coeﬃcients as shown in appendix C.
In general a change in behaviour can be due either to a shift in the preferences of the central bank
or to a structural shift in the economic relations. As shown by Svensson (1997), the coeﬃcients in the
monetary policy reaction function are a convolution of the central bank's preferences and other param-
eters describing the structure of the economy. Therefore the parameters coming from the estimation of
the monetary policy rule will just represents the weight assigned by the central bank to the variables
considered and conclusions on the source of their variation would need a further investigation in line
with Castelnuovo and Surico (2003) and Assenmacher-Wesche (2006).
To better understand the behaviour of the ECB, this work considers several diﬀerent speciﬁcations
for the monetary policy reaction function. The baseline speciﬁcation is a Taylor rule where the monetary
authority is considered to target the current annual inﬂation rate and the output gap, which are however
not known at the time of the policy decision but with at least one- or two-month lag. Assuming rational
expectations, the current variables are instrumented in the ﬁrst stage of the analysis taking the ﬁtted
values from a BVAR model with time-varying coeﬃcient. This allows to avoid the endogeneity problem
related to the use of their contemporaneous values. In order to correct for the generated-regressor bias
the two models are estimated in the same simulation exercise. This procedure amounts at estimating a
VAR model for inﬂation, the output gap and the monetary policy instrument and focusing only on the
last equation of the model in which some exogenous variables are added. This formulation is consistent
with Bernanke and Blinder (1992) and Bernanke and Mihov (1998) but also with a large part of the
literature on the estimation of monetary policy rules where the generalized method of moments is applied
after instrumenting the endogenous variables with their lags, as in Clarida, Galí, and Gertler (1998).
Then, the monetary policy reaction function is extended by adding other variables that might have
been considered by the ECB. Indeed, one of the purposes of this work is to test the explanatory power
of additional variables itself but also to see whether the inﬂation and the output gap coeﬃcients are
aﬀected.
Another contribution is the consideration of the post-2008 period, which will be simply referred to
as the crisis period. The aim is to evaluate whether relevant changes in the conduct of monetary
policy can be detected along the sample and if they can be attributed to the ﬁnancial-credit crisis and
sovereign debt sustainability issues that arose from 2008 on.
Results show that the sensitivity of the ECB towards inﬂation and output gap changed along the
time span and mainly after 2008 as it also started to respond to new variables like bank loans and
sovereign bond yield spreads.
Finally, also the variance-covariance matrix of the residuals is assumed to have a time-varying compo-
nent. Errors' heteroskedasticity is important to correctly identify parameter time variation as assuming
a constant variance-covariance matrix could induce to identify a change in the conduct of monetary
policy while in fact what is occurring is just an unaccounted change in the characteristics of the mone-
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tary policy shock1. As a matter of fact, the residuals of the monetary policy reaction function can be
interpreted as monetary policy shocks if the so-called recursiveness assumption is valid, i.e. the policy
shocks are orthogonal to the regressors and to the other contemporaneous economic disturbances. This
is one of the several methodologies used in literature to identify monetary policy shocks and it is ex-
tensively reviewed by Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans (1999). The two-step procedure applied in
this paper allows to correctly estimate exogenous monetary policy shocks without necessarily having to
identify the entire model structure as the suﬃcient assumption is that the policy instrument does not
inﬂuence the given macro variables in the current period.
From an econometric point of view, the model has a state-space representation to which the Kalman
ﬁlter and smoother can be applied and the estimation is possible through Bayesian simulation techniques.
This choice is motivated by the fact that allowing time-variation in coeﬃcients greatly increases the
number of parameters to estimate bringing about an overﬁtting problem. Bayesian inference is an
eﬃcient solution to this kind of problems because it allows to shrink the dimensionality of the problem
by letting parameters comes from posterior distributions deﬁned by a narrow set of hyperparameters.
The structure of the chapter is as follows. Section 2.2 summarizes the monetary policy strategy
adopted by the ECB since 1999. Section 2.3 reviews the literature about monetary policy rules both for
what concerns their theoretical speciﬁcation and the econometric applications with a focus on the Euro
area. Section 2.4 deﬁnes the theoretical and econometric speciﬁcation of the monetary policy reaction
function. Section 2.5 shows the estimation results from diﬀerent monetary policy reaction functions and
section 2.6 concludes.
2.2 The ECB Strategy
For the purpose of this work it would be useful to identify which are the macroeconomic variables that
are considered by the ECB in its decision process. This section reviews the monetary policy strategy of
the ECB in the period 1999-2013 and it is based on information coming from oﬃcial ECB documents like
Monthly Bulletins and speeches of the President, usually after the Governing Council monthly meeting.
The policy strategy of the ECB has been announced in October 1998 and its main objective is
the price stability in the Euro-area (ECB, 1998). The rationale behind this target is that a monetary
policy that credibly maintains price stability is assumed to give the best possible contribution to the
economic objectives of the European Union by creating an environment in which other policies can be
most eﬀective (ECB, 1999b). However, the ECB recognizes that it cannot directly control the price
level, but it faces a complex transmission mechanism based on several diﬀerent channels. This makes
it diﬃcult for the ECB to predict the eﬀects of its policy actions as they are also likely to change in
response to an evolving economic environment. To address this issue, the monetary-policy strategy is
based on two elements: a quantitative deﬁnition of price stability and a two-pillar approach for the
analysis of the risks to price stability.
Price stability is deﬁned as a year-on-year increase in the Harmonized Index of Consumer Prices
(HICP henceforth) of below 2% to be maintained over the medium term (ECB, 1999b). This quantitative
1Heteroskedasticity is a standard assumption in the Bayesian literature but the present framework diﬀers from those
of Cogley and Sargent (2005) and Primiceri (2005) as they assume an autoregressive structure for the error variance to
obtain a stochastic volatility model
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value has been chosen to balance the cost of inﬂation with the necessity for the central bank to maintain
an appropriate margin for policy reaction in case of deﬂationary pressures. On the other hand, the focus
on the medium term convey the principle that monetary policy cannot control price developments in
the short term with the aim to avoid the introduction of unnecessary volatility into the economy.
The two pillars on which the analysis of price stability is based are the monetary and economic
analysis. These approaches are intended to provide two diﬀerent perspectives on the determination of
price developments.
The monetary analysis assigns a prominent role to money growth in the assessment of the outlook for
price developments and takes a reference value for the broad monetary aggregate M3 which was derived
using the relationship between money, prices, output and the velocity of circulation. As for the target
inﬂation rate, the consideration of a reference value for money growth does not imply a commitment to
correct short-term deviations (ECB, 1999b).
On the other hand, the purpose of the economic analysis is to provide a broader outlook for price
developments by taking into account the shocks hitting the Euro-area economy and the interplay between
supply and demand in the goods and labour markets so that all the risks to price stability can be
evaluated. The assessment is made using a wide range of economic indicators that act as leading
indicators for prices including wages, the exchange rate, bond prices, the yield curve, measures of real
activity, ﬁscal policy indicators, price and cost indices and business and consumer surveys (ECB, 1999b).
Moreover, the economic analysis makes large use of macroeconomic models with the aim of producing
projections of the main economic variables as explained by Issing (2004).
This strategy has been reviewed in 2003 (ECB, 2003). The assessment led to a reaﬃrmation of the
main elements of the strategy except for the role of money growth, which has been revised. In particular,
the Governing Council decided to no longer consider the reference value of the broad monetary aggregate
M3 on an annual basis but to use the monetary analysis as a means of cross-checking the short-term
indications coming from the economic analysis from a longer-term point of view.
Monetary policy decisions are taken by the Governing Council on the basis of an assessment of
the monetary policy stance. The monetary policy stance can be deﬁned as the contribution made by
monetary policy to economic, ﬁnancial and monetary developments (ECB, 2010) while the assessment
is the procedure that allows to evaluate whether the eﬀects of monetary policy decisions are consistent
with the central bank's objectives. More in details, as stated in several diﬀerent documents issued by
the ECB, the assessment involves two elements: the formation of a view on the medium-term inﬂation
outlook and the identiﬁcation of the contribution that monetary policy makes to the real economy and
the maintenance of price stability. The assessment of the monetary policy stance takes into account a
broad range of economic, ﬁnancial and monetary variables.
During oﬃcial press conferences, the President of the ECB explains the monetary policy decisions
taken by the Governing Council in light of the current macroeconomic context focusing on the main
elements driving the policy decisions. As regards economic activity, the main macroeconomic variables
considered are: GDP and its components (mainly consumption and investments), unemployment and in-
dustrial production. As regards prices, the President often mentioned: the HICP, inﬂation expectations,
commodity prices, unit labour costs and industrial output prices. The ECB considers also sentiment
indicators like consumer and industrial conﬁdence and investors' sentiment. The most cited ﬁnancial
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variables are: the yield curve, market interest rates, nominal and real long-term interest rates, stock
market volatility and ﬁnancial indicators. Of much concern is also the member states' ﬁscal position
and debt ratios while from 2008 the Euro-area credit conditions gained much attention. Then, a ﬁnal
part of the talk is very often devoted to developments in the world economy with a focus on the US
economy.
The severe ﬁnancial crisis that hit the economy in 2008 has complicated the conduct of monetary
policy by the ECB. The ﬁnancial turmoil started in August 2007 and it initially led to an impaired
functioning of money markets. Then, in the ﬁrst half of 2010, the ﬁnancial crisis evolved into a sovereign
debt crisis. From an operative point of view, the ECB admitted that assessing the monetary policy
stance became more diﬃcult as the economic situation was rapidly changing and there was a high degree
of uncertainty: the structural economic regularities were not reliable anymore and the monetary policy
transmission mechanism was disrupted. In this context the ECB intervened by gradually cutting the
key interest rates by 400 basis points reaching the level of 0,25% at the end of 2013 and by implementing
a wide range of non-standard measures. At the beginning of the crisis, unconventional measures were
aimed at ensuring the necessary liquidity provision to banks. For these purposes, the ECB increased
the frequency and lengthened the maturity of its reﬁnancing operations and also provided liquidity in
foreign currencies. The rationale behind these interventions is that banks are considered a key elements
of the monetary policy transmission mechanism as they are the primary source of ﬁnancing for the
real economy. With subsequent unconventional measures the ECB kept on providing liquidity to the
banking sector by conducting reﬁnancing operations with ﬁxed rate tender and full allotment procedure
and by directly purchasing covered bonds along two covered bonds purchase programs. The eﬀects
of these decisions were to change the usual relationship existing between the main reﬁnancing rate
and the overnight money market rate as the latter fell signiﬁcantly below the main reﬁnancing rate
towards the deposit facility rate. To deal with the tensions involving sovereign bond markets the ECB
implemented the Securities Markets Programme by which it directly purchased Euro-area marketable-
debt instruments issued by central governments or public entities. This action was designed not to
aﬀect the monetary policy stance as the impact of the interventions has been sterilized through speciﬁc
operations to re-absorb the injected liquidity. For the same purpose, in August 2012 the ECB announced
that it may undertake outright open market operations on European government bonds. Overall the
ECB response to the ﬁnancial crisis is stated to be geared towards the achievement of the ECB's price
stability objective (ECB, 2010) and all the measures must be considered as temporary.
A broad picture on the conduct of monetary policy in the Euro area is provided by ﬁgure 2.1 which
shows the evolution of the three key ECB interest rates and the Euro-area overnight index average
rate for the period from January 1999 until December 2012. Rates increased until October 2000 and
then declined from April 2001 until June 2003. In the period from June 2003 to the end of 2005 rates
remained unchanged and then the ECB progressively increased them until June 2007. The unfolding of
the ﬁnancial crisis made necessary a rapid interest rate cut: in April 2009 the MRO rate reached the
1% and in July 2012 it has been further lowered to 0,75 with a deposit facility rate at the zero lower
bound. In November 2013 the MRO rate has been set to 0.25% and the marginal lending facility to
0.75%. As regard the EONIA rate, it has always ﬂuctuated around the MRO rate but this regularity
broke in October 2008 when it started to progressively decline below the MRO rate.
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Figure 2.1: Euro-area monetary policy rates (daily data)
Source: Datastream
2.3 Literature Review
This section presents a review of the empirical literature about the estimation of monetary policy rules
for the Euro-area. In this ﬁeld the literature follows three main strands: ﬁrst, there are papers that
compare the conduct of monetary policy in diﬀerent countries before the EMU, then other works are
interested in comparing the Bundesbank with the ECB and ﬁnally some authors tried to estimate the
reaction function of the ECB.
As regards the ﬁrst category, Clarida, Galí, and Gertler (1998) estimate monetary policy reaction
functions for two sets of countries, Germany, Japan and United States and United Kingdom, France and
Italy using monthly data over the sample 1979-1994. The policy function is a forward-looking version
of the Taylor rule considering also a set of other variables that can inﬂuence the rate setting. Results
show that the Bundesbank, the Bank of Japan and the Fed responded both to inﬂationary pressures
and output deviations. On the other hand, the Bank of Italy, the Bank of France and the Bank of
England responded less aggressively to inﬂation and they all followed the Bundesbank closely. Finally,
the authors calculate in each point in time a target interest rate and compare this with the actual
interest rate. The interesting ﬁndings are that the gap between the actual and the target rate behaves
similarly over time for all countries and the central banks started to track the Bundesbank several years
prior to the hard ERM (from 1990 to 1992) while with the onset of the hard ERM the gaps between
the actual and the target rates widen. This means that during the hard ERM period the actual policy
rate was not appropriate for France, Italy and Spain as the hypothetical interest rate gaps represents a
measure of the economic stress connected to the participation to the ERM and that lead to its collapse.
Other papers interested in the conduct of monetary policy in the period before the EMU are those
of Ciccarelli and Rebucci (2006) and Trecroci and Vassalli (2010) and they both use time-varying
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parameters models.
However, the aim of Ciccarelli and Rebucci (2006) is not to compare monetary policy rules but to
study the monetary policy transmission mechanism in the Euro area for the period 1981-1998. They
apply a two-step methodology as they ﬁrst estimate the reaction function of four central banks (Germany,
France, Italy and Spain), they take the residuals of the German monetary policy rule as to be the
monetary policy shock and then they study the monetary policy transmission mechanism by inserting
these residual into a VAR model. In both steps they use time-varying heterogeneous coeﬃcient models
estimated by means of Bayesian techniques. The ﬁnal objective is then to evaluate whether the impact
of monetary policy has changed and cross-countries diﬀerences have decreased over time, as one should
expect after the creation of the European Monetary Union.
Time-varying parameters reaction functions are estimated also by Trecroci and Vassalli (2010) for
ﬁve countries (United States, United Kingdom, Germany, France, Italy) over the sample 1971-1998.
They use simple interest rate rules depending on the output gap, inﬂation expectations and the lagged
interest rate. Their ﬁndings are that parameters do shift over time in most cases in a smooth and gradual
fashion and interest rate policies diverge widely across countries. Most interestingly these diﬀerences
are evident also across the three Euro-area countries.
Many works focused on the comparison between the conduct of monetary policy in the Euro-area
before and after the EMU.
The paper of Hayo and Hofmann (2006) falls in this category. They compare the Bundesbank and
the ECB reaction functions specifying a Taylor rule as in Clarida, Galí, and Gertler (1998). For the
estimation, monthly data are employed: from 1979 to 1998 for the Bundesbank and from 1999 to 2004
for the ECB. Instruments for the forward-looking and contemporaneous variables are chosen applying an
automatic model selection algorithm and estimation is done using GMM. For the Bundesbank results
are similar between the pre- and post-uniﬁcation period and show that the response to inﬂation is
signiﬁcantly larger than the response to the output gap. The ECB reaction function has an inﬂation
coeﬃcient that is not statistically diﬀerent neither to one nor to the Bundesbank's coeﬃcient. The
big diﬀerence between the two central bank is in the output reaction coeﬃcient as the one of the ECB
is more than twice as large as the one found for the Bundesbank. By using the monetary model of
Svensson (1997), this discrepancy is proved to be due to the relatively higher interest rate elasticity for
the German economy, i.e. a weaker transmission of monetary policy for the Euro-area.
Gerlach and Schnabel (2000) compare the interest rate implied by a Taylor rule with the real one
for 13 EMU-area countries over the period 1990-1998. The authors create a ﬁctitious central bank by
aggregating data of the considered countries so that a unique interest rate for the EMU is calculated.
Results show that the actual interest rate does not diﬀer much from the one implied by the Taylor rule
and the coeﬃcients are robust to the extensions of the monetary policy rule to other variables. This
means that, if the ECB were to conduct monetary policy using the Taylor rule, it would not deviate
much from the actual weighted interest-rate setting behaviour in the considered countries. The last
econometric exercise is to estimate a forward-looking monetary policy rule where regressors are the
inﬂation rate expected into four periods, the output gap and a constant term. Again this speciﬁcation
captures well the evolution of the EMU interest rate.
Sauer and Sturm (2007) estimates several policy reaction functions for the ECB over the sample
79
CHAPTER 2: The Conduct of Monetary Policy in the Euro Area
1991:01-2003:04 and compare them with the policy rules followed by the Bundesbank. They consider
both contemporaneous and forward-looking policy rules. The contemporaneous rules are estimated using
ex-post data and real-time data. The forward-looking rules are estimated using future output growth
rates, survey data and a GMM procedure. Their results show that the coeﬃcient on contemporaneous
inﬂation is positive but low for the ECB. However this ﬁnding is not anymore valid if a forward-looking
rule is considered. In this case the inﬂation coeﬃcient is positive and almost always greater than one. On
the other hand the estimates of the output gap coeﬃcient are more stable through diﬀerent speciﬁcations
and they are all positive but lower than one. The degree of partial adjustment in the interest rate is
found to be signiﬁcantly large.
Finally, other authors estimate a monetary policy reaction function for the ECB with the aim of
studying the conduct of monetary policy in the Euro area. There is a wide strand of literature dealing
with this issue and ﬁndings are not always comparable with each other. Table 2.1 summarizes some of
the results contained in the papers dealing with this issue.
Table 2.1: Inﬂation and output coeﬃcients in estimated reaction functions for the ECB
Authors Estimation Period INFLATION OUTPUT
Gerdesmeier and Roﬃa (2004) 1985-2002 >1 <1
Carstensen (2006) 1999-2003 lagged: <1 lagged: <1
Fourçans and Vranceanu (2007) 1999-2006 future: <1 contemp: <1
Blattner and Margaritov (2010) 1999-2007
contemp: <1,
future: >1
contemp: <1,
future: >1
Gorter, Stolwijk, Jacobs, and de Haan (2010) 1998-2010 >1
'98-'07: >1,
'98-'10: <1
Gerlach and Lewis (2010) 1999-2009 <1 <1
Gerlach (2011) 1999-2009 / <1
Gerlach and Lewis (2014) 1999-2011 <1 <1
Gerdesmeier and Roﬃa (2004) estimate several reaction functions for the Euro-area over the period
1985:01-2002:02 using GMM. In order to do so, they construct measures of aggregate variables and they
derive a ﬁctitious measure of monetary policy for the period before 1999. The theoretical framework
is the one of Clarida, Galí, and Gertler (1998) but they also enrich the speciﬁcation with several other
variables and consider diﬀerent measures of inﬂation and output. The main results are that both the
coeﬃcients of inﬂation and output are signiﬁcant and not statistically diﬀerent from the ones proposed
by Taylor (1993) and their magnitude is around 2 and 0.3 respectively. These estimates are not sensitive
neither to changes in the measures of inﬂation and output nor to the inclusion of other explanatory
variables. The exchange rate and commodity prices are found to be not signiﬁcant while the money
growth and a stock market index have positive and signiﬁcant coeﬃcients.
Carstensen (2006) estimates backward-looking monetary policy reaction functions for the ECB over
the ﬁrst four years of the EMU by employing an ordered probit model for the MRO rate. One of the
purposes of the paper is to test the signiﬁcance of monetary variables, and so diﬀerent measures of
money growth, the real money gap and money overhang are included as regressors. The main results
are that both the inﬂation and the output gap coeﬃcients are positive but lower than one. Money
growth, money overhang and the real money gap are found to be signiﬁcant so that it is possible to
conclude that the ﬁrst pillar of the ECB strategy has been important for the policy decisions. Also the
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signiﬁcance of the second pillar is tested by considering nominal and real eﬀective exchange rates, an
interest rate spread and a real interest rate. Among these variables the only one with a signiﬁcant and
positive coeﬃcient is the interest rate spread. Finally also the presence of asymmetries in the policy
reaction function is considered and only a slight asymmetric eﬀect is found.
Fourçans and Vranceanu (2007) analyse the ECB monetary policy over the period 1999-2006 by
means of a qualitative and a quantitative analysis. The qualitative analysis is based on the public
statements of the ECB while the quantitative analysis employs the estimation of reaction functions to
assess whether the policy actions are consistent with the founding principles. The estimated monetary
policy rule has the lagged short term rate, inﬂation and an indicator for real activity as regressors.
Both contemporaneous and forward-looking rules are estimated. Results show that the ECB responds
signiﬁcantly to future inﬂation and to diﬀerent measures of output gap with coeﬃcients smaller than
one while the coeﬃcient on contemporaneous inﬂation is not signiﬁcant. Then they estimate a small
model of the Euro-area economy made up by the forward-looking monetary policy rule, an IS equation
and a Phillips curve. Interest rate rule coeﬃcients are similar to those obtained from the estimation of
the single equations.
Blattner and Margaritov (2010) try to ﬁnd a robust speciﬁcation of the monetary policy rule of
the Euro-area by using a real-time monthly database consisting of 127 series compiled with the data
available to each Governing Council meeting over the sample 1999-2007. The ﬁrst econometric exercise
consists of estimating 3300 diﬀerent speciﬁcations of the policy rule and pool the parameter estimates
according to some eﬃciency criteria. The speciﬁcation of the policy rule is similar to the one in Clarida,
Galí, and Gertler (2000). Eventually they ﬁnd that 291 rules deliver a meaningful description of the
ECB interest-rate setting behaviour. Results show that the ECB is neither purely backward nor forward-
looking, but it reacts to a synthesis of the available information on the current and future state of the
economy. As regards the magnitude of coeﬃcients, those of the contemporaneous inﬂation and output
are positive but lower than one while those of future inﬂation and output are often greater than one.
In the last part of the paper six factor are extracted from the real-time database and they are used to
estimate a policy function. Results are consistent with the previous ﬁndings.
A last strand of literature faces the issue of characterising the conduct of monetary policy by the
ECB during the crisis.
Gorter, Stolwijk, Jacobs, and de Haan (2010) estimate a forward-looking reaction function with both
partial adjustment and ﬁrst-order serially correlated errors over the period 1998-2010 with the aim of
analysing the stability of coeﬃcients. They ﬁnd that the ECB gives priority to price stability and the
coeﬃcient of expected inﬂation is statistically stable over time while the coeﬃcient for expected output
gap decreases in the crisis period.
Gerlach and Lewis (2010), Gerlach (2011) and Gerlach and Lewis (2014) analyse the interest rate
setting behaviour of the ECB by using a smooth transition model that allows for two regimes in the
sample period. Their main ﬁnding is that the ECB reaction function is not stable over time. Gerlach
(2011) identiﬁes a shift in the reaction function in mid 2008 while Gerlach and Lewis (2014) identify
a ﬁrst switch in autumn 2008 and a second switch in late 2010. As regards the coeﬃcient, the ECB
responded more aggressively to expected inﬂation than to expected output with both coeﬃcients positive
and signiﬁcant in the pre-crisis period and non-signiﬁcant during the crisis. Moreover the ECB seems
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to have cut interest rate more rapidly than what the pre-crisis reaction function would have implied.
This is compatible with the theoretical literature on optimal monetary policy in the presence of the ZLB
which suggests that the central bank should implement an aggressive expansionary monetary policy to
maintain long-term interest rate low if it foresees that the ZLB will be binding in the near future2
2.4 The ECB Reaction Function
2.4.1 Theoretical Speciﬁcation
The baseline theoretical framework is similar to those used by Clarida, Galí, and Gertler (1998) except
that it is enriched with several other variables to test their explanatory power.
In the baseline speciﬁcation I assume that the ECB has a target interest rate for the nominal short
term interest which depends on the state of the economy:
i∗t = i
∗ + β (E [pit|Ωt]− pi∗) + γE [xt|Ωt] (2.1)
where: i∗ is the long-run equilibrium nominal rate, pit is the rate of inﬂation between period t and
t− 1, pi∗ is the target level of inﬂation, xt is the output gap in period t, i.e. the diﬀerence between the
real output yt and the natural rate of output y
∗ and Ωt is the information set available to the central
bank at time t. The current variables pit and xt are taken with expectations because their actual value
is not known by the central bank at the time in which it takes its policy decisions.
As regards the setting of the actual policy rate, two assumptions are made here. First, the actual
policy rate is set before the realization of pit and xt and second, the ECB follows a partial adjustment
mechanism for the theoretical reasons explained by Woodford (1999)3, i.e. the central bank has the
tendency to smooth the interest rate and to ﬁx it as a weighted average between the past interest rate
and the target, plus a random shock:
it = (1− ρ) i∗t + ρit−1 + vt (2.2)
Here vt is an exogenous shock to the interest rate which is assumed to be i.i.d.. There can be
several economic interpretations for vt. Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans (1999) report three diﬀerent
interpretations: vt can reﬂect exogenous shocks to the preference of the monetary authority, it can be
due to some technical factors like measurement errors in the preliminary data available leading to an
imperfect response of the central bank to changes in the economy or it can derive from the willingness
of the ECB to avoid the social costs of disappointing private agents' expectations so that shocks to their
expectations becomes self-fulﬁlling.
2See for example Reifschneider and Williams (2000), Orphanides and Wieland (2000) and Adam and Billi (2006).
Indeed Gerlach and Lewis (2014) also produces evidence of the fact that the ZLB has been actually binding from mid
2008 till at least the end of 2009 as the implied target interest rate was negative.
3Other reasons that can justify the appearance of the lagged interest rate in the monetary policy reaction function are
the fact that the central bank operates in an environment of data uncertainty as its decisions are based on real-time data
rather than revised ones (Orphanides, 2001) and the existence of serially correlated shocks which are not captured by the
empirical rule (Rudebusch, 2002).
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Substituting equation 2.1 in 2.2 I obtain the equation for the actual nominal interest rate:
it = α+ ψE [pit|Ωt] + θE [xt|Ωt] + ρit−1 + vt (2.3)
where: α = (1− ρ) δ, ψ = (1− ρ)β , θ = (1− ρ) γ and δ = i∗ − βpi∗.
From this equation it is clear that the parameters coming from the empirical estimation of the
monetary policy rule are reduced-form parameters, i.e. a convolution of both structural parameters and
central bank's preference parameters.
The estimation of equation 2.3 cannot be directly implemented by substituting to E [pit|Ωt] and
E [xt|Ωt] their contemporaneous values pit and xt as they would be aﬀected by an endogeneity problem.
This problem can be overcome by assuming that the ECB has rational expectations and so E [pit|Ωt] and
E [xt|Ωt] are instrumented. Here, instruments will be generally indicated as ut and their importance
comes from the fact that they allow to get identifying assumptions. So let ut be a vector of variables
within the central bank's information set at the time it chooses the interest rate (i.e. ut ∈ Ωt) that
are orthogonal to vt. Possible elements of ut include any lagged variables that help forecast inﬂation
and output, as well as any contemporaneous variables that are uncorrelated with the current interest
rate shock vt. Equation 2.3 and the fact that E [vt|ut] = 0 imply the following set of orthogonality
conditions:
E [it − α− ψE [pit|Ωt]− θE [xt|Ωt]− ρit−1|ut] = 0 (2.4)
In my speciﬁc case ut are the lagged inﬂation rate and the lagged output gap. A more extensive
speciﬁcation of the estimation procedure is postponed to the next section.
This baseline Taylor-type reaction function is then enriched with several other variables to allow
for a clearer identiﬁcation of the conduct of monetary policy in the Euro-area so that the general
speciﬁcation is the following:
i∗t = i
∗ + β (E [pit|Ωt]− pi∗) + γE [xt|Ωt] + ξE [zt|Ωt] (2.5)
As regards the variables considered for the estimation, I assume that the monetary policy instrument
is the short-term money market rate, i.e. the Euro-area overnight index average. This assumption is
standard in the empirical literature on the estimation of monetary policy rules4. Even though the EO-
NIA is not under the direct control of the ECB, because it represents the bank funding conditions on the
money market, it closely tracks the key policy rates as it ﬂuctuates around the rate on main reﬁnancing
operations and between the deposit facility and the marginal lending facility rates as shown by ﬁgure
2.1. However this relationships broke during the crisis period as the EONIA fell substantially below the
repo rate. This happened because of the unconventional monetary policy measures implemented by the
ECB which then makes the low level of the EONIA a direct expression of policy and does not invalidate
its use as monetary policy instrument.
The regressors of the policy rule represent the ECB's information set. From this point of view,
the necessary assumptions to correctly identify monetary policy shocks are that there are no missing
variables as the considered regressors can exhaustively describe the ECB behaviour and that the residuals
4See e.g. Bernanke and Blinder (1992), Clarida, Galí, and Gertler (1998), Clarida, Galí, and Gertler (2000) and Judd
and Rudebusch (1998).
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are orthogonal to the regressors, i.e. the so-called recursiveness assumption. Then regressors' coeﬃcients
represent the feedback rule.
As regressors I use contemporaneous and lagged values of inﬂation and the output gap. The reference
series for inﬂation is the annual growth of the HICP. It must be noted that the contemporaneous value
of the industrial production and of the HICP are not available neither to the monetary authority at the
time of policy decision nor to markets in the remaining part of the month. These values are usually
published with at least one month lag. For this reason the contemporaneous value of inﬂation and of
the industrial production gap can be considered as a measure of expected inﬂation and output while
its lagged value is what it is actually available at the time of policy decisions. In order to make the
equation 2.3 estimable, the ECB is assumed to have rational expectations and so the current inﬂation
rate and output gap are instrumented by taking the ﬁtted values of a time-varying parameters BVAR
model with one lag of the endogenous variables and of the policy rate. This approach is consistent
with Bernanke and Blinder (1992) and Bernanke and Mihov (1998). The output gap are calculated by
applying the Hodrick-Prescott ﬁlter to the original series and taking the diﬀerence between the actual
values and the ﬁltered series that represents the potential output5.
This basic model is then extended to include other variables that might have been taken into account
by the ECB so that both the explanatory power of this additional variables and the robustness of
coeﬃcients on inﬂation and the output gap are tested. The additional variables considered are an index
of Euro-area sovereign yield spreads, a stock market volatility index, the real eﬀective exchange rate, an
index of commodity prices, the lagged value of a broad monetary aggregate and the annual growth rate
of bank loans. The commodity price index is the Thomson Reuters/Jeﬀeries CRB Index and as stock
market volatility index I use the VIX index which is a measure of the implied volatility of S&P 500
index options over the next 30 calendar days. The index of sovereign yield spreads is built weighting the
bond spreads of 10 Euro-area countries for their relative debt-to-GDP ratio and it has been included
in the analysis to capture tensions on sovereign debt markets in the period 2010-2012. Bank loans
data come from the statistics on the monetary ﬁnancial institution (MFI) sector provided by the ECB
which summarize the aggregated balance sheet positions of MFIs in the Euro area. Further details over
the series used in the estimation can be found in appendix A. This speciﬁcation is consistent with a
closed-economy monetary policy rule as there are no foreign inﬂation and output among the regressors.
The estimation period goes from January 1999 to December 2013, all the considered variables are in
logarithms except for the Eonia and their values are represented in ﬁgure 2.2. As regards the output gap,
the annual inﬂation rate, the lagged growth rate of M3, the monthly change of the exchange rate and of
the CRB price index, logarithms are applied to the original series and then the necessary transformation
are calculated, i.e. the HP ﬁlter is run on the logarithm of the industrial production index and annual
(or monthly) growth rates are calculated as the diﬀerence between the current logarithmic value and its
12-month (or 1-month) lag.
5Results are very similar to those obtained by regressing the industrial production on a constant term, a linear trend
and a quadratic trend.
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Figure 2.2: Regressors
2.4.2 Econometric Speciﬁcation
In order to obtain estimates of the monetary policy reaction function coeﬃcients, it is necessary to
estimate two system of equations: the BVAR model and the reaction function.
As I allow coeﬃcients to be time-varying, the ECB reaction function can be re-written in a state-
space form. For each time t = 1, . . . T , the model has the following structure:
yt = Xtβt + εt, εt ∼ N (0, σtΣε) (2.6)
βt = βt−1 + ηt, ηt ∼ N (0,Ση) (2.7)
Here yt is the short-term interest rate, Xt is the (1× n) vector of regressors containing the lagged
value of the dependent variable and the (n− 1) exogenous regressors, βt = (β1t, . . . , βnt)′ is a (n× 1)
vector of coeﬃcients and εt and ηt are the error terms which are normally distributed and orthogonal
with each other.
Equation 2.6 is the measurement equation in which parameters are time-varying. The evolution
of parameters is random, the βs are treated as latent variables that captures the actual state of the
system. In particular they follow a random-walk without drift as described by the state equation 2.7.
This assumption is a standard way of modeling permanent structural changes in behaviour due to
fundamental changes in policy regime, see for example Cogley and Sargent (2005) and Primiceri (2005).
As regards variances of the error terms, Ση is an (n× n) matrix governing the parameters' evolution,
while in the measurement equation errors are heteroskedastic with variance σtΣε, i.e. the parameter
σt is responsible for time-variation and Σε is a constant scale parameter. Following Ciccarelli and
85
CHAPTER 2: The Conduct of Monetary Policy in the Euro Area
Rebucci (2006), I assume that σt is distributed as a scaled inverse-χ
2 with v degrees of freedom6
(σt ∼ Inv − χ2 (v, 1)). This makes the distribution of εt equivalent to a Student-t with v degrees of
freedom and scale matrix Σε (tv (0,Σε))
7 and so large realizations of the monetary policy shocks are
possible. As a matter of fact, the purpose of this work is not only to study the monetary policy reaction
function, but also to correctly identify monetary policy shocks, i.e. deviations of the short-term rate
from the value implied by the policy function. Assuming heteroskedasticity in the residuals is also
important to correctly identify time-variation in parameters. A constant variance-covariance matrix
could lead to erroneously identify a change in the conduct of monetary policy while it is just a change
in the characteristics of the monetary policy shock. However this model does not impose unnecessary
heteroskedasticity, i.e. if the heteroskedasticity factor is not signiﬁcant the coeﬃcients' dynamics and the
residuals will be equal to those one would have obtained by estimating an homoskedastic time-varying
parameters model. On the other hand, if heteroskedasticity is present, the magnitude of coeﬃcients will
be lower that in an homoskedastic framework as some part of the EONIA variations is explained by σt.
Priors are set as follow. The prior over the variance-covariance matrix of the parameters is assumed to
be Inverse-Wishart with γ degrees of freedom and scale matrix Υ. This scale matrix has a very relevant
role in determining parameters' evolution as the greater is the variance, the more time variation will be
displayed by parameters. According to what is done in the literature, Υ is considered to be equal to the
OLS variance-covariance matrix of the parameters multiplied by the sample size so that a high degree
of parameters time-variation is assumed. The parameters are assumed to be normally distributed with
mean equal to the OLS estimate and variance-covariance matrix equal to four times the OLS variance-
covariance matrix. The OLS estimates are calculated on the 36 observations previous to the estimation
sample.
Here it is necessary to more clearly justify the choice of Υ. The literature uses to rescale this matrix
by (0.1)
2
or (0.01)
2
in order to decrease the degree of time variation in coeﬃcients and improve impulse
responses and forecasting analysis (Stock and Watson, 1996; Primiceri, 2005). However, the purpose of
the current work is to study the evolution of coeﬃcients through time and it appears more appropriate
not to decrease the amount of time-variation so that the estimation can reach a better ﬁt of the data.
The output gap and inﬂation are made exogenous with respect to the short term interest rate by
taking the ﬁtted values from the following time-varying parameters VAR system in structural form:
At (L)Zt = DtRt−1 + Vt (2.8)
Here Zt is a (2× 1) vector containing the output gap and inﬂation at time t in natural logarithms,
Rt−1 is the ﬁrst lag of the monetary policy instrument, Vt is a (2× 1) vector of residuals that have zero
6The scaled inverse chi-squared distribution is the distribution for x = 1/s2, where s2 is a sample mean of the squares
of v independent normal random variables that have mean 0 and inverse variance 1/σ2 = τ2. The distribution is therefore
parametrised by the two quantities v and τ2, referred to as the number of chi-squared degrees of freedom and the scaling
parameter, respectively. In the case of interest τ2 = 1 meaning that the v independent normal variables are also standard
(N (0, 1)).
7This can be intuitively understood considering that the Student's t distribution (with v degrees of freedom) is the
distribution of the ratio of two independent random variables: Z/
√
W/v, where Z ∼ N (0, 1) and W ∼ χ2 (v). Moreover
the Student's t distribution can be interpreted as a mixture of normals with common mean and variances that follows an
inverse-Gamma distribution. In the case of interest εt ∼ N (0, σtΣε) with σt ∼ inv − χ2 (v, 1) and the inverse-χ2 is a
special case of the inverse-Gamma distribution. Therefore the vector of errors is a mixture of normals and it is equivalent
to a scaled t-distribution with v degrees of freedom tv (0,Σε).
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mean and are serially uncorrelated. Finally, At (L) and Dt are the time-varying coeﬃcients matrices
with dimension (2× 2), and (2× 1) respectively and At (L) speciﬁed in the lag operator L with lag
length p1 = 1
8.
The system deﬁned in equation 2.8 features time-varying coeﬃcients and can be alternatively rewrit-
ten as follows:
Zt = Xtθt + wt, wt ∼ N (0, ωtΣw) (2.9)
θt = θt−1 + υt, υt ∼ N (0,Συ) (2.10)
Here Zt is still the (2× 1) vector of dependent variables, Xt = diag [X ′1t, X ′2t] is a (2× h) matrix of
regressors where each Xit has dimension (ki × 1) and h = k1 + k2 is the total sum of regressors in the
model, θt = [θ
′
1t, θ
′
2t]
′
is a (h× 1) vector of coeﬃcients where each θit has dimension (1× ki) and wt is
the normally distributed error term.
The error terms wt and υt are orthogonal with each other, ωtΣw and Συ are their variance-covariance
matrix with dimensions (2× 2) and (h× h) respectively and therefore they govern the parameters'
evolution. As before, Σw is a constant scale matrix while ωt is responsible for time-variation and it is
assumed to be distributed as a scaled inverse-χ2 with v degrees of freedom (ωt ∼ Inv−χ2 (v, 1)) which
makes the distribution of wt equivalent to a Student-t with v degrees of freedom and scale matrix Σw
(tv (0,Σw)). The structure of the prior distributions on Συ and on the θs is the same as the one in the
model for the monetary policy reaction function.
This two-step estimation procedure is consistent with the VAR models speciﬁed by Bernanke and
Blinder (1992) and Bernanke and Mihov (1998). The policy rate is assumed not to inﬂuence the given
macro variables contemporaneously and this allows to correctly identify both the parameters of the
reaction function and the monetary policy shocks with the reduced-form coeﬃcient and the residuals
of model 2.6 - 2.7. The main advantage of this procedure is therefore to correctly identify parameters
without having to identify the entire model structure as the equations for inﬂation and the output gap
have a pure statistical speciﬁcation.
The Bayesian estimation of the two systems of equations 2.6 - 2.7 and 2.9 - 2.10 is possible through
the combination of the Kalman ﬁlter and the Gibbs sampler as suggested by Carter and Kohn (1994)
and Chib and Greenberg (1995). The procedure is based on the multi-move Gibbs sampler algorithm
which iterates the following steps until convergence is achieved:
1. conditional on the model's hyperparameters and the observed data, generate the entire set of state
coeﬃcient β1:T (or θ1:T for the VAR model);
2. conditional on β1:T (or θ1:T for the VAR model) and the observed data, generate the model's
hyperparameters.
The second step of this procedure is straightforward to implement as, conditional on β1:T , the mea-
surement and the transition equation are two independent regressions. On the other hand, the ﬁrst
step requires the derivation of the distribution of the generic term βt conditional on βt+1 and the set of
observations y1:t. Appendix B goes into the details of the estimation algorithm.
8The system has been estimated also with p1 = 2 but results do not change. Then for parsimony the lag length has
been chosen to be equal to one.
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This algorithm generates smoothed estimates, i.e. estimates that are based on the entire set of
observations, which are preferable with respect to ﬁltered estimates if, as in this case, the objective is
to study the evolution of the latent factors over time.
In order to correct for the generated-regressors bias the two systems are estimated in the same
simulation step. For every iteration of the Gibbs sampler, the coeﬃcients of the BVAR system are
estimated and used to obtained the ﬁtted variables which are in turns taken as regressors in the second
part of the algorithm where the monetary policy reaction function is estimated. By doing so, the
generated regressors will change at each iteration depending on the coeﬃcients' draw meaning that
their full distribution is considered in the estimation of the monetary policy reaction function. This
allows to take into account the uncertainty connected to the generated regressors and then it is not
necessary to correct the error terms as done in Kim (2006) and in Kim and Nelson (2006).
The classical estimation of the systems 2.6 - 2.7 and 2.9 - 2.10 would require to obtain the maximum
likelihood estimates of the hyperparameters σt, Σε, Ση and ωt, Σw, Συ and then, treating them as true
values, to derive the estimates of the state variables β1:T (or θ1:T for the VAR model). This approach has
at least two drawbacks. First, even though it is possible to derive the functional form of the likelihood
function, its maximization is not a simple task as it is deﬁned on a high-dimensional space. Then, a
second possible problem is that a complicated model like this could have a likelihood with multiple
peaks and the simple maximization does not ensure to ﬁnd reasonable values for the parameters. The
Bayesian approach can improve on both these issues. As regards the dimensionality of the problem,
Bayesian inference is more eﬃcient from a computational point of view than classical inference because
it allows to split the estimation problem in smaller and simpler ones. On the other hand, the use of
prior distributions can prevent the maximization algorithm to ﬁnd implausible maxima.
2.5 Estimation Results
In this section I present the results from diﬀerent speciﬁcations of the monetary policy reaction function.
The baseline speciﬁcation is a contemporaneous Taylor rule which is also extended to consider other
variables, namely M3 growth, a commodity price index, the real eﬀective exchange rate, a spread index,
a stock market index and bank loans. This exercise follows a marginal approach as the variables are
added one at a time so to evaluate their marginal signiﬁcance and whether the coeﬃcients of the baseline
speciﬁcations are aﬀected. Further details about the series used can be found in appendix A.
For all the following models the algorithm generates 20000 draws from the marginal distributions
and the ﬁrst 5000 draws are used as burn-in and so they are discarded. To eliminate autocorrelation
in some parameters and in the heteroskedasticity factor, posterior distributions are built retaining only
one draw every three cycles of the Gibbs sampler algorithm, i.e. by using 5000 from the remaining
15000 draws. Convergence is checked for every model by using both graphical analysis and convergence
diagnostics.
2.5.1 Contemporaneous Taylor Rule
The ﬁrst speciﬁcation is the simplest one as it considers only three regressors: the lagged EONIA rate,
the output gap and the inﬂation gap. Figures 2.3 and 2.4 show the results.
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The autoregressive coeﬃcient ﬂuctuates between 0.6 and 1 up to the end of 2008 when it becomes
not diﬀerent from 1. After the peak at the beginning of 2009 the coeﬃcient decreases up to 0.9 and
remains constant from 2010 on. This dynamics is consistent with the high volatility of the EONIA
during 2007 and with its fall from October 2008. From 2009 the EONIA stabilizes to a level close to
the deposit facility rate which justiﬁes the rise in the autoregressive coeﬃcient towards 1.
As regards the output gap, the coeﬃcient is low but positive from 1999 to mid 2001, in 2003 and
from 2007 to the beginning of 2009. The mean of the coeﬃcient is always positive but in the remaining
periods it is not statistically diﬀerent from zero. This dynamics shows that the ECB stabilized output
mainly during the peak of both the dot-com bubble and the subprime crisis. In particular, during both
periods the output gap was positive and the key policy rates have been ﬁrst increased and then cut.
This is due to the fact that probably at the beginning of both periods the ECB tried to contain the
fast rise of economic activity which can be interpreted as a predictor of future inﬂation but then it had
to ease monetary policy to ﬁght the recession. This interpretations is conﬁrmed by the coeﬃcient of
the annual rate of inﬂation which is (almost) positive only over the period 1999-2001 and around 2007
while it is either not diﬀerent from zero or negative over the remaining parts of the sample. This ﬁnding
can be considered as puzzling at a ﬁrst sight as the ECB has the clear mandate of reaching the target
level inﬂation of 2%, but from an economic point of view can be justiﬁed by the fact that inﬂation
expectations remained almost stable at the inﬂation target in the ﬁrst half of the sample while a further
investigation is needed in order to understand what happened during the recent crisis.
Moreover this evidence support the idea that the ECB responded more aggressively to economic
developments during the crisis started in 2008, in line with the theoretical literature on optimal monetary
policy at the ZLB that prescribes a rapid interest rate cut if the ZLB may bind in the near future
(Reifschneider and Williams, 2000; Orphanides and Wieland, 2000; Adam and Billi, 2006).
The heteroskedasticity factor and the residuals in ﬁgure 2.4 display several peaks around 2001 which
tells us that at that time the ECB surprised markets while it did not during the recent crisis. A possible
explanation is that from 2008 onwards the ECB aggressively intervened to curb the economic crisis also
by using a communicative strategy that helped in making its policy decisions less unexpected by the
economic community.
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Figure 2.3: Parameters (mean of posterior distributions with 16th and 84th quantile)
Figure 2.4: Residuals and heteroskedasticity factor
2.5.2 An Assessment
This section compares the previous results with those coming from a simple rolling regression estimation,
which are displayed in ﬁgure 2.5. Rolling regressions are estimated over 36 observations and then the
window is shifted forward of one observation. For sake of comparability, the estimation of the rolling
regression is Bayesian9. The contemporaneous output gap and inﬂation come from a constant-coeﬃcients
BVAR model.
9The regressions have been estimated also with OLS but results are not distinguishable.
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Figure 2.5: Parameters from rolling regressions (3-year sample)
The results for the constant, the autoregressive coeﬃcient and the output gap are quite in line with
those of the time-varying coeﬃcient model, while this is not true for the inﬂation coeﬃcient.
However it is necessary to notice that the fact that the coeﬃcients coming from the two estimation
methodology do not coincides does not invalidate the use of the time-varying coeﬃcient approach.
Rather, they are diﬀerent because the algorithms are substantially diﬀerent. The time-varying coeﬃcient
model produces smoothed estimates, i.e. the full sample of observations is used to estimate parameters.
On the other hand, a drawback of the rolling estimation procedure is that results are inﬂuenced by the
size of the estimation window so that it is a relevant issue. Finally, the time-varying parameter approach
is well suited for dealing with monetary policy as it seems appropriate to model policy changes with
smooth transitions.
2.5.3 Extensions
In this section the forward-looking Taylor rule is extended for taking into account other variables that
might have inﬂuenced the ECB in setting the interest rate. A marginal approach is followed here, i.e.
the variables are added one by one so that also their eﬀect on the coeﬃcients of output and inﬂation
can be clearly evaluated.
M3
The ﬁrst variable considered is money growth measured with the annual change in M3. To avoid
endogeneity issues the variable is lagged of one period.
As explained in section 2.2, monetary analysis had a preeminent role in evaluating price stability
up to 2003, when its role has been revised. The monetary analysis used a reference value for the broad
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monetary aggregate M3 (ECB, 1999b) which has been abandoned after 2003.
Figures 2.6 and 2.7 show that the inclusion of M3 growth into the monetary policy reaction function
leads to some changes in the coeﬃcients of the baseline Taylor rule. The M3 coeﬃcient itself is signiﬁcant
only around 2001 and its mean ﬂuctuates around zero afterwards. Even though the coeﬃcient is almost
never signiﬁcant, this dynamics can be considered as consistent with the revision of the M3 role in
deﬁning the monetary policy strategy. The residuals and the heteroskedasticity factor have now only a
peak in 2001.
Figure 2.6: Parameters (mean of posterior distributions with 16th and 84th quantile)
Figure 2.7: Residuals and heteroskedasticity factor
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Commodity Prices
Commodity prices are added to the monetary policy reaction function to evaluate whether the ECB
has a diﬀerent sensibility with respect to commodity inﬂation and to ﬁnal price inﬂation. The measure
considered is the monthly change in the CRB price index.
As shown in ﬁgures 2.8 and 2.9, the coeﬃcient of the CRB price index is never signiﬁcant and does
not alter the previous ﬁndings.
Figure 2.8: Parameters (mean of posterior distributions with 16th and 84th quantile)
Figure 2.9: Residuals and heteroskedasticity factor
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Exchange Rate
In this speciﬁcation the monthly change in the real eﬀective exchange rate10 is added.
Figures 2.10 and 2.11 display the results. The exchange rate coeﬃcient is rarely signiﬁcant and the
other coeﬃcients are not changed.
Figure 2.10: Parameters (mean of posterior distributions with 16th and 84th quantile)
Figure 2.11: Residuals and heteroskedasticity factor
10The exchange rate is deﬁned such that when it increases the Euro currency appreciates.
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Bond Yields Spreads
The recent ﬁnancial crisis also involved public ﬁnances of several European countries leading to tensions
in sovereign debt markets. For this reason an index of bond yield spreads is added to the monetary
policy reaction function. The index is computed as a weighted sum of government bond yield spreads
with respect to Germany of ten Euro-area countries and weights are given by the relative debt-to-GDP
ratios. To avoid endogeneity the ﬁrst lag of the index is considered.
Results are displayed in ﬁgures 2.12 and 2.13 and they show that the coeﬃcient of the spread index
is negative and signiﬁcant around 2009 which means that the ECB was trying to curb tensions on
sovereign debt markets. In the ﬁrst part of the sample the coeﬃcient is positive and signiﬁcant around
2003 but this result does not have any meaningful economic interpretation.
Figure 2.12: Parameters (mean of posterior distributions with 16th and 84th quantile)
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Figure 2.13: Residuals and heteroskedasticity factor
Stock Market Volatility
This speciﬁcation adds a stock market volatility index to the baseline Taylor rule. The index considered
is the Chicago Board Options Exchange market volatility index, also known as VIX, which is a measure
of the implied volatility of quoted options on S&P 500 index11. Its monthly variations are included into
the reaction function and, in order to escape any endogeneity issue, the ﬁrst lag is considered.
As for the previous speciﬁcations, the coeﬃcients, the residuals and the heteroskedasticity factor of
the baseline Taylor rule are unchanged. The VIX index has a positive coeﬃcient only from 1999 to 2002
and it display a peak in 2001 when the dot-com bubble burst.
11The VIX index has been preferred to the volatility index of the European stock market, the VSTOXX, because of
data availability. Data for the VSTOXX index are available from 1999 so that it would not be possible to initialize the
Kalman ﬁlter with its coeﬃcient calculated over the pre-sample. On the other hand data of the VIX index go back to
the 1980s. For seek of comparability of the results the VIX has been preferred to the VSTOXX. However the model has
also been estimated with the VSTOXX using the period 1999-2001 as a pre-sample but its coeﬃcient turned out to be
non-signiﬁcant.
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Figure 2.14: Parameters (mean of posterior distributions with 16th and 84th quantile)
Figure 2.15: Residuals and heteroskedasticity factor
Bank Loans
In this speciﬁcation the monetary policy reaction function is enriched with three bank loans variables,
namely the amount of loans to non-ﬁnancial corporations (NFCs), to households and to other ﬁnancial
institutions coming from the statistics on the monetary ﬁnancial institution (MFI) sector. These series
are available from 2003 and their annual growth rate is considered. Given that a pre-estimation sample
is needed to initialize the Kalman ﬁlter, the estimation starts in 2007.
Results are displayed in ﬁgures 2.16 and 2.17 and they show that the bank loans are signiﬁcant in
explaining the behaviour of the ECB. The ﬁrst thing to notice is that the inﬂation and output gap
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coeﬃcients are comparable to those obtained in the baseline Taylor rule speciﬁcation signalling they
are not aﬀected neither by the new variables considered nor by the shorter sample. The same is true
for the residuals and the heteroskedasticity factor. The coeﬃcients of the loans variables are positive
and signiﬁcant for almost the whole sample for loans to non-ﬁnancial corporations and for loans to
households while the coeﬃcient of loans to other ﬁnancial institutions is not signiﬁcant. This means
that the ECB tried to stabilize the amount of loans to the private sector.
Figure 2.16: Parameters (mean of posterior distributions with 16th and 84th quantile)
Figure 2.17: Residuals and heteroskedasticity factor
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2.6 Conclusion
This work produced some evidence on the conduct of monetary policy in the Euro area over the period
1999-2013 by using time-varying coeﬃcient reaction functions with heteroskedastic errors estimated
with Bayesian techniques.
Dealing with data of the 2008-2013 period is not an easy task as most of the macroeconomic variables
show huge variations which can easily invalidate any econometric analysis. A model with time-varying
coeﬃcients combined with heteroskedastic errors oﬀers a very ﬂexible framework that can ideally adapt
and capture changes in the macroeconomic environment.
The baseline speciﬁcation is a Taylor rule with contemporaneous inﬂation and output gap. Then this
speciﬁcation is extended adding further variables that might have been taken into consideration by the
ECB in setting the interest rate, namely M3 growth, a commodity price index, the real exchange rate,
a government bond yield spread index, a stock market volatility index and bank loans. The variables
are added one at a time so that their marginal inﬂuence on the inﬂation and output coeﬃcients can be
evaluated.
In order to avoid endogeneity issues, inﬂation and output have been instrumented by using a time-
varying parameters BVAR model. The BVAR and the monetary policy reaction function are estimated
in the same simulation algorithm: at each iteration of the Gibbs sampler the ﬁtted values coming from
the BVAR model are used as regressors for the reaction function. This allows to correct for the generated
regressors bias that would otherwise aﬀect the coeﬃcients of the monetary policy rule.
The results for the two main variables, i.e. output gap and inﬂation, are consistent through diﬀerent
speciﬁcations and show that the ECB stabilized output mainly during the peak of both the dot-com
bubble in 2001 and the crisis in 2009. The coeﬃcient of inﬂation is signiﬁcant only over the period
1999-2001 and in 2007 when inﬂation was increasing. The heteroskedasticity factor and the residuals
always display several peaks around 2001 which tells us that at that time the ECB surprised markets
while it did not during the recent crisis. A possible explanation is that from 2008 onwards the ECB
aggressively intervened to curb the economic crisis also by using a communicative strategy that helped
in making its policy decisions less unexpected by the economic community.
Concerning the other variables considered, only some of them are found to be able to signiﬁcantly
explain the conduct of monetary policy, i.e. the government bond yield spread index and the bank
loans. In particular, the spread index is not signiﬁcant in the ﬁrst subsample but its coeﬃcient becomes
negative when the ﬁnancial crisis evolved into tensions on sovereign debt markets. In the period 2007-
2013 the ECB reacted also to bank loans and in particular the loans to the private sector have a positive
coeﬃcient. Overall it is possible to conclude that the second pillar of the analysis of price stability has
gained importance during the crisis.
As regards the related literature, the results of this work are at odds with all the literature ﬁnding
signiﬁcant coeﬃcients on both future and current inﬂation like Gerdesmeier and Roﬃa (2004) and Sauer
and Sturm (2007) as over the same period I found that inﬂation is rarely signiﬁcant. On the other hand,
the results regarding the output gap show that its coeﬃcient is almost always signiﬁcant and greater
than the one of inﬂation and its magnitude is often consistent with much of the literature which identiﬁes
it to be lower than 1. Finally, as in much of the literature I also presented evidence of a high degree of
partial adjustment.
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Overall it is possible to conclude that over the period 1999-2006 the ECB seems to pursue a stabilizing
policy mainly towards output. Consistently with Gerlach and Lewis (2010), Gerlach (2011) and Gerlach
and Lewis (2014) I found evidence of a shift in the conduct of monetary policy during the crisis as from
2008 on the ECB increased again its sensitivity towards output but it also started to track new variables
like sovereign bond yield spreads and bank loans.
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Appendix A. Data Description
The overall data sample goes from January 1996 to December 2013. The monetary policy reaction
functions are estimated over the period January 1999 - December 2013 and the 36 observations from
January 1996 to December 1998 are used to calculate the OLS values necessary to initialize the Kalman
ﬁlter. Two of the regressors comes from the estimation of a VAR model starting in January 1996 and,
for lack of data, the OLS values to initialize the Kalman ﬁlter are calculated in-sample.
Variables are monthly and the logarithmic transformation is applied, except for the Eonia which is
taken in level. When not speciﬁed, data comes form Datastream and they are constructed in order to
take into account the evolving membership of the Euro area. The dependent variable is the Euro area
overnight index average (EONIA). The series is constructed by the ECB as the average of the daily
EONIA rate calculated by the European Banking Federation.
Variables used as regressors are:
• the industrial output gap: it is calculated as the diﬀerence between the logarithm industrial
production series (calculated by the Eurostat) and its HP ﬁltered output trend;
• the annual growth rate of inﬂation: it is calculated as the 12-month logarithmic diﬀerence of the
HICP series coming from the ECB;
• the annual growth rate of M3: it is calculated as the 12-month logarithmic diﬀerence of the
seasonally adjusted M3 series coming from the ECB;
• the Thomson Reuters/Jeﬀeries CRB Index: it is a commodity futures price index and it is com-
prised of 19 commodities sorted into 4 groups with diﬀerent weightings (petroleum based products,
liquid assets, highly liquid assets, diverse commodities)12;
• the monthly changes of the real eﬀective exchange rate: it considers 20 trade partners, it is adjusted
using the CPI and it is deﬁned such an increase indicates an appreciation of the Euro currency;
• the VIX index: it is a measure of the implied volatility of S&P 500 index options over the next
30 calendar days on the Chicago Board Options Exchange Market and it represents market's
expectation of stock market volatility;
• a sovereign bond yield spread index: it is calculated as a weighted sum of government bond yields'
spreads with respect to Germany of ten Euro-area countries (Austria, Belgium, Finland, France,
Greece, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Portugal and Spain) and weights are given by the relative
debt-to-GDP ratios calculated by the Eurostat;
• the annual growth rate of bank loans in the Euro area to non-ﬁnancial corporations, to households
and to other ﬁnancial institutions: these data come from the statistics on the monetary ﬁnancial
institution (MFI) sector provided by the ECB13 and the annual growth rate is calculated as the
12-month logarithmic diﬀerence.
12For further details see:
http://thomsonreuters.com/products_services/ﬁnancial/thomson_reuters_indices/indices/commodity_indices/
13Further information can be found in the Manual of MFI Balance Sheet Statistics available at:
http://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/pdf/other/manualmﬁbalancesheetstatistics201204en.pdf
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Appendix B. Estimation Procedure
Priors and Posteriors14
Monetary Policy Reaction Function
The complete-data likelihood of the model is:
L (y|Xt, β,Σε, σ,Ση) =
[
T∏
t=1
(
2piσ2t
)− 12] |Σε|−T2 exp{−1
2
T∑
t=1
(yt −Xtβt)′ (σtΣε)−1 (yt −Xtβt)
}
·
(2pi)
−T2 |Ση|−
T
2 exp
{
−1
2
T∑
t=1
(βt − βt−1)′ Σ−1η (βt − βt−1)
}
(2.11)
where β = (β0, β1, . . . , βT ) and σ = (σ1, . . . , σT ).
To implement the Gibbs sampler it is necessary to derive the conditional posterior distributions from
the product of the likelihood and the priors.
The parameters' priors are assumed to be independent with each other so that the joint prior is:
p (β,Σε, σ,Ση) = p (β) p (Σε) p (σ) p (Ση)
For the slope coeﬃcients βt a time-varying Minnesota prior is assumed, i.e. the coeﬃcients follow
a random walk (see Litterman (1986) for details), where errors are assumed to be normally distributed
with zero mean and variance-covariance matrix Ση.
Furthermore, for the constant scale parameter of the error term Σε a diﬀuse prior is assumed:
p (Σε) ∝ |Σε|−1 (2.12)
This corresponds to the Jeﬀreys prior density |Σε|−
(k+1)
2 with k = 1 (see Jeﬀreys (1961) for details).
The Jeﬀreys prior density is the limit of an inverse-Wishart distribution15, which is a conjugate prior
distribution for the covariance matrix of the multivariate normal distribution, with 1 degree of freedom
and scale matrix that tends to zero.
The time-varying component of the of the variance of the error term is assumed to be distributed as
14Deﬁnitions and derivations in this section follow Gelman, Carlin, Stern, and Rubin (2003).
15The Wishart distribution is a generalization to multiple dimensions of the chi-squared distribution, or, in the case of
non-integer degrees of freedom, of the gamma distribution. The relationship between the Wishart and the inverse-Wishart
is that if X ∼ W (v, S) then X−1 ∼ IW (v, S−1) where S is a symmetric and positive-deﬁnite k × k scale matrix and v
are the degrees of freedom.
The probability density function of a Wishart distribution is:
p (X; v, S) =
(
2
vk
2 · Γp
(v
2
))−1 |S|− v2 |X| v−k−12 exp{−1
2
tr
(
S−1X
)}
,
where Γp
(
v
2
)
= pi
k(k−1)
4
∏k
i=1 Γ
(
v+1−i
2
)
is the multivariate gamma function.
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a scaled inverse-χ2 distribution with v degrees of freedom and scale parameter 1 16:
σt ∼ Inv − χ2 (v, 1) (2.13)
The degrees of freedom are set as v = 5 as it is the value that ensures the maximum depart from
normality for εt. In fact, εt|σt ∼ tv (0,Σε) converges in distribution to N (0,Σε) as v approaches inﬁnity
because the mean of σt tends to one and its variance tends to zero in the limit. Moreover for v ≤ 4 the
variance of the distribution is inﬁnite and so v = 5 is the value that maximizes the prior variance but
restricting it to be ﬁnite.
The variance-covariance matrix of the parameters is assumed to be distributed as an inverse-Wishart
with γ degrees of freedom and scale parameter Υ:
Ση ∼ IW (γ,Υ) (2.14)
The degrees of freedom are imposed to be equal to the sample size. The scale matrix is assumed
to be equal to the OLS variance-covariance matrix of the parameters estimated on the pre-sample and
it is multiplied by the sample size. This set-up allows for a greater variance in the parameters which
translates into a high degree of time-variation and a better ﬁt of the data.
Posteriors distributions for the parameters are derived from the product between the likelihood and
the relative prior as they are assumed to be independent.
In particular, the full conditional posterior distribution of the constant part of the residuals' variance
Σε is an inverse-Wishart distribution with T degrees of freedom and scale matrix S
−1:
p (Σε|y,Xt, β, σ,Ση) ∝ |Σε|−
(T+1+1)
2 exp
{
−1
2
tr
(
SΣ−1ε
)}
= IW
(
T, S−1
)
(2.15)
where: S =
[∑
t (yt −Xtβt)σ−1t (yt −Xtβt)′
]
.
As we are in the univariate case (Σε is a scalar), the inverse-Wishart distribution degenerates into
an inverse-gamma distribution with shape parameter α = T2 and scale parameter β =
S
2 .
The full conditional posterior distribution of σt is a scaled inverse-χ
2 distribution with v+ 1 degrees
of freedom and scale matrix s2t :
p (σt|y,Xt, β,Σε,Ση) ∝ σ−(
v+1
2 +1)
t exp
{
− (v + 1) s
2
t
2σt
}
= Inv − χ2 (v + 1, s2t ) (2.16)
where: s2t =
[
v
v+1 +
(yt−Xtβt)′Σ−1ε (yt−Xtβt)
v+1
]
.
In general, to obtain a draw θ from an Inv− χ2 (v, s2t ) distribution it is necessary to draw x from a
χ2distribution with v degrees of freedom and then let θ =
vs2t
x .
The full conditional posterior distribution of Ση is an an inverse-Wishart distribution with γ¯ degrees
16The probability density function of a scaled inverse-χ2 distribution with v degrees of freedom and scale parameter τ2
is:
p
(
x; v, τ2
)
=
(
v
2
) v
2
Γ
(
v
2
) τ2x−( v2 +1) exp{−vτ2
2x
}
,
which is equivalent to an inverse-gamma distribution with shape parameter v
2
and scale parameter vτ
2
2
.
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of freedom and scale matrix Υ¯:
p (Ση|y,Xt, β,Σε, σ) ∝ |Ση|−
(γ¯+n+1)
2 · exp
{
−1
2
tr
(
Υ¯Σ−1η
)}
= IW
(
γ¯, Υ¯−1
)
(2.17)
where: γ¯ = γ + T and Υ¯ =
[
Υ +
∑
t (βt − βt−1) (βt − βt−1)
′]
.
The derivation of the joint conditional posterior distribution of the state variables deserves a more
extensive comment and the procedure is analysed in the next section.
VAR Model
The complete-data likelihood of the model is:
L (Z|Xt, θ,Σw, ω,Συ) =
[
T∏
t=1
(
2piω2t
)− 12] |Σw|−T2 exp{−1
2
T∑
t=1
(Zt −Xtθt)′ (ωtΣw)−1 (Zt −Xtθt)
}
·
(2pi)
−T2 |Συ|−
T
2 exp
{
−1
2
T∑
t=1
(θt − θt−1)′ Σ−1η (θt − θt−1)
}
(2.18)
where θ = (θ0, θ1, . . . , θT ).
As before the parameters' priors are assumed to be independent with each other so that the joint
prior is:
p (θ,Σw, ω,Συ) = p (θ) p (Σw) p (ω) p (Συ)
For the slope coeﬃcients θt a time-varying Minnesota prior is assumed. Errors are assumed to be
normally distributed with zero mean and variance-covariance matrix Συ.
For the variance-covariance matrix of the error term in the measurement equation a diﬀuse prior is
assumed:
p (Σw) ∝ |Σw|−
2+1
2 (2.19)
The time-varying component of the variance of the error term is assumed to be distributed as a
scaled inverse-χ2 distribution with v degrees of freedom and scale parameter 1:
ωt ∼ Inv − χ2 (v, 1) (2.20)
As before, to ensure the maximum degree of departure from normality, v is set equal to 5.
The variance-covariance matrix of the parameters is assumed to be distributed as an inverse-Wishart
with ψ degrees of freedom and scale parameter Ψ:
Συ ∼ IW (ψ,Ψ) (2.21)
As before the degrees of freedom are imposed to be equal to the sample size and the scale matrix
is assumed to be equal to the OLS variance-covariance matrix of the parameters estimated on the
pre-sample multiplied by the sample size.
Posteriors distributions for the parameters are derived from the product between the likelihood and
the relative priors as they are assumed to be independent.
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In particular, the full conditional posterior distribution of the residuals' variance Σw is an inverse-
Wishart distribution with T degrees of freedom and scale matrix Φ¯−1:
p (Σv|Z,Xt, θ, ω,Συ) ∝ |Σw|−
(T+2+1)
2 exp
{
−1
2
tr
(
SΣ−1w
)}
= IW
(
T, S−1
)
(2.22)
where: S =
[∑
t (Zt −Xtθt)ω−1t (Zt −Xtθt)′
]
.
The full conditional posterior distribution of ωt is an inverse-χ
2 distribution with v + n degrees of
freedom and scale matrix s2t :
p (ωt|Z,Xt, θ,Σw,Συ) ∝ ω−(
v+n
2 +1)
t exp
{
− (v + n) s
2
t
2ωt
}
= Inv − χ2 (v + 2, s2t ) (2.23)
where n is the number of dependent variables in the VAR and s2t =
[
v
v+2 +
(Zt−Xtθt)′Σ−1w (Zt−Xtθt)
v+2
]
.
The full conditional posterior distribution of Συ is an inverse-Wishart distribution with ψ¯ degrees
of freedom and scale matrix Ψ¯−1:
p (Συ|Z,Xt, θ,Σ) ∝ |Συ|−
(ψ¯+n+1)
2 · exp
{
−1
2
tr
(
Ψ¯Σ−1υ
)}
= IW
(
ψ¯, Ψ¯−1
)
(2.24)
where: ψ¯ = ψ + T and Ψ¯ =
[
Ψ +
∑
t (θt − θt−1) (θt − θt−1)
′]
.
The following section derives the procedure to estimate the state variables.
Procedure to estimate the state variables
The procedure to estimate the systems of equations 2.6 - 2.7 and 2.9 - 2.10 is based on Carter and Kohn
(1994) and Chib and Greenberg (1995).
Here β indicates a general vector of latent factors and this procedure is valid for any system written
in state-space form.
A state-space model has the following structure:
(yt|βt) ∼ p (yt|βt, y1:t−1, ϕ)
(βt|βt−1) ∼ p (βt|βt−1, y1:t−1, ϕ)
β0 ∼ p (β0|ϕ)
ψ ∼ p (ϕ)
Here ϕ is the vector of hyperparameters, p (yt|βt, y1:t−1, ϕ) is the measurement density, p (βt|βt−1, y1:t−1, ϕ)
is the transition density, p (β0|ϕ) is the initial distribution, i.e. the prior distribution on the initial state
of the system, and p (ϕ) is the prior distribution of the hyperparameters.
In a Bayesian setting, estimates for the states and the parameters are obtained as the mean of the
joint posterior density of the state and parameters vectors p (β0:T , ϕ|y1:T ). This can be done by applying
MCMC methods when it is not possible to analytically evaluate the posterior mean.
The easiest solution to simulate the posterior distribution is to implement a single-move Gibbs
sampler. This algorithm generates the states one at a time conditioned on the neighbouring states, i.e.
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sampling βt from its conditional distribution which does not contain βt, p (βt|β1:t−1, βt+1:T , y1:T ). The
drawback of this algorithm is that the outputs of the Gibbs sampler are highly correlated. As a matter
of fact the states of Markov chain are highly correlated to the neighbouring ones and the algorithm
slowly explore the state-space and will slowly converge to the posterior distribution.
To solve the autocorrelation problem, when the model is linear and gaussian, it is possible to apply
the multi-move Gibbs sampler which generates simultaneously all the state vectors from the joint dis-
tribution p (β0:T |y1:T , ϕ) using analytical ﬁltering and smoothing relations, as proposed by Carter and
Kohn (1994). For this purpose the Kalman ﬁlter and smoother can be applied.
Therefore the objective is to simulate the sequence of parameters vectors {βt} given the whole set
of observations of the dependent variable y1:T and the remaining parameters ϕ .
The ﬁrst step is to write the joint smoothing density of β in reverse-time order as in Chib and
Greenberg (1995) and in Carter and Kohn (1994):
p (β|y1:T , ϕ) = p (βT |y1:T , ϕ) · p (βT−1|βT , y1:T , ϕ) · . . . · p (β1|β2:T , y1:T , ϕ)
= p (βT |y1:T , ϕ) · p (βT−1|βT , y1:T , ϕ) · . . . · p (β1|β2, y1:T , ϕ)
= p (βT |y1:T , ϕ) ·
T−1∏
t=1
p (βt|βt+1, y1:T , ϕ)
= p (βT |y1:T , ϕ) ·
T−1∏
t=1
p (βt|βt+1, y1:t, ϕ) (2.25)
Following Carter and Kohn (1994), the second equality comes from the Markov property of the
process {βt}, i.e. βt+i|βt is independent of any previous realization βt−j , while the last equality comes
from the Markov structure of the problem, i.e. conditional on βt and y1:t−1, βt+1 and yt:T carries no
information about βt−1 beyond that contained in βt and y1:t−1.
This last observation can be proved by applying the Bayes theorem for the three-variable case17 to
the generic distribution p (βt|βt+1, y1:T , ϕ):
p (βt|βt+1, y1:T , ϕ) = p (βt|βt+1, y1:t, yt+1:T , ϕ)
=
p (yt+1:T |βt, βt+1, y1:t, ϕ) · p (βt|βt+1, y1:t, ϕ)
p (yt+1:T |βt+1, y1:t, ϕ)
=
p (yt+1:T |βt+1, y1:t, ϕ) · p (βt|βt+1, y1:t, ψ)
p (yt+1:T |βt+1, y1:t, ϕ)
= p (βt|βt+1, y1:t, ϕ) (2.26)
So, to obtain a draw from the joint distribution, ﬁrst draw β˜T from p (βT |y1:T , ϕ), then draw β˜T−1
from p (βT−1|βT , y1:T−1, ϕ) and so on until β˜1 is drawn from p (β1|β2, y1, ϕ). So, practically, the only
thing needed for this algorithm is the distribution of the generic term p (βt|βt+1, y1:t, ϕ).
17The Bayes theorem for three variables states that:
P (A|B,C) = P (B|A,C) · P (A|C)
P (B|C)
This can be easily derived by using the law of conditional expectations. As a matter of fact one can combine P (A|B,C) =
P (A,B,C)
P (B,C)
and P (B|A,C) = P (A,B,C)
P (A,C)
to obtain: P (A|B,C) = P (B|A,C)·P (A,C)
P (B,C)
. Then the last step is to substitute
P (A,C) = P (A|C)P (C) and P (B,C) = P (B|C)P (C).
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This distribution can be found by applying the Bayes theorem so that:
p (βt|βt+1, y1:t, ϕ) = p (βt+1|βt, y1:t, ϕ) · p (βt|y1:t, ϕ)
p (βt+1|y1:t, ψ)
∝ p (βt+1|βt, y1:t, ϕ) · p (βt|y1:t, ϕ) (2.27)
This is true as the denominator is a normalizing constant, i.e. it does not contains βt.
These two results can be obtained from the Kalman ﬁlter as βt|y1:t, ϕ ∼ N
(
βˆt|t, Pt|t
)
.
Here βˆt|s ≡ Eˆ [βt|y1:s, ϕ] and Pt|s = cov (βt|y1:s, ϕ) for s ≤ t ≤ T and from the Kalman ﬁlter
recursion:
βˆt|t = βˆt|t−1 +Kt
(
yt −Xβˆt|t−1
)
(2.28)
Pt|t = (I −KtX)Pt|t−1 (2.29)
where βˆt|t−1 = βˆt−1|t−1, Pt|t−1 = Pt−1|t−1 + Ση, Kt =
Pt|t−1X
′
Zt|t−1
and Zt|t−1 = XPt|t−1X ′ + σtΣε.
These results must be substituted in equation 2.27 to ﬁnd that βt|βt+1, y1:t, ϕ ∼ N
(
βˆt|t+1, Pt|t+1
)
.
In particular, the algorithm uses the last elements of the recursion, βˆT |T and PT |T , to make a draw
for βT as βT ∼ N
(
βˆT |T , PT |T
)
, i.e. they are the mean and the variance of the normal distribution from
which βT is drawn. The draw of βT and the output of the ﬁlter are then used for the ﬁrst step of the
backward recursion to obtain βˆT−1|T and PT−1|T . As before these two elements are necessary to make
a draw for βT−1 because βT−1 ∼ N
(
βˆT−1|T , PT−1|T
)
. The backward recursion continues until time
zero. For a generic time t, the updating formulas of the backward recursion are:
βˆt|t+1 = βˆt|t +Mt
(
βt+1 − βˆt+1|t
)
(2.30)
Pt|t+1 = Pt|t −MtPt+1|tM ′t (2.31)
where Mt = Pt|tP
−1
t+1|t.
The procedure to estimate the state vector is summarized in algorithm 2.1.
Algorithm 2.1 Gibbs sampler for the state vector
Simulate the state vectors by sampling from p (β|y1:T , ψ) in reverse time order by means of the recursive
factorization of the smoothing density:
• βT ∼ p (βT |y1:T , ψ) = N
(
βˆT |T , PT |T
)
• βT−1 ∼ p (βT−1|βT , y1:T−1, ψ) = N
(
βˆT−1|T , PT−1|T
)
• ...
• βt ∼ p (βt|βt+1, y1:t, ψ) = N
(
βˆt|t+1, Pt|t+1
)
• ...
• β1 ∼ p (β1|β2, y1, ψ) = N
(
βˆ1|2, P1|2
)
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Kalman Filter
The Kalman ﬁlter is a tool to deal with discrete linear and gaussian dynamical systems by state-space
modelling. When a system is modelled in a state-space form, the assumption is that its development over
time is determined by an unobserved series of vectors to whom are associated a series of observations.
The objective of the Kalman ﬁlter is to update the knowledge of the system each time a new observation
yt is brought in. So it consists in an iterative procedure in two steps, forecast and update, that allows
to calculate linear least squares forecasts of the state vector on the basis of data observed through date
t. Since all distributions are normal, joint conditional distributions of one set of observations given
another set are also normal.
The Kalman ﬁlter is applied to the the model described in equations 2.6 - 2.7 to obtain the elements
necessary to run the Gibbs sampler.
Forecast The forecast step allows to obtain the distribution of βt given the measurement up to t− 1:
βt|y1:t−1 ∼ N
(
βˆt|t−1, Pt|t−1
)
.
The forecast of the state vector coincides with the expected value of the distribution and it is:
βˆt|t−1 ≡ E [βt|y1:t−1] = E [βt−1 + ηt|y1:t−1] = βˆt−1|t−1.
The variance of the distribution is: Pt|t−1 = Var (βt|y1:t−1) = Var (βt−1 + ηt|y1:t−1) = Pt−1|t−1 +Ση.
It is also possible to prove that this quantity coincides with the mean squared error of the forecast.
Given the forecast of the coeﬃcients' vector it is possible to obtain the distribution of the data given
the state: yt|βt, y1:t−1 ∼ N
(
yˆt|t−1, Vt|t−1
)
.
The expected value of this distribution, which is also the forecast of the measurement equation, is:
yˆt|t−1 = XEˆ [βt|y1:t−1] = Xβˆt|t−1.
The variance of the distribution is: Vt|t−1 = Var
(
Xβˆt|t−1 + εt
)
= XPt|t−1X ′ + σtΣε.
The forecast error is: yt − yˆt|t−1 = X
(
βt − βˆt|t−1
)
+ εt.
The mean squared error of this forecast is: Zt|t−1 = XPt|t−1X ′ + σtΣε.
Update From the update step I obtain the elements to use in the Gibbs sampler, i.e. the parameters
of the distribution βt|y1:t ∼ N
(
βˆt|t, Pt|t
)
:
βˆt|t = βˆt|t−1 +
Pt|t−1X ′
Zt|t−1
(
yt − yˆt|t−1
)
= βˆt|t−1 +Kt
(
yt −Xβˆt|t−1
)
(2.32)
Pt|t = (I −KtX)Pt|t−1 (2.33)
Then the procedure continues with the next iteration that allows to obtain the distribution of βt+1
given the measurement up to t: βt+1|y1:t ∼ N
(
βˆt+1|t, Pt+1|t
)
.
The forecast of the state vector is:
βˆt+1|t = βˆt|t−1 +Kt
(
yt −Xβˆt|t−1
)
(2.34)
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The mean squared error of this forecast is: Pt+1|t = Pt|t + Ση.
Kalman Smoother
The Kalman smoother is a procedure to estimate the latent variable of a linear dynamical system using
the measurements from a ﬁxed interval. Usually the estimation considers all the information contained
in data, i.e. the full set of observations y1:T . Therefore this is a post-processing procedure, i.e. it can
be run once after the regular Kalman ﬁlter algorithm, and it is based on a backward recursion.
The main equations of this procedure are the smoothed states of t-th time step and the corresponding
state error covariance matrix:
βˆt|t+1 = βˆt|t +Mt
(
βt+1 − βˆt+1|t
)
(2.35)
Pt|t+1 = Pt|t −MtPt+1|tM ′t (2.36)
where Mt = Pt|tP
−1
t+1|t.
So, in other words, the objective of the Kalman smoother is to compute the distribution of βt|y1:T
given the distribution of βt+1|y1:T ∼ N
(
βˆt+1|T , Pt+1|T
)
.
This distribution can be derived according to the following steps.
1. Computation of the joint distribution p (βt|y1:t, βt+1|βt) (which is the distribution in equation
2.27) where, for seek of simplicity, I denote the distribution of βt|y1:t as βt|t = N
(
βˆt|t, Pt|t
)
and
the distribution of βt+1|βt as βt+1|t = N
(
βˆt+1|t, Pt+1|t
)
, :
(
βt|y1:t
βt+1|βt
)
∼ N
([
E
(
βt|t
)
E
(
βt+1|t
) ] [ V ar (βt|t) Cov (βt|t;βt+1|t)
Cov
(
βt+1|t;βt|t
)
V ar
(
βt+1|t
) ])
= N
([
βˆt|t
βˆt+1|t
][
Pt|t Pt|t
Pt|t Pt+1|t
])
= p
(
βt|t, βt+1|t
)
(2.37)
where:
Cov
(
βt|t, βt+1|t
)
= Cov
(
βt|t, βt|t + ηt+1
)
= Cov
(
βt|t, βt|t
)
+ Cov
(
βt|t, ηt+1
)
= V ar
(
βt|t
)
= Pt|t (2.38)
2. Computation of the conditional distribution p
(
βt|t|βt+1|t
)
given a speciﬁc value of βt+1, i.e. the
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distribution of p (βt|βt+1, y1:t)18:
p (βt|βt+1, y1:t) ∼ N (E (βt|βt+1, y1:t) , V ar (βt|βt+1, y1:t)) (2.39)
E (βt|βt+1, y1:t) = βˆt|t +Mt
(
βt+1 − βˆt+1|t
)
(2.40)
V ar (βt|βt+1, y1:t) = Pt|t −MtPt+1|tM ′t (2.41)
where Mt = Pt|tP
−1
t+1|t.
However the value βt+1 is unknown and we only have its distribution βt+1|y1:T ∼ βt+1|T =
N
(
βˆt+1|T , Pt+1|T
)
.
3. Computation of the distribution of βt|y1:T which is βt|T = N
(
E
(
βt|T
)
= βˆt|T , V ar
(
βt|T
)
= Pt|T
)
.
This distribution can be derived from p
(
βt|t|βt+1|t
)
by unconditioning on βt+1 ∼ βt+1|T =
N
(
βˆt+1|T , Pt+1|T
)
so that βt+1|t = βt+1|T , and using the law of total expectation and of to-
tal variance19.
From step 2 we have that:
E
(
βt|t|βt+1|t = βt+1|T
)
= βˆt|t +Mt
(
βt+1|T − βˆt+1|t
)
(2.42)
V ar
(
βt|t|βt+1|t = βt+1|T
)
= Pt|t −MtPt+1|tM ′t (2.43)
So that:
E
(
βt|T
)
= E
(
E
(
βt|t|βt+1|T
))
= E
(
βˆt|t +Mt
(
βt+1|T − βˆt+1|t
))
= βˆt|t +Mt
(
βˆt+1|T − βˆt+1|t
)
= βˆt|T (2.44)
V ar
(
βt|T
)
= E
(
V ar
(
βt|t|βt+1|T
))
+ V ar
(
E
(
βt|t|βt+1|T
))
= E
(
Pt|t −MtPt+1|tM ′t
)
+ V ar
(
βˆt|t +Mt
(
βt+1|T − βˆt+1|t
))
= Pt|t −MtPt+1|tM ′t +MtPt+1|TM ′t
= Pt|t +Mt
(
Pt+1|T − Pt+1|t
)
M ′t = Pt|T (2.45)
18This result comes from standard multivariate normal regression theory. As a matter of fact, given a bivariate normal
distribution
[
X1
X2
]
∼ N
([
µ1
µ2
] [
Σ11 Σ12
Σ21 Σ22
])
, the conditional distribution of X1 given X2 is also normally dis-
tributed as: p (X1|X2 = x2) = N
(
µ1 + Σ12Σ
−1
22 (X2 − µ2) ,Σ11 − Σ12Σ−122 Σ21
)
. These formulas are applied to the joint
distribution deﬁned in equation 2.37.
19The law of total expectation (or law of iterated expectation) states that if X is an integrable random variable (i.e., a
random variable satisfying E(|X|) <∞) and Y is any random variable, not necessarily integrable, on the same probability
space, then: E (X) = E (E (X|Y )). The law of total variance (or variance decomposition formula) states that, if X and Y are
random variables on the same probability space and the variance of X is ﬁnite: V ar(X) = E (V ar (X|Y ))+V ar (E (X|Y )).
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Gibbs Sampler
Here the Gibbs sampler to obtain the marginal posterior distributions of the parameters runs iteratively
through the conditional distributions 2.15, 2.16, 2.17 and algorithm 2.1 for 20000 times and the ﬁrst
5000 iterations are discarded. Then, to correct for autocorrelation in draws, only one draw each three is
retained so that posterior distributions are made up of 5000 draws. The only thing needed to initialize
the procedure are the initial states of the variables which are taken from the OLS estimation of the
monetary policy reaction function over the period from January 1997 - December 1998.
Convergence is checked by using the Matlab code for CODA20 containing convergence diagnostics
modelled after S-Plus CODA. The function computes diagnostics based on Raftery and Lewis (1992)
and Geweke (1992).
20This code has been written by J.P. LeSage and can be freely downloaded from the website www.spatial-
econometrics.com.
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Appendix C. Simulation Exercise
Simulation Exercise
It is necessary that the Matlab code can capture the real value of parameters. To check if this property
is met I constructed an artiﬁcial dataset by generating six variables to use as regressors, six time-varying
coeﬃcients and the dependent variable.
The size of my artiﬁcial sample is 180 observations. Regressors are generated from normal distri-
butions with diﬀerent means and unit variance. Coeﬃcients are assumed to be constant along the ﬁrst
100 observations and then to switch of 0.5 from observation 101 on. The dependent variable is then
constructed as the product between regressors and coeﬃcients. Details about the artiﬁcial dataset are
summarized in table 2.2.
Table 2.2: Artiﬁcial dataset
Regressors
X1 ∼ N (1, 1) X4 ∼ N (0.3, 1)
X2 ∼ N (−2, 1) X5 ∼ N (0.2, 1)
X3 ∼ N (0.5, 1) X6 ∼ N (1.3, 1)
Coeﬃcients
From observation 1 to 100: From observation 101 to 168:
β1 = 1 β1 = 1.5
β2 = −0.5 β2 = 0
β3 = 3 β3 = 3.5
β4 = −1.5 β4 = −1
β5 = 0.4 β5 = 0.9
β6 = −0.2 β6 = 0.3
The dependent variables and the set of regressors are put in the Gibbs sampler to verify whether the
algorithm is able to capture the true values of parameters. The state variables are initialized at zero
and the number of simulation is 20000. Only the last 15000 draws are used for posterior inference.
The results of the simulation exercise are displayed in ﬁgure 2.18 which shows the posterior means
of parameters through time. The ﬁrst thing to notice is that the Gibbs sampler is able to retrieve the
true parameters' value for most of the times. Deviations from the true value happen at the beginning
of the time period and around the switch date. These results due to the fact that the Kalman ﬁlter and
smoother are recursive algorithms that cannot immediately capture jumps but adjust only gradually.
Convergence is checked by both graphical analysis and convergence diagnostics. Figure 2.19 displays
the cumulative average of the time-varying parameters at selected times. The choice of the times is
arbitrary and aims at showing that parameters seem to converge all along the time window and, in
particular, that the empirical cumulative average of the simulations seems to stabilize after a limited
number of draws. The analysis of these ﬁgures and further graphical inspections justiﬁes a burn-in size
of 5000 draws as from then on cumulative average ﬂuctuates around the fourth decimal. Moreover the
sample autocorrelation shows that draws are not correlated and so no thinning is needed.
The convergence diagnostics considered are those of Raftery and Lewis (1992) and Geweke (1992).
Table 2.3 shows a summary of the Raftery and Lewis (1992) statistics for the estimated parameters on
the entire set of draws. As a matter of fact, the inputs to calculate these statistics are all the simulated
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values for all the parameters which are 180 for each β. As the statistics are the same through times for
each parameter, I only reported them once. I perform the diagnostics for three quantiles of the posterior
distributions: 0.16, 0.5 and 0.84. The imposed level of accuracy is 0.01 and the related probability is
0.95 which are standard values for these parameters.
Results show that convergence is achieved, no thinning is needed as draws are not autocorrelated
and that the size of my burn-in and of the posterior sample are suﬃcient to estimate the posterior
quantiles with the desired level of accuracy.
As regards Geweke diagnostics, the relative numerical eﬃciency (RNE) is constructed as the ratio
between the variance of iid draws from the posterior distribution and the empirical spectral density
and it therefore represents the number of draws that would be required to produce the same numerical
accuracy if the draws had been made from an iid sample drawn directly from the posterior distribution:
a value lower than one indicates that it is necessary to increase the number of draws while a value
bigger than one indicates that the same numerical accuracy could be reached with less draws. The RNE
statistics should ideally be close to one while the NSE should be as close as possible to zero. Table
2.4 shows that these requirements are met as it reports values of these statistics for the time-varying
parameters considering the entire set of draws. The RNE is equal to one for each parameter in each
time while for NSE the lowest and the highest value are reported and both are close to zero. Figure
2.20 displays the p-value of the test for the equality of the means of the ﬁrst 20% of the draws and
the last 50% of the entire set of draws. The test is performed under the assumption that draws are iid
and also considering draws as autocorrelated and uses 15% autocovariance tapered estimates. The null
hypothesis of the test is that the two means are not statistically diﬀerent that would signal that the
algorithm has reached convergence. The null hypothesis is rejected for p-values lower than 0.05. This
is the case only for very few parameters which indicates that some initial draws should be discarded.
Figure 2.18: Posterior means of the coeﬃcient states
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Figure 2.19: Cumulative average of time-varying parameters for selected times
Table 2.3: Raftery and Lewis (1992) convergence diagnostics for the coeﬃcients
Parameter β1 β2
Quantile 0.16 0.5 0.84 0.16 0.5 0.84
Thin 1 1 1 1 1 1
Burn-in 2 2 2 2 2 1
Total 5294 9760 5341 5266 9387 5151
Nmin 5163 9604 5163 5163 9604 5163
I-stat 1.025 1.016 1.034 1.020 0.977 0.998
Parameter β3 β4
Quantile 0.16 0.5 0.84 0.16 0.5 0.84
Thin 1 1 1 1 1 1
Burn-in 2 2 2 2 2 2
Total 5044 9253 5146 5267 9601 5143
Nmin 5163 9604 5163 5163 9604 5163
I-stat 0.977 0.963 0.997 1.02 1.001 0.996
Parameter β5 β6
Quantile 0.16 0.5 0.84 0.16 0.5 0.84
Thin 1 1 1 1 1 1
Burn-in 2 2 2 2 1 2
Total 5203 9498 5135 5306 9434 5104
Nmin 5163 9604 5163 5163 9604 5163
I-stat 1.008 0.989 0.995 1.028 0.982 0.989
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Table 2.4: Geweke (1992) convergence diagnostics for the coeﬃcients
Parameter RNE (iid) NSE (iid)
β1 1 0.0097 - 0.0206
β2 1 0.0078 - 0.0137
β3 1 0.0108 - 0.0202
β4 1 0.010 - 0.0193
β5 1 0.0104 - 0.0195
β6 1 0.009 - 0.0179
Figure 2.20: Geweke (1992) convergence diagnostic p-values for the coeﬃcients
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Chapter 3
Heterogeneity in the Euro Area and
the Crisis
3.1 Introduction
The recent economic crisis led to a strong recession in both United States and the Euro area. The crisis
started with the burst of an housing market bubble in the US which rapidly involved the credit and the
ﬁnancial sector of both sides of the Atlantic. The 2008-2009 recession was followed by a mild recovery.
Then, in 2010 the Euro area has been hit by a sovereign debt crisis following concerns about public
ﬁnances of the most indebted member countries which caused a second round of recession.
The crisis has been extensively studied both theoretically and empirically in order to understand its
causes and consequences and to study the best policy measures to overcome it.
This chapter will analyse the eﬀects of the recent economic crisis on the macroeconomic developments
in the Euro area but it will do so from a diﬀerent point of view with respect to the rest of the literature.
As a matter of fact, the objective of the chapter is not to study the crisis mechanism but rather to
evaluate the developments in the Euro area in light of historical macroeconomic relationships. So, a
ﬁrst issue this work will try to address is whether structural relationships remained stable from 2008
on.
Another peculiarity of this work is that it will not only take into account structural economic
relationships inside the Euro area, but also their interplay with the US economy.
More explicitly, the empirical model is a large Bayesian VAR with US and Euro area variables
estimated over the period 1995-2007 with quarterly data. The eﬀects of the crisis on the Euro-area
are evaluated through a conditional forecast exercise in which some country-speciﬁc macroeconomic
variables are forecasted conditioning their path on the realization of some exogenous variables. The
exogenous variables used in the conditional forecast exercise are US GDP growth and inﬂation, the
Fed funds rate and an index of oil prices so that the actual size of the US crisis is taken into account.
The estimation of the pre-crisis VAR is necessary to obtain the structural parameters used to produce
the conditional forecast. By comparing the actual path of European variables with their forecasts it
is possible to evaluate whether macroeconomic relationships have changed signiﬁcantly, given the US
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crisis.
The exercise is useful to provide a better understanding of the developments in the Euro area
during the crisis from which some policy implications could be drawn. When actual values are in line
with their conditional forecast it means that actual developments reﬂect deep structural relationships
so that policy reforms would be necessary to inﬂuence them. On the contrary, the change in the
relationships across countries can have a structural nature or reﬂects some Euro-area speciﬁc shocks
but the conditional forecast exercise is not able to distinguish between the two. The main diﬀerence
between this two explanations is that a break in the structural macroeconomic relationships would be
a permanent feature looking forward, while an idiosyncratic shock would be temporary.
The Euro area will be studied both as a whole as well as considering single countries, namely the
four biggest European economies: France, Germany, Italy and Spain which also well represent the
diﬀerent macroeconomic developments occurred during the crisis. The reason for considering also single
countries is to study heterogeneity. Therefore two diﬀerent models are going to be estimates, one with
US variables and Euro-area aggregates and the other with US and single-country variables. For both
the Euro area and the single-countries the variable considered are GDP growth, inﬂation and 2- and 10
years government bond yields. The ﬁrst two aspects are the main dimensions in which heterogeneity
has been studied in the context of the EMU. The latter have been added to the analysis because they
gained importance in the light of the 2010-2012 sovereign debt crisis.
The reason for considering also single countries is to study heterogeneity. Heterogeneity is a bread
concept and many diﬀerent deﬁnitions can be taken into account. The issue of heterogeneity, i.e.
asymmetries in macroeconomic fundamentals, in the Euro area has become popular in macroeconomic
literature since the establishment of the European Monetary Union (EMU henceforth). The literature
of the 1990s was mainly focused on evaluating whether countries' economic fundamentals were actually
converging. After 1999 another issue became relevant: whether asymmetries were still present and
which are their sources. A big strand of economic literature focused on the interplay between monetary
policy and countries' heterogeneity while other authors focused on the degree and the sources of real,
nominal and ﬁnancial heterogeneity. The kind of heterogeneity this work refers to is in the response to
the crisis shock, i.e. the asymmetries in the level of economic activity, inﬂation and sovereign borrowing
conditions recorded after 2008. However here heterogeneity is not quantitatively measured but simply
the actual developments in single-countries macroeconomic variables are taken into account.
The recent economic crisis led to very diﬀerent developments in Euro-area countries and a wide
strand of literature dealt with the possible explanations of this kind of heterogeneity. Taken this into
account, this work will try to answer to the following question: is the heterogeneity brought about by
the recent economic crisis in line with pre-crisis structural macroeconomic relationships? Therefore,
the objective of this work is not to evaluate the degree of heterogeneity across Euro-area countries by
itself as many authors already presented evidence about the fact that heterogeneity increased during the
recent crisis. Instead, this work tries to relate the developments in Euro-area countries with structural
international macroeconomic relationships.
The present work is similar to Giannone, Lenza, and Reichlin (2010) as they study business cycles
in the Euro area from 1980 to 2006 and use conditional forecast exercises to evaluate the joint output
dynamics of European countries and to investigate the relationship between the Euro-area and the US
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cycles. Their objective was to see whether heterogeneity across European countries and aggregate GDP
growth since the beginning of the EMU were in line with historical regularities. Recently, conditional
forecast exercise have been used to evaluate monetary policy in the Euro area by Lenza, Pill, and
Reichlin (2010), Giannone, Lenza, Pill, and Reichlin (2011), Giannone, Lenza, Pill, and Reichlin (2012)
and Altavilla, Giannone, and Lenza (2014). From this point of view my work integrate the paper of
Giannone, Lenza, and Reichlin (2010) as the same type of analysis is applied to the period 2007-2013.
The outline of the chapter is as follows. Section 3.2 presents some stylized facts regarding cross-
country heterogeneity and the relationship between the Euro-area and the US economy. Section 3.3
reviews the literature. Section 3.4 explains the large Bayesian VAR and the conditional forecast method-
ologies. Section 3.5 presents the results and Section 3.6 concludes.
3.2 Stylized Facts
This work is not concerned with a formal evaluation of heterogeneity across Euro-area countries but
the existence of asymmetries in economic cycles is taken as given. Rather, the chapter compares the
evolution of single macroeconomic variables across countries in light of structural relationships. In order
to better understand the issue of heterogeneity since the beginning of the EMU, this section presents
some stylized facts about the evolution of GDP, inﬂation and government bond yields in the Euro area
and about the correlation between Euro-area and US cycles.
3.2.1 Heterogeneity in the Euro area
Figures 3.1 and 3.2 display the distribution of the GDP annual growth rate, annual inﬂation and 2- and
10-year government bond yields in the Euro area.
Figure 3.1 considers 11 countries for GDP, HICP and 10-year government bond yields and 7 countries
for 2-year government bond yields1. Two main patterns are identiﬁable in all charts. The ﬁrst is the
fact that over the ﬁrst part of the sample (before 2008) the standard deviation of all variables was quite
stable and low. The only exception is GDP growth in 2001 whose standard deviation reached almost
the 3% level, even higher than the level reached in 2009. This was due to the strong rise in Irish GDP.
The second relevant pattern is that the heterogeneity across Euro-area countries increased during
the recent crisis. The standard deviation of GDP growth started to increase in the third quarter of 2008
and reached it maximum in Q2 2009 when annual GDP growth was at its lower level. The sovereign
debt crisis led to again to an increase in the spread of the GDP growth distribution mainly for the fall in
Greek GDP. The standard deviation of inﬂation started to increase at the beginning of 2009 and reached
its peak in Q2 2010 when annual inﬂation was again rising after the drop in 2009. During the sovereign
debt crisis inﬂation dispersion decreased and went back rising from the start of 2013. Government bond
yields display a peak in Q4 2011 in periphery countries and their standard deviation at that time was
more than six time those of the previous year. This was due not only to the rise in yields of Greece,
1The distributions of GDP, HICP and 10-year government bond yields consider data of 11 Euro-area countries: Austria,
Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Portugal and Spain. Due to data availability
issues, the chart of 2-year government bond yields has been constructed considering data of just 7 Euro-area countries:
Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, Portugal and Spain.
119
CHAPTER 3. Heterogeneity in the Euro Area and the Crisis
Figure 3.1: Distribution of Euro-area GDP, HICP and government bond yields
Ireland, Italy, Portugal and Spain, but also to the decrease of French, German, Finnish and Dutch yields
as a consequence of a ﬂight to quality.
Figure 3.2 considers only France, Germany, Italy and Spain. In this case the standard deviation of
GDP growth still increases in 2009 and 2011 but only up to 6%. On the other hand, inﬂation dispersion
shows a negative trend from 2007 on. The standard deviation of government bond yield still display a
peak in 2012.
As regards Euro-area structural macroeconomic relationships, ﬁgure 3.3 present some evidence about
the relationship between GDP growth and inﬂation. In the period between 1999 and 2007 this rela-
tionship was positive with a correlation coeﬃcient of 0.6. Instead, over the crisis period the correlation
coeﬃcient is slightly negative and equal to -0,03. Therefore after 2008 no signiﬁcant relationship is
identiﬁable between GDP growth and inﬂation.
3.2.2 Euro area - US correlations
As the purpose of this work is to analyse structural macroeconomic relationships, the following ﬁgure
presents some evidence regarding the relationship between GDP growth, inﬂation and government bond
yields in the Euro-area and the correlation between Euro-area and US variables.
Figure 3.4 displays charts in which US and Euro-area variables are plotted together. In particular,
they show the evolution of annual GDP growth, inﬂation, 10-year and 2 year government bond yields.
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Figure 3.2: Distribution of GDP, HICP and government bond yields of France, Germany,
Italy and Spain
The considered Euro-area countries are France, Germany, Italy and Spain which are also the countries
considered in the VAR. The Euro-area aggregates are added for a more complete comparison.
As for GDP growth, Euro-area and US appear to have quite correlated business cycles. The drop
started in 2008 has been contemporaneous in both areas. Most interestingly, starting from the end
of 2011 the US and Euro-area GDPs started to diverge as US economy expanded while Euro-area
contracted. Inﬂation rates appear to be less correlated in the ﬁrst part of the sample but more during
the crisis period. As regards heterogeneity across Euro-area countries, Italy and Spain display a higher
volatility all along the sample. Finally, Euro-area government bond yields follow US yields up to 2010
when they start to increase, mainly in periphery countries, due to the sovereign debt crisis.
Overall these charts show that the dynamics of the considered variables at the beginning of the crisis
was very similar, much more than in previous periods, while from 2010 macroeconomic relationships
became less stable and heterogeneity increased. What is this decoupling due to? Can structural macroe-
conomic relationships in place before 2008 explain the evolution of Euro-area variables in more recent
years? The conditional forecast exercise in this chapter will try to shed some light on these issues.
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Figure 3.3: Relationship between annual GDP growth and inﬂation
Figure 3.4: US and Euro-area variables
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3.3 Literature Review
This work is connected with several diﬀerent issues. One of them is the relationship between US and the
Euro area. The literature dealing with it is reviewed in section 3.4.3 as further evidence is also produced.
Another connected strand of literature is the one represented by papers using the conditional forecast
tool, which have been brieﬂy mentioned in the introduction as they are concerned about monetary
policy issues.
However, the main goal of the chapter is to understand whether the increase in Euro area cross-
country heterogeneity, i.e. the very diﬀerent economic developments due to the crisis, is in line with
structural relationships, given the crisis shock. The related literature is the one dealing with economic
asymmetries across Euro-area countries. In this ﬁeld, the literature either studied nominal or real
heterogeneity, i.e. inﬂation diﬀerentials or business cycle heterogeneity. During the last years also
ﬁnancial conditions have caught the attention of researchers. This section will review some papers
dealing with these issues.
3.3.1 Inﬂation Diﬀerentials
The economic literature has put lots of eﬀort in understanding the sources of prolonged inﬂation dif-
ferentials. Temporary price misalignments should not be a source of concern by itself as they can be
the consequence of adjustment processes. As a matter of fact, in the presence of regional economic
imbalances or asymmetric shocks, price and wage ﬂexibility and factor mobility are important elements
of the convergence process. On the other hand, persistent inﬂation diﬀerentials are a cause of concern
because they can reﬂect structural diﬀerences in the adjustment process to economic shocks or inappro-
priate domestic policies and, in absence of a national monetary policy, other national policies should be
implemented in response of persistent deviation from price stability (ECB, 1999a).
From a political point of view, inﬂation diﬀerentials are particularly relevant for the unpopularity of
inﬂation in EMU countries, especially if it cannot be mitigated by a weaker exchange rate or by targeted
monetary policy actions. As a consequence, the public opinion could blame the currency area to be the
source of high inﬂation in some countries, as stressed by Honohan and Lane (2003).
The main sources of inﬂation diﬀerentials and the related literature are reviewed by De Haan (2010).
The author classiﬁes the factors inﬂuencing inﬂation diﬀerentials into ﬁve categories: (i) convergence,
(ii) business cycles, (iii) asymmetric shocks and diﬀerent adjustment mechanism to common shocks, (iv)
characteristics of the national goods, labour and factor markets, (v) price/wage rigidities.
These factors can also be distinguished according to the time horizon over which they inﬂuence inﬂa-
tion as in ECB (2012b). Structural factors like inﬂation persistence, labour productivity and price/wage
rigidities are likely to inﬂuence prices for a long period of time. On the other hand business cycles and
other pro-cyclical factors and import price shocks aﬀect inﬂation in the short-medium term.
The ﬁrst set of factors refers to the fact that inﬂation diﬀerentials can be due to the price level
convergence process to a homogeneous inﬂation rate if initially prices were diﬀerent across countries.
This process operates through the higher level of market integration, which leads to homogeneous
prices of traded goods, and the Balassa-Samuelson eﬀect generating higher inﬂation in the countries
experiencing a more rapid productivity growth. Beck and Weber (2005) ﬁnd that the convergence
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occurs only at a modest pace and it is a nonlinear process as its speed seems to decrease the further it
proceeds.
As also the business cycle can inﬂuence inﬂation diﬀerentials through its eﬀects on prices, business
cycle heterogeneity is a matter of concern. Business cycles and inﬂation are endogenous to each other
and one of the main connections between the two is the real rate: an ease in monetary policy leads
to lower real rates in countries with higher inﬂation which in turns put a stronger upward pressure
on prices. The opposite is true for a monetary policy tightening and overall the real rate channel can
exacerbate inﬂation diﬀerentials.
The eﬀects of the real rate can be oﬀset by the decline in competitiveness in high-inﬂation countries
due to the real appreciation leading to lower exports, weaker demand and lower prices. As regards
international trade, also exchange rate shocks and import prices are relevant in shaping inﬂation diﬀer-
entials. Trade openness and trade patterns are diﬀerent across countries so that the impact on domestic
inﬂation of movements in the euro currency, i.e. the so-called pass-through, is not homogeneous. From
this point of view, inﬂation diﬀerentials can be considered as necessary to converge to the purchasing
power parity when import prices diﬀer. The nominal eﬀective exchange rate has been found to be
relevant for the determination of inﬂation diﬀerentials in the period 1999-2001 by Honohan and Lane
(2003).
The last two elements aﬀecting inﬂation diﬀerentials, i.e. characteristics of the national goods, labour
and factor markets and price/wage rigidities, are structural factors that can lead to higher inﬂation by
itself or by inﬂuencing the propagation of shocks. With this respect, Beck, Hubrich, and Marcellino
(2009) ﬁnd that structural factors are the main determinants of inﬂation diﬀerentials in the Euro area.
A further source of heterogeneous inﬂation rates is found to be inﬂation persistence. Angeloni and
Ehrmann (2004) estimate an aggregate demand equation and a Phillips curve for a panel of 12 coun-
tries and ﬁnds that the main driver of inﬂation diﬀerentials over the period 1998-2003 was inﬂation
persistence, even if equal across countries. Therefore the prescription for monetary policy is to mini-
mize deviations of Euro-area prices from their long-run values in order to lower cross-country inﬂation
diﬀerentials.
The 2008 crisis is taken into account by very few authors. Lopez and Papell (2012) ﬁnd that the 2008
crisis led to an initial weakening of the convergence process with an increase in the inﬂation persistence
followed by a period of faster convergence. Pirovano and Van Poeck (2011) tests the stability of inﬂation
diﬀerentials over the period 1999-2011 which are found to be stable during the pre-crisis period, in line
with Lopez (2009), while the null hypothesis of stability is rejected when the full sample is considered.
When coming to the analysis of the determinants of inﬂation diﬀerentials, they ﬁnd that they are
originated by persistent structural and country-speciﬁc factors.
The existence of a rebalancing eﬀect after 2008 is documented also by ECB (2012b) that presents
evidence of the fact that inﬂation persistence has been higher over the period 2002-2008 than after 2008.
This outcome is due to the implementation of ﬁscal consolidation measures and of structural measures
aimed at increasing the ﬂexibility in the product and labour market, the decrease of unit labour costs,
the rise in real interest rates and the negative output gaps. Most of these factors were already inﬂuencing
inﬂation in the pre-crisis period but after the crisis they started to operate in the opposite direction.
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3.3.2 Real Heterogeneity
Many authors studied business cycle heterogeneity across Euro area economies. Starting from the
adoption of the Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM) in 1992 and further with the introduction of the
unique currency in 1999, the literature discussed three related issues. First, whether business cycles
in the Eurozone have become more similar, second, which are the factors that drive business cycle
synchronization, and third, whether the transmission of monetary policy shocks is homogeneous across
countries. In general, business cycle divergence can be caused by asymmetric shocks or diﬀerences
in national policies but also by an heterogeneous transmission mechanism of common shocks due to
diﬀerences in structural characteristics.
Haan, Inklaar, and Jong-A-Pin (2008) review the empirical literature concerned with business cycles
synchronization in the Euro area. Evidence shows that periods of of greater and lesser synchronization
tend to alternate but in general business cycle heterogeneity decreased during the 1990s. The main
factors driving business cycle synchronization are trade intensity, monetary integration, ﬁnancial inte-
gration and ﬁscal policies. Trade openness and ﬁnancial integration can increase synchronization as they
increase the sensitivity of domestic demand to foreign demand but they also lead to a higher degree of
production specialization, i.e. diﬀerent economic structures, which, in case of sectoral shocks, decreases
business cycle correlations. Finally, monetary integration can foster synchronization through the unique
monetary policy and the exchange rate stability. However, in a monetary union, the exchange rates
cannot anymore absorb shocks which in turns causes more divergences in business cycles.
Camacho, Perez-Quiros, and Saiz (2008) evaluate business cycles of European countries consider-
ing both synchronization and the form of the cycles, i.e. length, depth and shape. The study uses
monthly data of the industrial production from 1962 to 2004 ﬁnding that European business cycles can
be classiﬁed into diﬀerent clusters featuring diﬀerent cycle characteristics. When two subsamples are
considered, the results show that the exchange rate mechanism implemented in early 1990s did not lead
to convergence in business cycle characteristics.
Giannone, Lenza, and Reichlin (2010) study the evolution of heterogeneity in the Euro-area through
a conditional forecast exercise where single-country GDP growth rates are conditioned on the realised
path of aggregate GDP growth. Euro-area countries can be divided into two groups and for both the
business cycle characteristics did not change with the introduction of the Euro. The ﬁrst group consists
of countries with similar business cycles over the sample 1970 to 2006, i.e. Austria, Belgium, France,
Germany, Italy and Netherlands, while the second group is composed by countries where economic
activity was more heterogeneous and volatile, i.e. Finland, Greece, Ireland, Luxembourg, Portugal and
Spain.
As regards the crisis period, Ciccarelli, Ortega, and Valderrama (2012) analyse heterogeneity and
spillovers in macro-ﬁnancial linkages across 10 developed economies (5 of them are part of the EMU)
over the period 1980-2011 by using a time-varying parameter panel-VAR model and show that the
developments in Euro-area variables were mainly driven by a common component and, to a lesser
extent, by country-speciﬁc factors. The opposite is true for the pre-crisis period. Then the two factors
lost their signiﬁcance in 2010 and 2011.
These results are in line with Giannone and Reichlin (2006) that analyses output dynamics in 12
EMU countries from 1970 on ﬁnding that output diﬀerentials have remained stable over time while
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business cycles have become more synchronized. Cross-country heterogeneity turns out to be due to
small and persistent idiosyncratic shocks while output ﬂuctuations are caused by area-wide shocks with
a similar transmission mechanism. Euro-area and US business cycles are found to be highly correlated.
US shocks are the main drivers of output ﬂuctuations, their eﬀects on the Euro-area are lagged but more
persistent and less volatile than in the US meaning that the two economies have diﬀerent structural
characteristics shaping the transmission mechanism.
Overall, the results of the latter two papers are interesting because they shed some light on the
sources of heterogeneity across diﬀerent countries pointing towards the relevance of idiosyncratic factors
in explaining divergent macroeconomic developments.
Heterogeneity regards also the monetary policy transmission mechanism. As of the eﬀects of the
crisis on the transmission mechanism of monetary policy shocks, Ciccarelli, Maddaloni, and Peydró
(2013) ﬁnd that in distressed countries the credit channel played a strong ampliﬁcation eﬀect. They
obtain this result through the estimation of a panel VAR model with 15 macro, ﬁnancial and credit
variables for 12 Euro-area countries over the period 2002Q4 - 2011Q3 with an expanding rolling window.
The monetary policy transmission process turns out to be time-varying with shocks having the strongest
impact on GDP at the height of the crisis. Also the cross-country dimension is important because the
eﬀects of monetary policy have changed in an heterogeneous way across countries and across the diﬀerent
credit channels.
The eﬀects of credit dynamics in Euro area countries are studied also by Bijsterbosch and Falagiarda
(2014) which ﬁnd that credit supply shocks have played an important role in business cycle ﬂuctuations
in most Euro-area countries and that their eﬀect increased after the recent crisis. In particular, credit
supply shocks had a positive eﬀect on GDP growth in the pre-crisis period and a negative eﬀect afterward
with a positive correlation is the size of the two opposite contributions. Credit supply shocks are also
found to contribute to an increase in cross-country heterogeneity and in the variability of real GDP,
inﬂation, short term interest rate and lending in the post-crisis period.
Bagliano and Morana (2010) investigate whether the spillovers of macroeconomic and ﬁnancial shocks
from the US have aﬀected the convergence process in the Euro area. The empirical model consists of
a FAVAR considering 50 countries and the sample goes from 1980 to 2009. Their results point towards
a likely contribution of US real and ﬁnancial factors to real and ﬁnancial divergence in the Euro area
while the opposite is true for inﬂation.
3.3.3 Financial Heterogeneity
Heterogeneity in ﬁnancial conditions, i.e. credit and government bond markets, has been documented
by ECB (2012a). The ﬁnancial and sovereign debt crisis has increased the degree of heterogeneity in
ﬁnancial conditions across Euro area countries by aﬀecting those countries that beneﬁted the most from
the access to the EMU. As a matter of fact, the EMU brought about a process of ﬁnancial integration
which led to a decrease in nominal interest rate and ﬁnancing costs in all countries. This provided
incentives for households, corporations and government to increase spending and the incentive was
higher for the countries that experienced higher interest rates before joining the EMU. The lack of
structural reforms in these countries led to an accumulation of macroeconomic, ﬁscal and ﬁnancial
imbalances which created the basis for the increase in the heterogeneity after 2008.
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During the crisis, ﬁnancial heterogeneity appeared with impaired money market functioning, a de-
crease in credit supply and eventually tensions on sovereign debt markets. Financial heterogeneity is
a source of concern because it can by itself foster heterogeneity in macroeconomic fundamentals as it
prevents the most aﬀected countries from accessing the funds needed to stimulate growth.
The ECB intervened by cutting interest rates and implementing unconventional monetary policy
measures aimed at restoring homogenous ﬁnancing conditions as the high degree of heterogeneity poses
challenges in the conduct of monetary policy impairing the transmission mechanism. ECB (2014)
retraces the developments in sovereign bond yields, analyses the eﬀects of unconventional monetary
policy measures and reviews some of the related literature.
As regards the dynamics of government bond yields during the crisis, the literature has found that
spreads have been driven by both common international factors, as risk aversion, and country-speciﬁc
factors, as default and liquidity risk.
Afonso, Arghyrou, Bagdatoglou, and Kontonikas (2013) study the determinants of sovereign bond
yield spreads over the period 1999-2011 and identify country-speciﬁc time variation in the relationship
between spreads and fundamentals. In particular they ﬁnd that the set of ﬁnancial and macroeconomic
variables inﬂuencing spreads became richer during the crisis mainly for periphery countries pointing to-
wards an increase in heterogeneity. The new determinants of sovereign spreads were ﬁscal fundamentals
and international ﬁnancial risk while liquidity risk increased its signiﬁcance.
Similar results are found by Bernoth and Erdogan (2012) that apply time-varying coeﬃcients to a
non-parametric ﬁxed-eﬀects panel model for the sovereign bond yields of 10 Euro-area countries for the
period 1999-2011. The main ﬁnding is that the increase in yield spreads during the ﬁnancial crisis can
be explained by an increase in investors' risk aversion, a deterioration of governments' ﬁscal position
and by an increase in the price of risk, i.e. ﬁnancial markets reacted more strongly to risk variables.
Credit and liquidity risk as well as higher international risk aversion are found to be the determinant
of sovereign bond yields over the period 2007-2009 by Attinasi, Checherita-Westphal, and Nickel (2009).
Arghyrou and Kontonikas (2012) conﬁrm that after 2007 sovereign bond yields have been driven
mainly by macro fundamentals and international risk while in the pre-crisis pricing can be explained by
a convergence-trade pricing model, i.e. investors bought the bonds of periphery countries leading to a
convergence of their yields with those of Germany. Furthermore, the crisis period can be divided into two
subperiods. During the ﬁrst one, up to the beginning of 2010, yields were mainly driven by the Greek
debt crisis which has been caused by an unfavourable shift in country-speciﬁc market expectations. The
second period, from March 2010, is instead characterized by an increase in the sensitivity of bond yields
to fundamentals and several contagion sources were active.
Contagion is found to signiﬁcantly aﬀect bond yields also by Favero and Missale (2012). Fiscal
fundamentals are the key variable driving it as they inﬂuence the sensitivity of domestic yields to other
countries' spreads.
More recently, Costantini, Fragetta, and Melina (2014) found that also inﬂation diﬀerentials aﬀect
sovereign bond yield spreads of Euro-area periphery countries. Here cumulated inﬂation diﬀerentials are
used to capture asymmetric shocks leading to a divergence in competitiveness and the fact that they are
statistically signiﬁcant is an indication that those countries do not belong to an optimal currency area.
Moreover, the sensitivity of spreads to expected debt-to-GDP ratios turns out to be 20 times higher in
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periphery countries than in core countries. Therefore ﬁnancial markets punished the deterioration of
public ﬁnances of those countries that are not perceived as members of the optimal currency area.
3.4 The Methodology
The econometric methodology is based on the estimation of a large Bayesian VAR and the calculation of
a conditional forecast. This section brieﬂy discuss both approaches and the assumption of US exogeneity.
3.4.1 Large Bayesian VARs
Large Bayesian VARs have been introduced by Banbura, Giannone, and Reichlin (2010) as a tool to
handle systems of many variables so to avoid the curse of dimensionality. The overﬁtting problem is
avoided through the application of Bayesian shrinkage which amounts at increasing the tightness of the
priors as more variables are added. The rationale behind this approach is that by using informative priors
it is possible to shrink the highly parametrised VAR model towards a more parsimonious benchmark
representation captured by the prior distributions.
The choice of the informativeness of the prior distribution is a crucial issue because it inﬂuences
the ﬁt of the model and its forecasting performance. The tightness of the prior can be chosen so as
to maximize the out-of sample forecasting performance of the model as in Litterman (1980) and in
Doan, Litterman, and Sims (1984) or by targeting a desired in-sample ﬁt as in Banbura, Giannone, and
Reichlin (2010).
Here the appropriate degree of shrinkage is chosen as in Giannone, Lenza, and Primiceri (2012), i.e.
it is automatically selected by maximizing the posterior distribution of the hyperparameters. This is
possible by exploiting the hierarchical structure of the model as hyperparameters are treated as any
other unknown parameter so that the Bayes theorem can be applied to produce inference on them.
In particular, maximizing their posterior distribution amounts at maximizing the marginal likelihood
with respect to them. The MCMC algorithm used to estimate the parameters of the model is based
on a Metropolis step to draw the vector of hyperparameters which is then used to draw the vector
of parameters from a Normal - Inverse-Wishart distribution. As regards priors, a combination of the
Minnesota, sum-of-coeﬃcients and initial-dummy-observation priors is considered. As a result, priors
will be tighter when the model is overparametrised and they will be looser in the opposite case. Appendix
B reviews this approach in some more details.
Two diﬀerent BVARs are estimated in this work. The ﬁrst one considers US variables, the oil price
index and Euro-area aggregate variables. The second VAR considers 16 Euro-area country-speciﬁc
variables instead of the aggregate ones so that it has 21 variables overall. The US variables are GDP
growth, inﬂation, the Fed funds rate and 10-year government bond yields. The Euro area aggregate and
country-speciﬁc variables are GDP growth, inﬂation and 2- and 10-years government bond yields. The
countries considered are France, Germany, Italy and Spain because they are the four biggest European
economies but also well represents heterogeneity. Finally, the index of oil prices is included with the
aim of capturing exogenous determinants of inﬂation. Collecting all the variables in the vector Yt, both
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VARs can be written in the following reduced-form:
Yt = C +A1Yt−1 + . . .+ApYt−p + εt, (3.1)
where C is a vector of constants and Al with l = 1 . . . p are the matrices capturing the relationship
between Yt and its p lags.
The model is estimated over the period from Q1 1995 to Q2 2007 with quarterly data and ﬁve
lags (p = 5). The estimation sample has been chosen in order to capture only pre-crisis structural
macroeconomic relationships. Variables enter in log-levels, except from interest rates. Appendix A
describes the sources and the exact transformation applied to each variable.
3.4.2 Conditional Forecast
The estimation of the BVAR model is necessary to obtain the structural parameters which will be used
to produce the conditional forecast. The conditional forecast amounts at the following exercise: from a
period t0 on, where t = 1 . . . t0 . . . T , we want to produce the conditional forecast of Euro-area variables
given the US developments during the crisis period.
Therefore, the variables of the VAR can be divided into two subset, the variable of which we want
to derive the conditional expectations (Z) for the period t ≥ t0, and the variables in the conditioning
set (X) so that, for every Euro-area variable z of the VAR model, the algorithm computes the forecast
based on the parameters coming from the VAR, the past value of the Euro-area variables and the past
and future observations of US variables, i.e
EA(L) [zt|Zt, t = 1 . . . t0 − 1,∧Xt, t = 1 . . . T ] (3.2)
More precisely, in the forecasting period the VAR system has the following state-space representation:
Xt = BZt + εt (3.3)
Zt = DZt−1 + ηt (3.4)
Here Xt is a (k × 1) vector of observables, Zt is a (m× 1) vector of latent state variables and B and
D are two, respectively, (k ×m) and (m×m) matrices of coeﬃcients. Observables are the conditioning
variables, i.e. US variables and the oil price index in this case, unobservables are the variables to
forecast, i.e Euro-area variables, and coeﬃcient matrices come from the estimation of the large BVAR
model on the pre-crisis period.
The conditional expectations of Euro-area variables are computed using the Kalman-ﬁlter based
algorithm discussed in Banbura, Giannone, and Lenza (2014) which in turn is based on the simulation
smoother developed by Carter and Kohn (1994). This smoothing algorithm allows to estimate a value
for Zt taking into account the full sample of observations with their variance-covariance matrix, meaning
that also the size of the shocks occurred to the conditioning variables is taken into account.
In conclusion, the conditional forecast gives a probability distribution to evaluate how likely are
actual values, given pre-crisis structural macroeconomic relationships and the US crisis. The comparison
of actual values of Euro-area variables with their conditional forecasts will allow to evaluate whether
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the correlations between the variables in the VAR model have changed after Q3 2007.
3.4.3 US exogeneity
One issue when dealing with conditional forecasts is the endogeneity of the conditioning set with respect
to the forecasted variables. As a matter of fact, the conditional forecast exercise tries to evaluate
whether, given the structural macroeconomic relationships, the variables in the conditioning set are able
to correctly reproduce the path of the forecasted variables. Endogeneity means that the conditioning set
is itself inﬂuenced by the realised path of the forecasted variables so that it already contains information
about it. Therefore, if endogeneity is present the results will be diﬃcult to interpret as the direction of
causality between the two sets of variables is not clear.
In this work the conditioning set contains four US macroeconomic variables and an oil price index and
therefore the conditional forecast exercise lies on the assumption that the US economy is exogenous to
the Euro-area economy. This section will try to justify this assumption brieﬂy reviewing some literature
dealing with this issue and running an out-of-sample forecasting exercise to prove that the Euro area
does not Granger-cause US.
Giannone and Reichlin (2005) model the interactions between the US and the Euro area cycle over
the period 1970-2003. Stylized facts show that cycles are longer in US than in the Euro area while
recessions are shorter and the Euro-area cycle is smoother than the US one. The analysis of growth
rates show that US have higher output volatility while persistence is larger in the Euro area and lags
the US analog. Then there are two interesting ﬁndings regarding US exogeneity. The ﬁrst is that that
Euro-area growth does not Granger-cause US growth, i.e. world growth is led by the US and the Euro
area follows with a lag. The second one is that cointegration analysis shows that the two economies
are driven by only one shock in the long run and model simulation demonstrate that this shock can be
interpreted either as a world shock or as a shock originating in the US as the outcomes of the two are
not statistically distinguishable. Finally, the model also proves that US output can be fully explained
by a technology shock while for Euro-area output a further idiosyncratic shock is necessary. The same
authors, in a later paper (Giannone and Reichlin, 2006) analyse output dynamics in 12 EMU countries
from 1970 on and they again ﬁnd that US shocks are the main drivers of output ﬂuctuations.
Giannone, Lenza, and Reichlin (2010) produced evidence about the exogeneity of US GDP growth
by evaluating the forecasting performance of a bivariate VAR with Euro-area and US GDP growth over
the sample 1980-2006 by comparing it with a random-walk model. Results show that US GDP helps
to predict Euro-area GDP but the opposite is not true. This ﬁnding allows them to use US GDP as
conditioning variable to study the evolution of Euro-area GDP.
Further evidence on the eﬀects of US shocks in the Euro area is produced by Favero and Giavazzi
(2008) and Bagliano and Morana (2010). Favero and Giavazzi (2008) study Euro-area yields on long-
term bonds and ﬁnd that their level is almost entirely explained by US shocks and by the systematic
response of US and Euro-area variables to these shocks. Bagliano and Morana (2010) ﬁnd that US real
and ﬁnancial factors contributed to real divergence in the Euro area as a contraction in US economic
activity leads both to a decrease in the average Euro-area GDP growth and to an increase of the standard
deviation and skewness of its cross-sectional distribution. Also ﬁnancial convergence is inﬂuenced by
US developments while the opposite is true for the Euro-area inﬂation.
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Table 3.1: RMSFE of US and Euro-area GDP from diﬀerent models
US GDP
Model with US only Extended Model Percentage diﬀerence
t+ 1 2,77 2,8158 1,7%
t+ 2 2,3612 2,4850 5,2%
t+ 3 2,1665 2,3399 8,0%
t+ 4 2,0592 2,2188 7,7%
Euro-Area GDP
Model with EA only Extended Model Percentage diﬀerence
t+ 1 3,0295 2,5596 -15,5%
t+ 2 2,9354 2,4977 -14,9%
t+ 3 2,8142 2,3680 -15,9%
t+ 4 2,7257 2,2604 -17,1%
The weakness of the previous studies is that they do not consider the crisis period. Billio, Casarin,
Ravazzolo, and Van Dijk (2013) in turns, studied the interactions between US and Euro-area cycles
over the sample 1991-2013. The empirical model is a Bayesian panel Markov-switching VAR with three
regimes, recession, recovery and expansion, for seven countries, six Euro-area economies plus the US.
Their main ﬁndings are in line with the above literature as US cycle turns out to lead the Eurozone one
and reinforcement eﬀects in the recession probabilities are present.
In order to reproduce these results in the current framework, an out-of-sample forecasting exercise
is run. The forecasting exercise allows to evaluate whether European variables Granger-cause US ones.
The exercise is structured as follows. The forecasts coming from two country-speciﬁc BVAR models for
US and Euro-area aggregate variables are compared with the one from an extended model considering
both set of variables. The direction of causality, i.e. if US Granger-cause Euro area or viceversa, is
assessed comparing the eﬀect of US variables on the Euro-area forecast with the eﬀect of Euro-area
variables on the US forecast.
Overall three BVAR models2 are estimated recursively, using the Giannone, Lenza, and Primiceri
(2012) framework, on an expanding window with the ﬁrst estimation sample going from 1995 to the end
of 2006. At each iteration the sample is increased with one observation and for all the estimated models
the four-period-ahead forecast is produced3. Eventually, the last estimation sample ends in Q4 2012
and the forecast for the conditioning variables is produced up to Q4 2013. The forecast is evaluated
in terms of growth rates with respect to the last observation in the estimation sample and then it is
rescaled to obtain annual growth rates, as in Stock and Watson (2004). Finally, the forecast accuracy
is evaluated through the calculation of the root mean square forecast error (RMSFE henceforth) with
respect to the realised path of the variables4.
Table 3.1 reports the average RMSFE of the variables for the four forecast periods.
2The US model considers the variables in the conditioning set, i.e. US GDP, US HICP, the Fed funds rate, the US
10-year government bond yields and the oil price index. The Euro-area model considers Euro-area GDP, HICP and 2-
and 10-years government bond yields. The extended model combines the variables of the two previous models.
3The forecast is produced using the entire posterior distribution of the BVAR parameters so that a density forecast
is obtained. The forecast has been calculated also considering the mode of the parameters' posterior distributions but
results are not qualitatively diﬀerent.
4The RMSFE is calculated using the median of the forecast distribution.
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Results show that the extended model worsen the forecast of US GDP of around 5.5% on average
while it improves the forecast of Euro-area GDP of around 15.5% on average meaning that US variables
are useful to forecast Euro-area GDP but the converse is not true. Therefore it is possible to conclude
that it is the US business cycle to Granger-cause the Euro-area one.
3.5 Results
This section reports and comments the results of the conditional forecast produced for GDP growth,
inﬂation and 2- and 10-year government bond yields of the Euro area, Germany, France, Italy and Spain.
The exogenous variables used to produce the conditional forecast are US GDP growth and inﬂation, the
Fed funds rate, the 10-year government bond yield and an index of oil prices. Further details about the
dataset can be found in appendix A.
3.5.1 Conditional Forecast of Euro-Area Aggregates
Figure 3.5 reports the results of the conditional forecast exercise starting in Q3 2007 for aggregated
Euro-area variables.
The black solid lines refer to the actual values, the red lines display the 5th, 16th, 50th, 84th and
95th percentiles and the mean of the conditional forecast distribution. Finally, the blue line is the
median of the unconditional forecast and is included to better understand the eﬀect of conditioning on
the forecast. All variables are in percentage annual growth rates.
As the blue line highlights, the unconditional forecasts perform worse than the conditional forecast
as they only take into account pre-crisis structural macroeconomic relationships but not the information
regarding the crisis brought by the US variables and the oil price index.
Coming to the conditional forecast, Euro-area GDP is predicted to slow down in 2008 but the actual
values are well below the conditional forecast distribution meaning that in that period either a structural
break or an idiosyncratic shock occurred. The subsequent rebound is on the 95th quantile and others
very unlikely values of the annual GDP growth rate are recorded in the second half of 2012 after the
sovereign debt crisis.
Inﬂation is almost always in line with its conditional expectation even though the actual value often
lies in the tails of the distribution. The values in the period from 2009 to mid 2010 are far below the
conditional forecast distribution. Inﬂation lies again below the forecasted distribution in the last two
quarters of 2013 justifying the concerns about deﬂation as these values cannot be explained neither by
structural relationships nor by the US crisis evolution.
On the other hand, 10-year government bond yields closely track the mean and the median of the
conditional forecast meaning that for this variable no structural break or idiosyncratic shock can be
detected. The conclusions are diﬀerent for 2-year government bond yields as in 2009 yields lie in the
lower part of the conditional forecast distribution, probably driven by the liquidity injections of the ECB
to curb the ﬁnancial crisis, and the peak at the beginning of 2012 is outside the distribution meaning
that the developments of the sovereign debt crisis cannot be explained by pre-crisis macroeconomic
relationships, even when the US crisis is taken into account.
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Figure 3.5: Actual values, conditional and unconditional forecast of Euro-area variables
3.5.2 Conditional Forecast of Euro-Area Countries
Euro-area aggregate variables showed that the ﬁnancial crisis and the sovereign debt crisis caused a
decline in GDP growth rate, inﬂation and 2-year government bond prices that cannot be explained by
pre-crisis structural relationships and the US crisis shock.
The purpose of this section is to compare country-speciﬁc developments with the results for the
Euro-area aggregate variables and to evaluate whether the increase in cross-country heterogeneity from
2008 on is somehow predictable.
Figures 3.6 and 3.7 display the results of the conditional forecast exercise for single Euro-area coun-
tries which starts in Q3 2007. As before, the black solid lines refer to the actual values, the red lines
are the percentiles and the mean of the conditional forecast distribution and the blue line is the median
of the unconditional forecast. All variables are in percentage annual growth rates.
As before, the conditional forecast improves a lot with respect to the unconditional one. The
unconditional forecast can somehow capture the evolution of the variables at the beginning of the
sample but from then on it predicts that they should remain almost unchanged. Therefore the diﬀerence
from the conditional and the unconditional forecast is due to the conditioning, i.e. it comes from the
relationship between US and Euro area and the size of US shocks.
The four conditional forecasts of GDP growth have similar patterns as they all decrease around
2009 and then go up again. The levels are however diﬀerent, heterogeneity is deﬁnitely present all
along the crisis period and it is often not in line with the conditional forecast. The starting point is
around 4% for Germany and Spain and around 2% for France and Italy. The actual values of GDP
growth are often outside the distribution of the conditional forecast. For the ﬁrst four periods, up to
around Q3 2008, the actual GDP is in line with the conditional forecast meaning that the structural
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Figure 3.6: Actual values, conditional and unconditional forecast of GDP and HICP YoY
Figure 3.7: Actual values, conditional and unconditional forecast of 10-year and 2-year
government bond yields
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macroeconomic relationships remained stable. In the second half of 2008 all the GDPs fall abruptly and
reach a negative peak in the second quarter of 2009. Also the conditional forecasts display a slowdown
in that period but the actual values are well below it. This evolution can be easily connected to the
Lehman Brothers bankruptcy. More in details, the recession has been stronger for Germany and Italy as
GDP contracted of more than 7%. Unexpectedly, the conditional forecast predicts a stronger recession
in Germany reaching the level of -2% while for France and Italy it does not even cross the -1%. The
conditional expectation of Spain is even more surprising as it always ﬂuctuates between 1% and 4%.
The ﬁrst conclusion stemming from the comparison of actual and forecasted values at the beginning
of the crisis is that the European recession has been far too strong with respect to what the pre-crisis
macroeconomic relationships would have implied and given the path of US variables.
Afterwards the recession mitigates in all countries and diﬀerences appear markedly. GDP growth
rates slowly go back to positive values from mid 2010. France and Italy GDP growth remains in line
with the conditional forecast up to 2011 and then display a positive peak above it. For France and
Italy the peak is just above the 5th percentile of the distribution while for Germany the peak is much
higher and GDP growth reaches a value which is more than double the one implied by the conditional
forecast, i.e. the eﬀects of the recovery have been much stronger in Germany. After the peak of 2011
the German GDP growth slows down and goes back in line with the conditional forecast up to the end
of the sample. A second negative peak is recorded at the beginning of 2013. This slowdown of economic
activity is in line with the conditional forecast for Germany and outside for France and Italy. French
and German GDP remained stable in Q1 2013 while Italian GDP declined at a 2% rate as in Spain.
Spain deserves a special comment as the results have some peculiarities. Even though the ﬂuctuations
of its GDP growth are similar to the other ones, its level never goes back to the 4% of the beginning of
2007 and its always far below the conditional forecast. The positive peak in 2011 is just below 1% and,
as for Italy, output was still contracting at a 2% rate at the beginning of 2013. The crisis had strong
negative consequences in Spain and it seems that the austerity measures and reforms implemented did
not succeed in reestablishing the potential pre-crisis level of growth. These particularly negative results
for Spain are consistent with Ciccarelli, Ortega, and Valderrama (2012) as they ﬁnd that Spain was the
only country among the four considered here to be signiﬁcantly inﬂuenced by a negative country-speciﬁc
factor from 2008 on.
Single-country GDP evolution is very diﬀerent from Euro-area aggregate and it is much less in line
with the conditional forecast.
The divergence between Euro-area GDPs and their conditional forecasts is relevant in light of the
fact that Giannone, Lenza, and Reichlin (2010) found that Euro-area GDP growth remained in line with
historical regularities up to 2006. The results for the crisis period could be due to a break in the structural
macroeconomic relationships or to some idiosyncratic shocks generated in the Euro area. Answering to
this question would mean to condition the forecast on all the possible sources of idiosyncratic shock for
all the countries considered. However, the use of endogenous variables in the conditioning set would
impair the interpretation of the causal relationships. So, as for the current results, the only possible
conclusion is that the underlying structural relationships are not able to explain the evolution of GDP
in the four Euro-area countries considered and so either a break or an idiosyncratic shock must be
occurred.
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Results are diﬀerent for inﬂation, measured as the annual growth rate of the HICP for each country,
as the actual values are more often in line with the conditional expectation and are less heterogeneous
than GDP growth rates. This ﬁnding points towards a more structural-based explanation of inﬂation
developments, in line with most of the literature analysing inﬂation diﬀerentials, e.g. Beck, Hubrich, and
Marcellino (2009) and Pirovano and Van Poeck (2011). More in details, the dynamics of the forecast is
very similar for Germany and France, as it ﬂuctuates around a mean value lower than 2%, while it has
a wider distribution for Italy and Spain. Italian and Spanish predicted inﬂation ﬂuctuate around 2%
and 3% respectively. Again, given the pre-crisis structural relationship and the US economic crisis, the
Spanish level is above the remaining three countries' forecasts. As regards actual inﬂation, all countries
display an acceleration up to mid 2008 and then a slowdown with a negative peak in mid 2009 which is
outside the conditional forecast distribution meaning that the eﬀects of the ﬁnancial crisis were not in
line with previous structural macroeconomic relationships. Spain distinguishes because of the greater
diﬀerence between the lower bound of the forecast distribution and the realised value which is close
to -1%. Such a deﬂation in Spain implied higher real rates with respect to the other three countries,
partially compensating for the cut in Euro-area interest rates by the ECB and justifying the slower
recovery in GDP. Afterward inﬂation increases again and goes back in line with the predictions for all
countries. Only in the last part of the sample it crosses again the lower bound of the distribution for
France, Italy and Spain and this justiﬁes the deﬂation concerns in this countries. Germany HICP is
instead in line with its conditional expectation. This heterogeneity is particularly relevant from the
point of view of policy makers as some measures to ﬁght deﬂation are needed in France, Italy and Spain
but not in Germany.
As regards government bond yields, the conditional forecasts are similar to each other: they have
wide distributions whose means are predicted to remain almost stable around 3-4%. The relationship
between the conditional forecast and the actual bond yields is similar across countries up to 2011. From
2009 on the 2-year yields fall in the lower part of the distribution probably as a consequence of the
unconventional monetary policy measures implemented by the ECB. After 2011 the countries can be
divided into two groups, Germany and France, whose actual yields are always in the lower part of the
conditional forecast distribution, and Italy and Spain as they display a peak at the end of 2011 which is
located in the upper part of the distribution. The pattern of German and French yields reﬂects a ﬂight
to quality eﬀect which is particularly strong in 2-year government bond yields in 2010 and 2012 while
10-year government bond yields are more in line with pre-crisis structural macroeconomic relationships
as they always lie inside the 5th and 95th quantiles of the conditional forecast distribution. As a
consequence of the sovereign debt crisis, Italian and Spanish bond yields display a peak around 2012
which lies in the upper part of the forecast distribution signalling that the probability of those values
to realize is low given the structural macroeconomic relationships. Therefore, what can be considered
as abnormal, given the developments in US variables, is more the increase in short-term German and
French bond prices rather than the rise in the Italian and Spanish yields. Overall, the 2008 brought
about an increase in the heterogeneity between Euro-area government bond yields which is partly too
strong with respect to what implied by the pre-crisis macroeconomic relationships.
In conclusion, the conditional forecast of single-countries variables shows that their evolution is much
more less predictable than the one of Euro-area aggregate variables meaning that either a structural
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break or an idiosyncratic shock occurred.
3.5.3 Conditional Forecast with Euro-area Government Bond Yields in the
Conditioning Set
The reason for the poor performance of the conditional forecast in predicting the actual path of Euro
area variables is that either a structural break or an Euro-area speciﬁc shock occurred. A candidate
explanation of this evidence is the Euro-area sovereign debt crisis which is an example of an idiosyncratic
shock.
In order to test this conjecture, 2- and 10-year government bond yields have been used as conditioning
variables in addition to US variables and the oil price index. However it is necessary to point out that
this exercise suﬀers from an endogeneity problem due to the fact that the Euro-area bond yields are
endogenous to the business cycle so that they might also reﬂect shocks originated in other sectors of the
economy. Therefore a shortcoming of this exercise is that it cannot give a precise account of economic
causality and results should be taken with caution.
Results for the Euro area aggregate and the single countries are displayed in ﬁgures 3.8 and 3.9.
Figure 3.8: Actual values and conditional forecast of Euro-area GDP and HICP YoY
Figure 3.8 reports the results of the model with Euro-area aggregate variables. The comparison
with ﬁgure 3.5 reveals that the conditional forecast distributions are tighter when the 2- and 10-year
government bond yields are included into the conditioning set. However the forecast is not improved as
it predicts a higher recovery in 2011, in the middle of the sovereign debt crisis. Finally, no information
seem to be added to the period before 2011.
The results for the single Euro-area countries are displayed in ﬁgure 3.9. The inclusion of 2- and 10-
year government bond yields makes the conditional forecast distributions a bit tighter mainly for Italy
and Spain. The conditional expectations better approximate the 2009 and 2012 recessions. However
the general results do not change, GDP growth and inﬂation are often not in line with its conditional
forecast. One interesting ﬁnding is that the prediction ability of the conditional forecast for inﬂation
worsen signiﬁcantly at the end of the sample so that the current low levels of inﬂation in France, Italy
and Spain seem to be even more worrisome.
Overall, taking into account the developments in sovereign debt markets does not help predicting real
variables of the Euro area suggesting that the recent recession and economic slack cannot be attributed
to ﬁnancial market tensions and other reasons, either structural or idiosyncratic, should be investigated.
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Figure 3.9: Actual values and conditional forecast of GDP and HICP YoY
3.6 Conclusion
This chapter has dealt with the analysis of the eﬀects of the recent economic crisis in the Euro area in
light of historical macroeconomic relationships. The aim is to provide the reader with a broad under-
standing of macroeconomic developments in the Euro area. This objective has been achieved through
a conditional forecast exercise which allowed to predict the path of some European macroeconomic
variables taking into account the developments in the US variables to capture the crisis shock. A large
Bayesian VAR has been estimated up to mid 2007 and the parameters have been used to compute the
conditional forecast up to the end of 2013. The comparison of the actual path of Euro area variables
with their conditional forecast has allowed to evaluate whether the developments of the crisis period
can be considered unusual given the structural macroeconomic relationships and the crisis shock.
The main focus of the analysis is on cross-country heterogeneity. Indeed, the macroeconomic vari-
ables of four Euro-area countries have been considered and two diﬀerent VAR models, a ﬁrst one with
Euro-area aggregate variables and a second one with country-speciﬁc variables, have been estimated.
In both models the conditioning set contains four US variables (GDP, CPI, the Fed funds rate and the
10-year government bond yield) and an oil price index.
The conditional forecast of Euro-area aggregate variables shows that the recessions caused by the
ﬁnancial and sovereign debt crisis are not in line with pre-crisis structural macroeconomic relationship.
More interestingly, actual inﬂation was outside the conditional forecast distribution in 2009 and again
in the last part of 2013 justifying the concerns about the current low level of inﬂation. The 10-year
government bond yields lie instead always in the high-density region of the conditional forecast distri-
bution. The eﬀects of the sovereign debt crisis are visible in the peak of 2-year government bond yields
at the beginning of 2012. The conclusion of this ﬁrst analysis is that something like a structural break
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or an idiosyncratic shock occurred in the Euro-area in the ﬁrst and second phase of the crisis.
The second VAR model considers country-speciﬁc variables in order to study the pattern of hetero-
geneity across the main 4 European economies, namely France, Germany, Italy and Spain. Results show
that heterogeneity is present as country-speciﬁc variables are much less in line with their conditional
forecast. Again the stronger eﬀects of the ﬁnancial and sovereign debt crisis cannot be explained neither
by structural macroeconomic relationships nor by the crisis shock. The most interesting ﬁndings regard
GDP and HICP. GDP is the variable which shows the higher degree of heterogeneity and it is less in
line with its expectations, mainly for Spain. On the other hand, inﬂation shows less heterogeneity up to
2013 conﬁrming the previous ﬁndings but the last values are outside the conditional forecast for France,
Italy and Spain. This means that some measures to foster inﬂation are needed in these countries but
not in Germany and this can be an issue for monetary policy. Results are less clear-cut for government
bond yields. The developments outside the forecast distributions are due to the sovereign debt crisis
and are the ﬂight to quality in German and French yields and the rise in Italian and Spanish yields.
Overall, the eﬀects of the crisis have been much more heterogeneous than what implied by struc-
tural relationships and the crisis shock. Moreover, the conditional forecast of single-countries variables
shows that their evolution is much more less predictable than the one of Euro-area aggregate variables
conﬁrming that either a structural break or a strong idiosyncratic shock aﬀected the Euro area after
2008. Finally, the sovereign debt crisis by itself seems not to be able to explain neither business-cycle
and inﬂation heterogeneity, nor the recent recession and economic slack.
139
CHAPTER 3. Heterogeneity in the Euro Area and the Crisis
Appendix A. Data Description
The BVAR models consider US and Euro-area variables. The models are estimated over the sample
1995-2013 with quarterly data and ﬁve lags as variables are in levels.
US variables comes from Datastream and are:
• GDP growth: the log of real GDP multiplied by 4;
• Inﬂation: the log of CPI multiplied by 4;
• the Fed funds rate.
The oil price index is calculated by the IMF.
Euro-area aggregate variables are:
• GDP growth: the log of real GDP multiplied by 4, real GDP data come from the ECB;
• Inﬂation: the log of HICP multiplied by 4, HICP data come from Datastream;
• 2-year and 10-year government bond yields: data come from Datastream.
Euro-area country-speciﬁc variables are the same for Germany, France, Italy and Spain:
• GDP growth: the log of real GDP multiplied by 4, real GDP data come from the ECB;
• Inﬂation: the log of HICP multiplied by 4, HICP data come from the ECB;
• 2-year and 10-year government bond yields: data come from Datastream.
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Appendix B. Estimation Procedure
This work is based on the estimation of a large Bayesian vector-autoregressive model.
The estimation is possible through the application of Bayesian shrinkage which amounts at increasing
the tightness of the priors as more variables are added, i.e. by using informative priors it is possible to
shrink the highly parametrised VAR model towards a more parsimonious benchmark representation as
explained in Banbura, Giannone, and Reichlin (2010).
The priors are set as in Giannone, Lenza, and Primiceri (2012), i.e. the appropriate amount of
shrinkage is automatically selected by maximizing the posterior distribution of the hyperparameters.
Giannone, Lenza, and Primiceri (2012) apply a Bayesian approach to the choice of the tightness of
priors as they treat hyperparameters as any other unknown parameter and produce inference on them.
In details, the VAR model is conceived as a hierarchical model described by a likelihood function p (y|θ)
and a prior distribution p (θ|γ), where θ is the vector of the model's parameters and γ collects the
hyperparameters. In this setting the hyperparameters can be assigned a hyperprior p (γ) so that their
posterior can be evaluated as follows:
p (γ|y) = p (y|γ) · p (γ) (3.5)
Here p (y|γ) is the marginal likelihood, i.e. the density of the data as a function of the hyperpa-
rameters obtained after integrating out the uncertainty about the model's parameters θ, which can
be decomposed into two terms, one capturing the in-sample ﬁt and the other one penalizing for the
model complexity. As the hyperprior is assumed to be ﬂat, maximizing the posterior simply amounts
at maximizing the marginal likelihood.
Another interesting feature of this approach is that the unconditional prior of the parameters p (θ)
has fatter tails than its component distributions p (θ|γ), i.e. the conditional prior distributions, so that
the posterior is less sensitive to discrepancies between the prior and the likelihood and inference is more
robust.
As regards priors, Giannone, Lenza, and Primiceri (2012) consider a Normal - Inverse-Wishart
distributions and a combination of the Minnesota, sum-of-coeﬃcients and dummy-initial-observation
priors for the VAR coeﬃcients. The characteristics of these priors are brieﬂy described in the following
subsection. The use of this prior distributions on the VAR coeﬃcients allows to take into account
cointegration and unit roots, leading to more robust inference.
In general, this approach allows to obtain very accurate out-of-sample forecasts and impulse-response
functions.
The posterior distributions of the model's parameters θ is derived by applying the MCMC algorithm
3.1 which features a Metropolis step to draw the vector of hyperparameters and a Gibbs sampler step
to draw the parameters.
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Algorithm 3.1 MCMC algorithm for the posterior of θ from Giannone, Lenza, and Primiceri (2012)
1. The hyperparameters γ are initialized at their posterior mode by maximizing the marginal likeli-
hood.
2. Draw a candidate value of the hyperparameters γ∗ from a Normal distribution with mean γ(j−1)
and variance c ·W where γ(j−1) is the previous draw of γ, W is the inverse Hessian of the negative
of the log-posterior of the hyperparameters at the peak, and c is a scaling constant calibrated to
obtain an acceptance rate of approximately 20%.
3. Set
γ(j) =
{
γ∗ with probability α
γ(j−1) with probability (1− α)
where the acceptance probability is the ratio between the value posterior distribution in the
candidate point and the value of the posterior in the previous step of the chain:
α(j) = min
{
1,
p (γ∗|y)
p
(
γ(j−1)|y)
}
4. Draw the parameters of the model θ(j) =
[
β(j),Σ(j)
]
from their conditional posterior distribution
p
(
β,Σ|y, γ(j)) which is Normal - Inverse-Wishart.
5. Increment j to j + 1 and go to 2.
Priors
One of the main issues in dealing with VAR models is the overﬁtting problem, i.e. the fact that the
number of parameters to be estimated is much higher than the number of data in the sample. In a model
with n endogenous variables, p lags and d exogenous variables, the number of parameters to estimate is
n (np+ d) and this quantity grows geometrically with the number of variables n and proportionally with
the number of lags p. Actually, in macroeconomics, the available time series include not many data, and
then the estimation process will yield distorted estimates. In practice, this turns into estimates that are
not signiﬁcant but with a high value of the R2.
Various solutions to the overﬁtting problem have been proposed and they all amount at putting prior
constraints on the value of the model's parameters. Prior restrictions can be exact, i.e. some coeﬃcients
are pre-set to zero, or inexact, i.e. the uncertainty on the real value of the parameter is described by a
prior distribution. This last case falls into the Bayesian approach to estimate VARs and the resulting
issue is how to determine the parameters of the prior distributions.
Giannone, Lenza, and Primiceri (2012) use the following Normal - Inverse-Wishart priors for the
model's parameters:
Σ ∼ IW (Ψ, d) (3.6)
β|Σ ∼ N (b,Σ⊗ Ω) (3.7)
Here Σ is the variance-covariance matrix of the residuals and β is the coeﬃcients vector and the
hyperparameters Ψ, d, b, and Ω are functions of the lower-dimensional vector of hyperparameters γ.
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As for Σ, the degrees of freedom are set to be d = n + 2 5 and the scale matrix Ψ is assumed to
be diagonal with an n × 1 vector ψ on the main diagonal. Here ψ is an hyperparameter so that its
value comes from the maximization of its posterior. On the other hand, the conditional prior for β
is a combination of a Minnesota, sum-of-coeﬃcients and dummy-initial-observation priors, which are
described in the following subsections.
Minnesota Prior
The Minnesota prior has been introduced by Litterman (1980, 1986) so as to capture three statistical
regularities of the macroeconomic time series:
• the existence of a trend;
• the fact that more recent lags of the variables contain more information on the recent value of the
series than past values;
• the fact that the lags of a given variable contain more information on its current state than past
values of other variables.
If these statistical regularities are applied, a VAR model becomes a multivariate random walk. Each
coeﬃcient is then assumed to be an independent, normally distributed random variable.
These features can be described by setting hyperparameters so that:
• the mean of the coeﬃcients of the ﬁrst lag of every variable is equal to one;
• the mean of the coeﬃcients of all other lags is equal to zero;
• the variance of the coeﬃcients depends inversely on the number of lags;
• the variance of the coeﬃcient of variable j in equation g is lower than those of variable g.
The last two points derive from the concept that assigning a prior with higher variance implies giving
more importance to data.
In practice, this set of restrictions can be modelled through a vector of hyperparameters Λ ≡
(λ1, . . . , λh) and each hyperparameter is assigned the task to describe a speciﬁc aspect of the model. A
possible speciﬁcation is the following:
• λ1 controls the value of the mean of the ﬁrst lag of every variable and it is set equal to 1;
• λ2 controls the variance of the lags of variable g in equation g;
• λ3 controls the variance of the lags of variable j in equation g;
• λ4 controls the speed of decrease of the variance as the number of lags increase;
• λ5 controls the variance of the exogenous part;
• λ0 controls the overall degree of prior uncertainty.
5This is the minimum value that guarantees to have a ﬁnite mean.
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So, in this situation, the original estimation problem of n (np+ d) parameters has been converted into
a problem of estimating six hyperparameters.
These hyperparameters determines the mean and the variance of the coeﬃcients' distribution.
The mean vector of the VAR coeﬃcients in equation i is β∗i = (0, . . . , 0, λ1, 0, . . . , 0) where λ1 is in
the ith position and their standard deviations are:
Vi =

λ0λ2
lλ4
for the ith lagged endogenous variable,(
λ0λ3
lλ4
) (
σii
σjj
)
for the jth lagged endogenous variable,
λ0λ5σii for deterministic and exogenous variables.
Here l = 1, . . . , p denotes the number of lags and (σii/σjj) is the scale parameter.
The Minnesota prior implies that the limiting form of each VAR equation is a random walk with
drift.
Under a strict interpretation of the Minnesota prior, the variance-covariance matrix of the error
term is diagonal with σii determined from data. This simpliﬁes the estimation problem because it is
not necessary to specify how the prior distribution of the errors' variance-covariance matrix is related
to the prior distribution of the coeﬃcients.
For this reason Giannone, Lenza, and Primiceri (2012) used it in the context of a Normal-Inverse-
Wishart distribution so that its ﬁrst and second moments are:
E
[
(Bl)ij |Σ
]
=
1 if i = j and l = 10 otherwise
Cov
[
(Bl)ij , (Bk)hm |Σ
]
=
λ20 1l2 Σihψj/(d−n−1) if m = j and k = l0 otherwise
Here the indeces l and k refer to lags, i and h refer to equations and j and m refer to variables. The
interpretation is therefore that the coeﬃcients of the same variable and lag in diﬀerent equations are
allowed to be correlated and the variance is lower for the coeﬃcients associated with more distant lag,
due to the term 1l2 , so to shrink their mean to zero.
A shortcoming of the classical Minnesota prior is that it does not allow for unit roots and cointe-
gration which are common features of macroeconomic time series. In order to account for unit roots
and cointegration, the Minnesota prior is combined with the sum-of-coeﬃcients prior and the dummy-
initial-observation prior.
Sum-of-coeﬃcients prior
The sum-of-coeﬃcients prior has been proposed by Doan, Litterman, and Sims (1984) to account for
unit roots and cointegration. This prior is implemented augmenting the dataset with some dummy
observations on top of the data matrices. In particular, the artiﬁcial observations are n, one for each
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variable, and have the following structure:
y+ = diag
(
y¯0
µ
)
x+ =
[
0, y+, . . . , y+
]
Here y¯0 is an n × 1 vector containing the average of the ﬁrst p observations of each variable. The
matrix y+ has dimension n×n while the matrix x+ has dimension n× (1 + np). The hyperparameter µ
controls the variance of this prior. Inference is produced using the Theil and Goldberger (1961) mixed
estimation.
The prior implied by this dummy observations is centered at 1 for the sum of coeﬃcients on own
lags for each variable and 0 on other variables' lags. Furthermore, it introduces correlation between
the coeﬃcients on each variable in each equation. This prior states that a no-change forecast is a good
forecast at the beginning of the sample. The limiting case in which µ = 0 implies the presence of a unit
root in each equation ruling out cointegration.
Dummy-initial-observation prior
The dummy-initial-observation prior has been introduced by Sims (1993) and it accounts for cointegra-
tion. It is implemented by adding the following artiﬁcial observations on top of the data matrices:
y++ =
y¯′0
δ
x++ =
[
1
δ
, y++, . . . , y++
]
Here y¯′0 is an 1 × n vector containing the average of the ﬁrst p observations of each variable. The
matrix y++ has dimension 1×n while the matrix x++ has dimension 1× (1 + np). The hyperparameter
δ controls the variance of the prior. This prior introduces correlation between all coeﬃcients in each
equation and it states that a no-change forecast for all variables is a good forecast at the beginning of
the sample.
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